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About the cover 
The cover image of this book 
contains an invitation and a 
warning. It prompts us to 
remember that our entire 
civilisation is grounded in the 
global evolution of life over 
immense periods of time. Yet, as 
the dominant life form, we tend 
to forget our profound debt to 
natural process and our role as 
caring stewards. High-tech 
culture can be deceptive. It can 
appear all-powerful, but this 
transitory moment on the 
surface of deep time hides our 
debt to, and continuing 
dependence on, natural 
process. So, as digital technologies driven ever deeper into human 
society by the rich and powerful accelerate the disruption of global 
systems, we might be reminiscent that there’s always a price to pay 
for carelessness. 
This book reminds us that what matters most in this critical 
digital era is not the power and reach of advanced technologies but 
the core values that guide our use of them. The 400-million-year-old 
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This book has been a team project from the outset. It emerged 
from conversations between myself and Luke van der Laan over 
an extended period of time. Following an invitation to join the 
Professional Studies team at the University of Southern 
Queensland, it seemed a natural step to draw together the threads 
of a project I’d commenced back in 2017. That was when I’d started 
looking more closely at what appeared to be increasingly 
problematic features of what was loosely called ‘the IT revolution.’ 
Far from helping to create a world of democratic enlightenment 
and human flourishing it appeared to be heading elsewhere. All the 
way, in fact, toward the kind of high-tech Dystopia foreshadowed, 
and repeatedly warned against, in hard science fiction, futures 
studies and a few other relevant fields. This, however, could neither 
be dismissed as fiction nor mere ‘speculation’. It is occurring before 
our eyes right here, right now, with dramatic real-world 
consequences. Despite the emergence of many superficially 
compelling new devices and options, IT systems appear bereft of 
the idealism shown by the early pioneers. Now they appear set 
on undermining democracy, eliminating privacy and destroying 
human autonomy on a global scale. 
To embrace the concerns of this more critical perspective a 
decision was made within the Professional Studies program to 
support the project and produce this book.  Sincere thanks are 
therefore due to Luke for undertaking the hard work involved in 
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bringing it to life. Working closely with him at every stage has 
been a genuine pleasure. Further thanks are due to the incredibly 
positive response and hard work of Nikki Andersen (copy editing 
and production), Sophia Imran (copy editing), Samara Hoffmann 
(graphics) and Tara Mann (graphics). Tara took up an early idea 
for the cover and produced a stunningly simple but very effective 
design that contrasts deep time with current technology. It is sure 
to provoke reflection and raise questions – as intended at the 
outset. I also want to thank Adrian Stagg, Tahnee Pearse and Alex 
Charchar for the institutional support they provided.  Finally, I’m 
indebted to my wife, Laurie, who has patiently put up with far 
too many details of this and related projects, let alone my 
all-too-frequent rants and ruminations about IT and world issues. 
I hope that readers coming fresh to this material will gain a new 
appreciation for two suggestions contained herein. One, that the 
current uses and abuses of IT systems fall far short in human and 
cultural terms of what we have every right to expect. Second, to 
realise that help is indeed on the way. The seeds of constructive 
change are emerging in many places. To begin the process of 
‘deleting dystopia’ they only need to be nourished and applied. 






Arthur C. Clarke’s 2001: A Space Odyssey written in 1968 probes 
the perils and benefits of technological advancement. In particular, 
Clarke vividly raises questions as they relate to human interactions 
with computers and artificial intelligence. It is not a one-sided 
account of science fictional writing. The benefits of digital 
technology are abundantly displayed in the book as it (technology) 
enables humanity to explore the depths of outer space in an 
attempt to solve civilisational problems. But, there is a dark side. 
Fast forward from Clarke anticipating the complexities of 
technological advancement to the reality of the dawning of the 21st 
century. He may not have anticipated the size (hand-held devices), 
popularity, processing power and reach (internet of things) of 
digital technologies but A Space Odyssey does describe likely 
troubles and consequences associated with them. 
Since the earliest recorded history (and likely before), human 
characteristics and abilities, and earth’s natural resources have 
been commercialised and monetised. To some extent these have 
been regulated but unrestrained exploitation has always been a 
standout feature. There have always been winners and losers when 
it comes to this form of exploitation with nature and the majority of 
people consistently amongst the ‘losers’. 
It is now clear that the monetisation of individual data and its 
exploitation is in the hands of powerful people who control digital 
oligarchies. The apparent abuse of this power and reach into the 
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everyday lives of humans, through collecting and commercialising 
personal data, represents a threat to humanity that has become 
increasingly prominent since Clarke’s seminal work. These signals 
have ‘hidden in plain sight’ for all to see. We have seen them in 
non-fictional media, art, the news, dystopian fiction (books and 
movies), via the stock exchanges and increasingly in the political 
discourse of governments. 
Shoshana Zuboff’s The Age of Surveillance Capitalism clearly 
provides new insights into the nature of commercialising human 
data through digital surveillance. She points out that a business 
model has emerged that now includes the exploitation of “human 
experience as a free raw material” that is being increasingly traded. 
Many have suggested that A Space Odyssey’s HAL (Heuristically 
programmed ALgorithmic computer) reflects the liberal economic 
notion that ‘bigger is better’ and to some extent is mirrored in 
the unabated growth of this ‘new business model’. Combined with 
the popular notion that humanity should aim to mimic the human 
brain, we increasingly face a decline in human privacy and 
autonomy. Yet despite clear signals of these impending perils, the 
unrestrained use of individual data and the quest for developing 
non-human ‘intelligence’ continues unabated. Since these 
technologies are not yet fully understood and poorly regulated, 
they are difficult to control, resulting in a threat to human rights 
and the future of humanity. 
Dystopian accounts of the occurrence of the threats posed by 
the oligarchies, unrestrained development of technologies and the 
‘dumbing down’ of humanity by computers, feature in both fictional 
and non-fictional works. Irrespective of their accuracy, new 
evidence continues to emerge that humanity is on a trajectory 
whereby it represents an existential threat. Transhumanist and 
corporate interests appear to knowingly continue to navigate this 
path. A path that is not representative of the world’s citizens. 
A perspective that may reflect this power dynamic is offered 
by Michele Foucalt who suggests that the more useful humans 
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become, the more obedient they have to become. The purpose 
of maintaining this obedience is not only to continue exploiting 
the human skills and characteristics for financial gain but also to 
prevent the same from being used to revolt against this power. 
Parallels can be drawn between this view of power and the course 
of surveillance capitalism. Both imply that a level of obedience or at 
least apathy is needed to maintain current influence. 
Richard Slaughter and the likes of Shoshana Zuboff validate the 
concerns of citizens and civil society in seeking to test and restrain 
the boundaries of potentially harmful technologies. This book 
reflects those concerns. Moreover, these human-centered insights 
and the ability to anticipate harm are starting to have meaningful 
results. And so, instead of global apathy in the face of the power 
imbalance the means to “delete dystopia” are appearing. Deleting 
Dystopia confirms that the threat is real and offers grounds for 
lasting solutions. 
In its commitment to access and knowledge equity in the pursuit 
of human providence and rights, the University of Southern 
Queensland is proud to publish this book in collaboration with 
Richard Slaughter. It is a privilege and an honour to be associated 
with his long and highly impactful work over the last five decades. 
Together with his Biggest Wake-up Call in History (2010) he has now 
clearly described the greatest threats to humanity and the planet 
in the in the 21st century, along with a wide array of responses and 
possible solutions. 
The Professional Studies research programs at the University 
of Southern Queensland are concerned with pragmatic 
evidence-based responses to everyday, social and existential 
problems. Of the over one hundred research projects at any time, 
all are concerned with addressing the problems faced by society 
and individuals. This book helps illustrate the impact of our 
research and frame a futures perspective to ensure that our 
research remains relevant over time. Further, the programs are 
absolutely committed to open access to, equity and participation 
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in knowledge and education. As such, supporting the publication 
of this book as an open access resource made complete sense. 
Sharing the knowledge, perils and solutions mentioned in the book 
is indeed a privilege. 
Luke van der Laan 







By embedding its values and goals into concrete technologies, capital 
seeks to assert dominion over the future – constraining what type 
of social change is viable. This makes techno-politics a natural 
battleground for staging struggles over what utopias are imagined and 
whose utopia is materialised (Sadowski, 2021). 
This book presents a critical analysis of the IT revolution in the 
early 21st Century. In so doing, it seeks to account for the way that 
innovations initially regarded by early pioneers as liberating and 
helpful have become absorbed into an oppressive global system. 
A system that appears more dangerous and invasive with each 
passing year. It’s not a particularly easy call since this is a huge 
subject. Moreover, many of the services that the system provides 
appear, on the surface, to meet authentic human needs. We tend 
to forget that in order to make each and every device appear 
desirable, every item of consumer hardware (smart phones, 
tablets, screens and related devices) has been subjected to 
purposeful design and testing. The whole effort is backed by 
pervasive high-end marketing that has, over several decades, 
sought to construct entire populations as passive consumers. Not, 
it should be noted, as autonomous beings, meaning-makers, who 
deserve be seen and respected as such. 
It follows that, in order to understand what is at stake, we need 
to confront the rationales and practices that create such radically 
diminished and reductive views of human life. The point here is 
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not that the products of this revolution are not useful. Clearly, 
they are and may well continue to be. But the current ‘terms of 
engagement’ are unacceptable both in principle and in practice. 
What is clearly at stake are the growing costs, dependencies and 
long-term hazards that have crept up on entire populations almost 
unawares. These are, however, no ‘ordinary’ hazards since, even in 
the present, relatively early stages, the tendency toward unliveable 
dystopian futures is becoming unavoidable. Thus, to confront and 
‘delete’ dystopia is not merely a question of prudence. It constitutes 
a vital series of time-critical investments in the futures of our 
grandchildren and of future generations. 
There’s something distinctly odd, or ambiguous, about this story. 
The systems and devices that we’ve become so dependent upon 
only reveal very limited aspects of themselves to human senses 
in the context of our everyday lives. It can be a shock to realise 
that a vast slice of reality, known only to a few, controlled by fewer 
still, holds us in an invisible grasp, directs our actions and, in the 
process, by-passes our conscious senses and undermines our 
critical judgement. To deal with this ‘other world’ of hidden codes, 
distant servers, cloud repositories, hidden power structures, 
obscure algorithms and the like, we need to become conscious 
of them and how they operate. That is a primary purpose of this 
book. In this connection, some readers may recall the Matrix film 
trilogy. It drew on similar concerns by depicting stark, and at times 
shocking, contrasts between the awesome power of these hidden 
entities and the diminished status of humanity. In effect it provided 
a kind of fictional ‘master class’ that showed why these hidden 
structures and processes needed to be revealed. Without that 
knowledge, that clarity of understanding, we remain beholden to 
forces we can neither see nor hope to understand. With it we take 
the first steps toward reclaiming our dignity, re-asserting human 
needs and replacing redundant values with consciously adopted 
ones that make greater sense in our fragmented and imperilled 
world. 
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A secondary purpose of the book is to foreground the work 
of others who have also considered these issues in some depth. 
Chapter one ‘Starting points and emerging issues‘ picks up the 
story from the viewpoint of various qualified observers during the 
early 2010s. It is a useful place to begin since this is when serious 
concerns about ‘where the IT revolution was going’ began to arise 
and underlying issues were beginning to emerge. Many ideas were 
generated that served to prime and inform subsequent debates. 
Chapter two ‘Case studies and implications‘ considers three distinct 
issues that have attracted significant critical attention: the ‘Internet 
of Things;’ the prospect of ‘driverless’ cars; and growing concerns 
about what exactly was going on inside the slick but isolated world 
of Silicon Valley. It’s in the latter connection that we first encounter 
Shoshana Zuboff who has probably done more than anyone else to 
reveal what surveillance capitalism is and how it operates. Her early 
critique of what she called ‘the big other’ pre-dates her impressive 
book on this subject by several years. Yet even at that stage, it 
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helped to register a new stream of informed insight and enhanced 
clarity that fed into her master work (considered in Part four). 
Since language is part of her gift, and one of the keys to in depth 
understanding, a glossary of key terms is included in the 
Appendices. 
In chapter three the focus shifts toward several broadly defined 
areas that serve to frame possible solutions. Since the notion of 
‘compulsive innovation’ is relevant to the whole project the first 
section takes a critical look at some of the existing and possible 
future expressions of this impulse. The following sections consider 
the grounds of various possible solutions under a variety of 
headings and conclude with a brief review of values and moral 
development. Far from being obscure esoteric matters, these 
topics reflect a further theme of the book. Namely that while 
science and technology are often assumed to be neutral, this is 
merely a convenient – and problematic – fiction. Both science and 
technology reflect aspects of the society (values, institutions, 
regulatory regimes, culture etc.) in which they occur. It follows that 
current usages of digital technologies tend to be misleading and 
diversionary. The term ‘technology’ cannot merely be applied to a 
limited set of physical objects but need to include the networks 
and wider human / social / cultural / environmental contexts in 
which they are embedded. For these and many other reasons, 
new technologies cannot but exhibit a range of unforeseen and 
unintended side effects. As such they need to be considered 
ambiguous from the outset and subjected to intense 
broad-spectrum evaluation. While the ‘tunnel vision’ of powerful 
actors allow them to ignore such inconvenient facts, the wider 
consequences of ‘rushing’ such innovations to market can be, and 
are, severe. 
Towards the end, the book draws on the foregoing to propose 
a way of understanding our real-world situation. The aim is to 
clarify some of the ways in which the current system exerts its 
power and influence over whole societies, to their present and 
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long-term detriment. Four ‘witnesses to the revolution’ are then 
introduced. These are people who, in one way or another have had 
relevant experience of some of the core issues. They have, so to 
speak, ‘done their homework,’ so their accounts are both recent 
and reliable. It’s all-but certain that they’ve worked independently. 
Taken together, they provide a coherent overview of the current 
state of play. They are telling us that while the age of traditional 
utopias may be over, the outlines of technological dystopia are 
already taking shape around us. The final section of the book draws 
a number of conclusions. It recognises useful work already being 
carried out and suggests broadly a two-pronged response to the 
present over-dominance of ‘Big Tech.’ On the one hand, a firm 
and steady continuation by governments of their efforts to enforce 
various forms of regulation (privacy, tax reform and anti-trust 
measures). On the other, significantly increased support for civil 
society, ‘sharing cities,’ community start-ups and the like. Both 
multi-initiatives are required to take market share away from the 
oligarchs by creating equivalent or improved services based not on 
the familiar capitalist imperatives of profit and exploitation but on 
defensible, clearly articulated human and community values. This 
is urgent work in its own right. But even more so in light of other 
existential threats facing humankind. 
It’s time for the power and influence of the oligarchs, if not to 
be removed entirely from history, but at least to be significantly 
diminished and replaced by carefully designed and implemented 
democratic alternatives. 
Richard Slaughter 
Foresight International, Brisbane, March 2021 
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Timeline of events in tech history 
Scroll through the timeline below to discover key events in tech 
history. 
An interactive H5P element has been excluded from this version of the text. You 









Starting points and emerging 
issues 
Mass surveillance is fundamental threat to human rights says 
European report (Harding, 2015). 
 We are moving into an era when ‘smart’ machines will have more 
and more influence on our lives (but) the moral economy of machines 
is not subject to oversight in the way that human bureaucracies are
(Penny, 2017). 
Headlines such as those above demonstrate as well as any that 
the IT revolution brings with it a series of challenges that societies 
are ill prepared to face. While surprisingly large numbers of people 
unthinkingly renounce such of their privacy as remains for trifles, 
the idealistic hopes of early pioneers and freedom-loving ‘netizens’ 
remain largely unfulfilled. Benign notions such as ‘cyber 
democracy’ and the ‘information superhighway’ have all but 
disappeared, replaced by a growing sense of uncertainty, 
disillusion and fear of unknown consequences. For many the digital 
realm has become an elusive and obscure ‘nowhere place’ whose 
shadowy operations lie beyond the boundaries of human 
perception. A few vast corporations, and those with privileged 
access to their services, appear to have almost unlimited influence 
both for good and for ill. To capture attention and encourage wide 
immediate usage it’s the presumed utility of emerging technologies 
that’s highlighted rather than the radical ambiguity that attends 
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their longer-term use. The implications of this ambiguity need to 
be more thoroughly understood if positive measures to reduce or 
eliminate its negative consequences are to be undertaken. 
Those driving the IT revolution claim new benefits and highlight 
examples of successful implementation – email, tablets, health 
innovations and so on. Yet, despite such obvious successes, many 
IT practices are powerfully disposed in favour of the interests of 
agencies, corporations, innovators and entrepreneurs, with little 
evidence that these actors are motivated by positive values that 
promote public interest. So concerns that the overall effect of the 
IT revolution could herald the onset of a humanly oppressive 
technological dystopia remain remarkably durable – if not always 
spelled out in detail (Harari, 2015). Consequently no amount of 
saturation marketing will cancel out the ‘dark’ side of the IT 
revolution or allow it to be wished out of existence. The collective 
subconscious has access to truths, archetypes, dimensions of 
reality, denied to, and by, high-tech gurus (Slaughter, 2012, 2015a). 
It knows, for example, that intangible entities can reach out and 
destroy centrifuges in a distant country, disrupt civil infrastructure, 
undermine organised life across the globe. It knows that private 
bank accounts can be drained before their owners realise what has 
happened. It also knows that women are attacked and sometimes 
killed by former partners who’ve tracked their movements, their 
conversations, using smart phones and social media. Which leaves 
out a host of phishing attempts, scams, identity theft and other 
on-line abuses (Glenny 2011; Williams, 2015). 
This enquiry first seeks to account for the underlying polarity 
outlined above between the promoters of high-tech ‘solutions’ and 
those who view the onset of the IT revolution from a more critical 
perspective.  Since the literature is huge and growing it draws on 
an indicative sample of literature including informed (or ‘quality’) 
journalism produced over the last decade or so. It begins by 
outlining key assumptions (including that technology is ‘not merely 
stuff” and ‘new technologies are ambiguous’). It provides a critical 
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review of several key works and identifies some emerging themes. 
It then provides a critique of three case studies: the Internet of 
Things (IoT), autonomous vehicles (AV) and the Silicon Valley itself. 
It draws on Integral futures methods to provide a brief account 
of some internal aspects of the Internet giants. It finally concludes 
that a variety of actions, decisions and policies are needed to 
reduce high-tech ambiguity and expand social equity. Such 
‘conclusions’ should be regarded as starting points for further 
enquiry. Turning the IT revolution toward more productive and 
egalitarian ends will require dedicated social efforts that are 
sustained over the longer term. 
KEY ASSUMPTIONS 
1 – Technology: not merely ‘stuff’ 
A key insight that emerges from STS (Science, Technology and 
Society) perspectives is that we should not think, speak or refer 
to ‘technology’ as if it were merely an array of physical (or digital) 
objects. While it is the material existence of technologies that 
present themselves to our most obvious and external senses, 
linear and external views reify what ‘technology’ actually is – a 
consequence of the interaction of long-term social, cultural and 
economic processes. Hence, many of the most significant 
characteristics of any particular technology are effectively invisible 
– both to the naked eye and the credulous mind. These 
characteristics are not visible in the ‘things’ (or software) that are 
displayed before us but hidden in the patterns inherent in the 
causative relationships that brought them into being and maintain 
them over time. Anything of value about ‘the IT revolution’ or ‘the 
Internet’ suggests a need to consider particular items, or suites of 
technology, in relation to their wider contexts. That’s where the 
fun begins because as soon as you look ‘beneath the surface’ of 
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social reality you find powerfully contested dynamics just about 
everywhere. 
2 – New technologies are ambiguous yet warnings and costs 
are ignored 
An underlying fact that’s often overlooked is that new technologies 
are, on the whole, seldom actively sought by anyone representing an 
existing public interest. Rather, ‘demand’ is manufactured and 
propagated by powerful organisations through pervasive and 
relentless marketing across all available media by sheer financial 
and economic power. One is reminded of the aphorism credited to 
Donella Meadows that you don’t have to spend millions of dollars 
advertising something unless its worth is in doubt. Few stand back 
to question the fact that the corporations assume that they know 
what’s best for everyone. Yet technical developments have always 
created ‘winners’ and ‘losers.’ So new technologies are often 
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fundamentally ambiguous in the early stages or until sufficient 
time has passed for social experience to accumulate. While they 
are often introduced with showy fanfares enumerating supposed 
benefits, there are always hidden dangers and costs. For example, 
the ubiquitous rise of GPS devices has led to a marked decline 
in people’s own ability to navigate. Again, commonly used ‘phone 
numbers once memorised are now merely a click away and the 
memory fades. Most parents understand how technology alters 
things as basic as child rearing as they struggle to mediate between 
their children and the increasingly enticing attractions of ‘screen 
time.’ Then there are the ‘lonely hearts’ looking for love on the 
Internet and ending up seriously out of pocket or worse. 
The following section provides a small but indicative sample of 
work on aspects of the IT revolution that was produced over the 
last decade or so. While superseded in some respects by later 
works (considered here below) they indicate the beginnings of an 
evolving response to careless high-tech innovation. As such they 
provide a ‘way in’ to this vast domain and a foundation from which 
more influential accounts would grow. 
EARLIER VIEWS OF THE IT REVOLUTION 
Big data, small vision 
Mayer-Schonberger and Cukier’s book Big Data 
(Mayer-Schonberger & Cukier, 2013), is sub-titled ‘A revolution that 
will transform how we live, work and think.’ Ironically, the 
associated threats appeared to escape them entirely. The bulk of 
the book was devoted to arguing how ‘big data’ provides new 
insights into many otherwise elusive phenomena and in so doing 
creates new sources of value. The authors ignored some key 
assumptions (for example that the emergence of IT can be equated 
with the ‘end of theory’) and concentrated exclusively on positive 
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uses of big data. These include the ability to predict the emergence 
of epidemics and the prevention of aircraft breakdowns due to real 
time engine monitoring. 
But what they consistently failed to do was to separate what they 
considered to be ‘good for business’ from what may or may not be 
good for everyone else. Hence, the underlying theme, perhaps, can 
be summarised as ‘jump aboard or be left behind.’ While limited 
acknowledgements were made of how previous long-standing 
occupations and professions had been undermined by 
technological changes, the wider costs were overlooked. A brief 
section outlined strategies to minimise technology related risks, 
but no attention was given to evaluating the culture and worldview 
from which these technological changes originate. Nor was there 
any attempt to consider or evaluate their future implications. 
Rather these powerful background factors were taken as given 
and hence remained invisible throughout. As such the book 
demonstrated a familiar preoccupation with how ‘technology’ will 
help us to ‘create the future’ along with a strong sense of blinkered 
optimism. 
Reform and renewal 
Taylor’s The People’s Platform (Taylor, 2014) felt like a breath of fresh 
air in a difficult and often demanding IT debate – one that is often 
obscured by the overwhelming self-interest of some of the most 
powerful entities in the world. With the subtitle ‘taking back power 
and culture in the digital age’ the reader recognises at the outset 
that this will not be another banal enumeration of the purported 
‘wonders of IT.’ For the author, the mantra of ‘open markets’ is far 
from an unalloyed ‘good’ because ‘the more open people’s lives 
are, the more easily they can be tracked and exploited by private 
interests’ (Taylor, 2014, p.23). At the outset she clearly 
acknowledges the way conventional discourse about IT is framed. 
It ‘tends to make technology too central, granting agency to tools 
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while sidestepping’ larger social structures (Taylor, 2014, p. 6). She 
adds that ‘technology alone cannot deliver cultural transformation’. 
Rather, we must address the underlying social and economic forces 
(Taylor, 2014, pp. 9-10).  The issues could not be put more plainly 
than that. The language and intent here also echo those of the STS 
discourse mentioned above. Grounded approaches that explore 
the IT revolution’s social and ecological implications certainly lie 
outside the realm of every day knowledge, but they are essential 
for ‘clearing the fog’ and making sense of what is happening around 
us. 
Later she points out how, far from promoting competition, 
high-tech monopolies prosper online sanctioning a new kind of 
‘vertical integration’ and power over people (Taylor, 2014). A major 
challenge in her view is that the more user-friendly digital devices 
are, the more we are connected to machines that ‘keep tabs on our 
activities’ (Taylor, 2014, p. 32).  One of the most striking conclusions 
is that the future currently being fashioned, far from being 
innovative and ‘new,’ is in fact deeply conservative, even regressive. 
That is, it ‘perpetuates and expands upon the defects of the earlier 
system instead of forging a new path’ (Taylor, 2014, p. 34). The 
analogy to this conclusion is reflected in modern day advertising. 
During earlier times advertising was little more than a kind of visual 
adjunct to shopping that simply drew attention to what was for 
sale. A century or so later it has become a vastly inflated, 
turbo-charged public nuisance. It not only embodies crass and 
indefensible conceptions of human life (‘shop ‘til you drop’) but 
also imposes incalculable costs on individuals, societies, cultures 
and the environment in part through misdirecting them wholesale 
and undermining useful, i.e. less self-focused values. It becomes 
increasingly vital to contest the power of what Taylor (2014, p. 
78) calls ‘the overlords of monopoly journalism’ and the ways that 
they’ve become ‘disconnected from the communities they were 
supposed to serve’. 
As suggested above, new technologies don’t emerge in a cultural 
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vacuum without a host of wider influences. It follows that, ‘if we 
want to see the fruits of technological innovation widely shared, 
it will require conscious effort and political struggle’ (Taylor, 2014, 
p. 54). What is also refreshing here is that the author is under no 
illusion that the main beneficiaries of IT innovations have indeed 
been US corporations. Given the worldview these share, it’s obvious 
that limits need to be applied to their activities and their growth. 
During previous years a great deal was written and said about 
the rise and rise of online ‘social networks’. But, at that time, few 
examined the ways that they quietly ‘shuffle hierarchies’ and 
produce ‘new mechanisms of exclusion’ (Taylor, 2014, p. 108). Such 
media, it turned out, are by no means immune to what has been 
called the ‘iron law of oligarchy.’ It has ‘a surprising degree of 
inequality built into its very architecture’ (Taylor, 2014, p. 121). 
Again ‘the topology of our cultural landscape has long been twisted 
by an ever-shrinking number of corporations’ (Taylor, 2014, p. 129). 
She adds that ‘powerful hierarchies have come to define the 
medium,’ (Taylor, 2014). Moreover ‘online spaces are… designed 
to serve Silicon Valley venture capitalists…and advertisers (Taylor, 
2014, p. 139). The smoothness and ease of use of the technology 
belies an appalling ‘structural greed’ such that ‘the cultural 
commons have become little more than a radically discounted 
shopping mall (Taylor, 2014, p. 166). 
Some of the solutions – or at least necessities for creating 
positive change – that emerge from Taylor’s (2014) well-founded 
critique include the following: 
 
• The need for new social protocols that include ‘ethical 
guidelines for engagement and exchange, restrictions on 
privatising and freeloading, fair compensation and the 
fostering of an ethos of stewardship. 
• An explicit recognition of the need to acknowledge the 
people and resources of all kinds upon which IT systems 
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rest. These include, rare minerals, mines, data centres, 
toxic waste, low paid factory workers and the growing 
mountains of e-waste that turn up in poor countries. 
• A serious attempt to define just how IT systems could be 
re-designed to better serve the public and also ensure 
that they are sustainable. 
• A strategy to withdraw from the current practice of 
commodifying and monetising the attention of IT users 
and expropriating their personal information for profit. 
That is ending ‘a new form of discrimination’ where 
companies use data without your permission, ‘dictating 
what you are exposed to and on what terms’ (Taylor, 
2014, p. 191). 
• Defining and enacting new national policies to rein in the 
worst excesses of the IT industry and, at the same time, 
protect people and cultural spaces where creativity, art 
and innovation occur for non-instrumental purposes. 
• Reducing the colossal amount of resources expended on 
advertising (over US$700 billion a year in the US alone) 
which is something that has virtually no social value and 
that most people despise. 
As a way of bringing these ideas together, Taylor (2014, p. 215) 
proposes a ‘manifesto for a sustainable culture’; one in which ‘new 
and old media are not separate provinces but part of a hybrid 
cultural ecosystem that includes the tradition and digital 
composites of the two’. In her view such a culture will possibly 
include the following features. 
 
• It will balance a preoccupation with ‘nowness’ with 
encouragements to think long term. As such it will include 
building archives ‘to allow people to explore their cultural 
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heritage for years to come.’ 
• It will ‘harness new communications tools to shift the 
conversation from ‘free’ culture to ‘fair’ culture. 
• It will re-draw the boundaries for subsidies that currently 
go to the powerful and make them more widely available 
for genuine useful civic purposes. 
• Current Internet oligarchs will give way to new civic 
organisations such as a ‘digital public library.’ The former 
would, at the same time, be required to pay their fair 
share of tax. 
• Service providers and popular IT platforms will be 
regulated as public utilities. As part of this new ‘firewalls’ 
would be created to separate those entities that create
information from those that transport it. In other words, 
the ‘vertical integration’ of the oligarchs would be reduced 
and eliminated over time. 
• Similarly, meaningful government oversight of digital 
media will be re-established. 
• New investment in non-commercial enterprises will be 
evaluated and encouraged. 
• Overall, art, culture and commerce will be freed from 
being monetised, commodified and relentlessly exploited 
These are clearly the kinds of suggestions that could in some places 
generate familiar accusations of ‘Socialism’ and the like. Yet without 
taking such proposals seriously it is difficult to imagine how the 
present trajectory of global civilisation catastrophe can be turned 
around. 
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THE DARK SIDE 
Thus far we’ve considered sources dealing with some of the social 
and commercial uses or misuses of advanced IT. But there’s an 
even darker and yet more challenging side to this story – the 
military and criminal uses of IT. The questions they pose are of 
the utmost significance to humanity and its possible futures but 
too few appear willing or able to grapple with the issues, let alone 
provide satisfying answers. Given the secrecy and obscurity that 
characterises the area, reliable sources are few and far between. 
An exception is Misha Glenny’s 2009 book McMafia (Glenny, 2009) 
which provides a detailed overview of organised crime around the 
world. The book illustrates how the advent of the Internet was a 
boon for criminals since it made their activities easier and that 
of governments and other civil authorities harder. That’s because 
the Internet provides an ever-growing number of ways to hide, 
launder money and pursue a vast range of criminal activities that 
are difficult to detect or deter. 
Glenny spent the next two years researching and writing a book 
on cybercrime called Dark Market (Glenny, 2011). Here he 
concentrates on the emergence of individuals and groups who 
were all-too-ready to capitalise on the new opportunities to steal 
from unsuspecting organisations and individuals. For example he 
describes how the emergence of ‘carding’ allowed hackers to 
discover and access personal information and use it to withdraw 
funds from unsuspecting banks. This rapidly morphed into the 
development and online sale of card skimming devices, the 
duplication of credit cards and so on. An online presence called 
CarderPlanet facilitated this underground trade for some time by 
operating out of the ‘Dark Net’ of hidden sites that require special 
software for access. Nowadays its successors facilitate a vast 
network of illegal transactions that appear to cover the entire 
gamut of criminal activity around the world. Glenny follows some 
of the individuals who developed and pursued this parasitic 
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underground trade and found that many of them came from 
Ukraine and other parts of the Russian Federation. But, of course, 
it did not stop there. 
As all Internet users know to their cost the rise of spam quickly 
began to infest email communications. Vast quantities could now 
be generated at minimal cost. Moreover, very few hits were 
required to create substantial profits. The Nigerian 419 up-front 
or money transfer scam was one of many that began to divest 
the naïve and vulnerable from their hard-earned cash. This, 
unfortunately, is a game that continues to grow and for which 
there are no simple or easy solutions. The rise of ‘phishing’ and the 
exploitation of human weaknesses continue to degrade the web 
and take it ever further away from the idealism expressed by many 
of its early promoters. Certain well-meaning groups (sometimes 
referred to as ‘white hat hackers’) trawl the Internet continuously 
to detect ISPs (Internet Service Providers) that support such illegal 
activities. But, as Glenny (2011, p.151) notes, it is an unequal 
struggle since ‘there are tens of thousands of active cyber criminals 
out in the ether, and only a tiny fraction of them are likely to get 
caught.’ Nasty as these criminal operations undoubtedly are, they 
are still relatively minor when compared to the growing use of the 
Internet for industrial espionage and sustained cyber aggression. 
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Often cited in this context is the case of the Stuxnet virus that was 
specifically designed to destroy uranium enrichment centrifuges 
in Iran. The virus is widely thought to have been a collaborative 
project carried out by the USA and Israel. The immediate end of 
disrupting the enrichment process for a period of time was 
apparently achieved. But informed observers point out that this 
dangerous piece of military software also had many other uses 
and thus potentially unlimited targets. Here the two-edged sword 
aspect of new technology is clearly revealed. What was originally 
touted as a ‘solution’ to a particular ‘problem’ becomes a vastly 
magnified ‘problem’ (if that is the appropriate word) in its own right 
with consequences that are, to a considerable degree, unknowable. 
The very same dynamic re-occurred in Syria in early 2017 when 
drones were used to attack the ‘liberating’ forces. Glenny’s book 
was written out of a concern that ‘in humanity’s relentless drive 
for convenience and economic growth, we have developed a 
dangerous level of dependency on networked systems in a very 
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short space of time’ (Glenny, 2011, p. 1). Yet none of these 
technological corollaries appear to have deterred the corporates 
and Internet oligarchs from pressing onward and promoting new 
digital capabilities – including what is now being called the ‘Internet 
of Things,’ explored in more depth later in this book. 
At the end of his book Glenny refrains from suggesting solutions 
because, he does not see many emerging. He notes, for example, 
that the resources being poured into ‘cyber security’ are, by and 
large, being invested in technology. Here is another reflection of 
the structural bias that is common across a wide span of 
innovations. By contrast, ‘there is virtually no investment in trying 
to ascertain who is hacking and why.’ He adds that ‘nobody 
differentiates between the hackers from Wikileaks, from the 
American or Chinese military, from criminal syndicates and from 
the simply curious’ (p.268). It’s important, in his view to develop 
a more detailed and sophisticated understanding of the hackers 
themselves. A thumbnail sketch suggests that most of them are 
male, bright (often in possession of advanced degrees), socially 
withdrawn and have had problems with family, especially parents. 
These attributes resonate with those attributed by Joel Bakan and 
others to certain corporations themselves, suggesting that the 
behaviour of some could legitimately be described as psychotic 
(Bakan, 2003). 
Glenny’s work provides a valuable source of knowledge and 
understanding about the widespread criminality of our times and 
also the extent to which it is supported and facilitated by IT in 
general and the Internet in particular. To dig deeper, we turn to one 
work that delves further into the notorious world of IT. 
INTERROGATING NET DELUSIONS 
The works considered so far have each tackled aspects of the IT 
revolution in fairly straightforward ways. They amount to what 
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could be regarded as a ‘first wave’ of critique in that they deal with 
fairly obvious topics and employ quite straightforward thinking and 
analysis. Fewer have related IT and its many extensions to other 
frameworks of knowledge and meaning-making in any depth. Nor 
have they accessed narratives that bring into focus the wider and 
deeper threats to our over-extended civilisation (Ehrlich & Ehrlich, 
2013). Evgeny Morozov brought a qualitatively distinctive voice to 
the conversation and qualified, perhaps, as an early ‘second wave’ 
contribution. His two books The Net Delusion (Morozov, 2011) and 
To Save Everything Click Here (Morozov, 2013) set new critical 
standards, broke new ground and brought into play an impressive 
range of cultural and linguistic resources. This brief overview 
concentrates on the second of these. 
What immediately set Morozov apart is that, unlike other 
observers who focused on more tangible and realist aspects of 
IT, his approach sought to ‘interrogate the intellectual foundations 
of the cyber-theorists.’ Thus, according to a Guardian review he 
found that ‘often, they have cherry-picked ideas from the scholarly 
literature that are at best highly controversial in their own fields’ 
(Poole, 2013). Morozov was critical not only of the means employed 
by the Internet oligarchs and Silicon Valley but also of their ends. 
The premise of To Save Everything uses: 
Two linked “small ideas” to critique the belief that the internet will 
help to improve everything. These two ideas are “internet centrism” 
and “solutionism”. The former idea is self-evident – advocates of 
the internet tend to assume that features of the internet can be 
mapped into other areas, and that its exceptional qualities will 
transform any area of life that comes to be mediated by it. The 
latter idea, drawn from science and technology studies and urban 
planning, argues that focusing on solutions limits our ability to 
think critically about the nature of the problems they are supposed 
to solve – or even whether they are ‘problems’ at all! To a hammer, 
everything looks like a nail, and to a social network entrepreneur, 
both politics and obesity look like problems that can be solved 
through behaviour change instigated through social networks 
(Powell, 2013) 
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The method employed is ‘radical questioning’ and the author 
demonstrated a formidable grasp of doing it methodically and 
authoritatively. His arguments cannot be covered in detail as they 
need to be read and reflected on in the original. But it is useful 
to summarise some of the language and conceptualisations 
employed as these can be viewed as powerfully enabling resources 
in their own right. The main themes of Morozov’s work address a 
number of long neglected topics including: 
 
• Questioning the means and the ends (or purposes) of 
Silicon Valley’s quest. 
• Rejecting what he calls ‘Internet centricism’ along with the 
‘modern day Talorism’ that it promotes. 
• Opposing the rise of pervasive ‘information reductionism’ 
in many areas of life, culture, economic activity and so on. 
• Questioning the fact that many apparently innovative 
procedures that are being promoted provide pseudo 
‘solutions’ to problems that may not exist. 
• Questioning the tendency of IT to reduce the viability of 
many socially grounded functions and activities – for 
example, causing entire professions and types of work 
(both repetitive and creative) redundant. 
• Asserting the value of some of the human and social 
capacities that are undermined by IT. These include 
ambivalence, the capacity to make mistakes, the need for 
deliberative spaces and so on. 
Morozov supported Taylor in reminding us that the dynamic that 
shaped and is continuing to drive the Internet’s rapid growth and 
over-reach derives from the never-ending search for profits rather 
than any concern for human rights. In this view rights are 
everywhere being extinguished. The underlying dynamic is 
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revealed in many different ways. It shows up in the supposed 
‘neutrality’ of algorithms that, while ubiquitous, are hidden and 
inaccessible so far as most people and organisations are 
concerned. It also shows up in the vastly expanding realm of ‘apps’ 
that have hidden costs in terms of privacy, dependency and the 
promotion of questionable notions such as that of the ‘quantifiable 
self.’ (That is, a ‘self’ that can be tracked, measured, located, 
directed and ‘enhanced’ in real time.) Also involved here is a 
‘quantification fetish’ – the idea that more data is always better, 
always ‘objective’. 
What this amounts to is a vast and pervasive collective pressure 
on how people understand their world and how they operate 
within it. Already there is a costly ‘narrowing of vision’ and a decline 
in the ‘narrative imagination.’ Morozov (2013, p. 282) quoted Clay 
Johnson that ‘much as a poor diet gives us a variety of diseases, 
poor information diets give us new forms of ignorance’. Having 
done so he also critiqued this view for portraying citizens as being 
too passive and hence unable to ‘dabble in complex matters of 
media reform and government policy’ (Morozov, 2013, p. 284). 
Instead Morozov preferred Lippmann’s formulation of ‘multiple 
publics.’ These are seen as being ‘fluid, dynamic, and potentially 
fragile entities that don’t just discover issues of concern out ‘in 
nature’ but negotiate how such issues are to be defined and 
articulated; issues create publics as much as publics create issues’ 
(2013, p. 287). 
Morozov’s work confirmed what some have critiqued for some 
time – namely that that the apparent ‘success’ of Silicon Valley, its 
entrepreneurs and, of course, the Internet oligarchs, arose out of a 
flawed and increasingly risky foundation. That ‘success’ for example 
depends on: 
 
• Profoundly inadequate understandings of human identity 
and life; 
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• Thin and unhelpful notions of how private and public 
realms arise, exist and remain viable; 
• Equally thin and unhelpful views of core concepts such as 
‘communication’ and ‘progress.’ 
• An overwhelming tendency to elevate ‘technology’ to a far 
higher ontological status than it deserves or can support. 
One of the ‘strands’ of this multi-themed critique is the tendency 
of Internet promoters to forget that the kind of ‘theory-free’ 
approaches to knowledge and action that they’d consciously or 
unconsciously adopted had a protracted and chequered history. It 
reflected the tendency, powerfully inscribed in American culture, 
of setting theory and reflection aside in favour of action and 
innovation. This is certainly one of the most credible drivers of 
the ‘GFC’ (Global Financial Crisis) meltdown. The fact is that those 
driving the ‘Internet explosion’ are ‘venerating a God of their own 
creation and live in denial’ of that fact (Morozov, 2013, p. 357). 
Morozov’s analysis supported some of the suggestions put 
forward by observers such as Taylor and Glenny, but also went 
beyond them; He sought a broad-based oppositional movement that 
called into question both the methods and the purposes of Silicon 
Valley. Part of this movement involves the conscious design and 
use of ‘transformational’ products. These are products that, instead 
of hiding and obscuring relationships, dependencies, costs and the 
like, reveal them as a condition of use. An example would be an 
electronic device that provides tangible feedback about the 
sources, types and costs of the energy being used. Some of these 
examples are reminiscent of Tony Fry’s attempts to counter what 
he calls ‘de-futuring’ by re-directing the evolution of the design 
professions (Fry, 2009). Such ‘post-Internet’ initiatives encourage 
people to ‘trace how these technologies are produced, what voices 
and ideologies are silenced in their production and dissemination, 
and how the marketing literature surrounding these technologies 
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taps into the zeitgeist to make them look inevitable’ (Morozov, 
2013, p. 356). 
A further characteristic of Morozov’s (2013, p. 357) approach is 
that ‘it deflates the shallow and historically illiterate accounts that 
dominate so much of our technology debate and opens them to 
much more varied, rich and historically important experiences’. 
Finally, Morozov (2013, p. 358) was at pains to remind us that 
‘technology is not the enemy,’ rather, ‘our enemy is the romantic 
and revolutionary problem solver who lives within’. This neatly 
turned the discussion back onto broader questions regarding the 
constitution of human needs, wants etc. This ‘take away’ message is 
strikingly similar to that set out in the Biggest Wake-Up Call in History 
(Slaughter, 2010). 
CRITIQUE AND TRANSFORMATION 
The sections above considered works that focus primarily on IT, the 
Internet and associated matters. Rushkoff’s approach differs in that 
his focus is not primarily on IT per se but the ways that society 
and business have unthinkingly extended industrial practices well 
beyond their use-by date, supercharged unsustainable growth and 
missed the most positive opportunities that arise from digitisation 
(Rushkoff, 2016). In his view industrial innovations operated over 
time to disconnect people from the value chains that their labour 
helped create. Today’s monopoly platforms, supported by 
centralised currencies have taken this process to extremes.  Hence, 
‘the digital landscape so effectively monopolises economic activity 
that most people have nothing left to be extracted,’ (Rushkoff, 
2016). Consequently ‘social media companies grow at the expense 
of their users’ (Rushkoff, 2016, p, 33-4). The process is also 
counterproductive because it leads to an unsustainable endgame, 
namely ‘an economy based entirely on marketing and advertising’ 
(Rushkoff, 2016, p.36). 
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Rushkoff reminds us that Daniel Bell’s earlier work on the 
‘information society’ went well beyond purely technical issues. 
Among the latter’s suggestions was that ‘technical progress’ should 
be balanced by what he called ‘up-graded political institutions’ 
(Rushkoff, 2016, p. 53). Clearly that did not occur but many of 
Rushkoff’s recommendations for dealing with 21st century 
problems do serve to refocus attention on institutional change 
and transformation. Moreover these are to be guided, in part, by 
what he calls a ‘recovery of values’ (a topic that is explored further 
below). The modus operandi of platform monopolies like Uber and 
Amazon is seen as detrimental since neither accept any obligation 
to uphold the public good. In fact both rose to prominence by 
destroying and replacing pre-existing industries (taxi firms and 
publishing). A way forward, in his terminology is, to ‘re-code’ or 
reinvent the corporation – which is obviously easier said than done. 
The author does, however, make a strong case for creating what he 
calls ‘steady-state enterprises through engaging strategies such as: 
 
• Get over growth (focus on sustainable equilibrium); 
• Take a hybrid approach (commercial and more 
‘distributed’); 
• Change shareholder mentality (addressing social and 
sustainability concerns); 
• Shift to a new operating system (revise and re-design the 
corporation). 
For Rushkoff the central flaw of ‘runaway capitalism’ is the notion 
that ‘more profit equals more prosperity’ whereas in his view 
‘non-profits’ (such as Mozilla) may be better adapted for a digital 
future. The important thing is to ‘re-write the rules of the growth 
game itself’ (Rushkoff, 2016, p. 121-3). Much of the rest of the 
book deals with the nature of money. He is particularly critical of 
the dominance of centralised currencies – which he regards as 
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‘the core mechanism of the growth trap’ – and insists that ‘we 
can program money differently’ (Rushkoff, 2016, p. 132-8). One of 
his most original suggestions is that money should be optimised 
not for growth but for ‘velocity.’ He makes a strong case for using 
existing, and designing new, ways to ‘slow’ money down so that it 
can circulate more productively. Local area trading schemes (LETS) 
are one way to do this and, despite its ‘brittleness,’ emerging 
blockchain technology may be another. 
Rushkoff (2016, p. 153) then brings a key suggestion to the table 
when he writes that ‘reprogramming money requires less digital 
technology than digital thinking and purpose‘. This is a crucial point 
that supports a central claim of this book, namely that the power of 
technology needs to be matched by the wider, broader, deeper powers 
of understanding and insight that are available but sadly lacking in 
the culture of Silicon Valley (Slaughter, 2015a). For example in this 
context we need to consider what kinds of money (plural) are 
needed? Local currencies make sense in some places, virtual 
bartering systems (‘free money’) in others and co-operative 
currencies in still others. Equally the existing heavy trend toward 
monopoly platforms designed for growth and for humanly 
extractive business methods can be replaced by what he calls 
‘platform cooperatives.’ Models of the latter are said to already 
exist in Ecuador and in Spain’s well-known Mondragon Collective. 
At least two broad considerations appear to support Rushkoff’s 
proposals. One is the sheer dysfunctionality of an economic system 
built on growth, extraction and exploitation, a system that works 
for a shrinking minority. The other is the growing influence of 
positive values that depart from this increasingly risky and 
over-extended model and that suggest viable ways forward. 
Readers will likely have their own list of candidates but those 
mentioned here include: women’s equality, integrative medicine, 
worker ownership and local currencies. Finally, he suggests that a 
‘genuinely digital, distributist business’ would: 
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• amplify value creating from everywhere; 
• obsolesce centralised monopolies; 
• retrieve the values of the medieval marketplace 
(inexpensive exchange between peers); and, in the long 
run perhaps 
• seek some sort of collective or spiritual awareness 
(Rushkoff, 2016. p. 237-8). 
In summary, what Rushkoff hopes to see is a wide range of social, 
organisational and related innovations that are informed by digital 
understanding but strongly oriented toward more productive 
human and social purposes. 
SUMMARY 
Mayer-Schonberger and Cukier’s Big Data (Mayer-Schonberger & 
Cukier, 2013) demonstrated some of the pitfalls of taking an overly 
one-sided view of something as powerful as big data. Used 
carefully, with restraint and effective oversight, it certainly has a 
variety of helpful uses. Used carelessly and in covert, dishonest 
ways, it readily becomes a tool of domination and control. Taylor’s 
The People’s Platform (Taylor, 2014) offered a fresh way of looking at 
IT in general and a comprehensive list of ‘desirable actions,’ many 
of which could be readily undertaken with political and social will 
and enabled with appropriate organisational support. 
Glenny’s tour of the ‘dark side’ (Glenny, 2011) shed light on a 
widely felt but often ignored or denied reality. That is, the human, 
organisational and technical means through which the integrity of 
the early Internet was compromised. It drew attention to the fact 
that technical arrangements draw life, significance, meaning, both 
positive and negative capabilities, from human traits and cultural 
values. It therefore again demonstrated that these wider, deeper 
factors – rather than servers and ISPs – powerfully affect the 
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underlying foundations and operational structure of the Internet. 
Morozov’s To Save Everything Click Here (Morozov, 2013) arguably 
set new critical standards and helped to create a more robust and 
capable discourse for dealing in depth with many of the issues 
raised here. He articulated a strong case for intelligent opposition 
to ‘solutionism’ and what might be called ‘Internet-centricity.’ As 
such his work provided in depth appreciation of the IT revolution 
and the need for ways of influencing it for the wider good. 
Finally Rushkoff (2016) followed suit with other contributors by 
demonstrating how redundant values and skewed power relations 
create adverse outcomes when expressed through digital 
technologies such as monopoly platforms, related social media 
and mis-named ‘sharing economies’. He also showed how, in their 
own terms, they lead to arid, self-defeating social and economic 
consequences. But, importantly, he also sees many positive 
opportunities. He demonstrates that other options can be 
envisaged, some of which already exist in one form or another. 
Alternatives emerge from adopting constructive values, ‘re-coding’ 
organisations, developing new kinds of money and evolving new 
or renewed social and organisational forms.  His work also serves 
to confirm the two assumptions that underpin this work. He 
demonstrates the practical utility of perspectives that look beyond 
technologies as such to embrace richer worlds of significance and 
meaning. 
Despite the power and wealth of dominant IT based Silicon Valley 
mega-corporations they may not be as durable as they seem. 
Despite their current success most will at some point have to 
confront the fact that they are founded on a worldview and a set 
of values derived from the most problematic and short-sighted 
form of economic organisation that has ever existed (Ramos, 2011; 
Ehrlich & Ehrlich, 2013; Klein, 2014). To retain legitimation such 
organisations deny or obscure the fact that present forms of 
neoliberal techno-capitalism are poorly adapted to human needs 
and the reality of planetary limits (Slaughter, 2015b). Certain core 
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operating assumptions dictate the way the system operates and 
powerfully shape and condition many of its products and services. 
These include the ‘freeing’ of markets from effective oversight and 
government regulation, the pursuit of ‘growth’ as an unquestioned 
goal, viewing the natural world instrumentally as merely a set of 
resources for human transformation and use and demeaning view 
of human beings as consumers or pawns. One result has been the 
concentration of wealth into the hands of ever fewer individuals 
and groups (Piketty, 2015). So this is a state of affairs that cannot 
continue indefinitely. 
Conclusion 
If human societies wish to protect the wellsprings of life, culture and meaning they will 
need to limit the wealth, power and reach of the Internet oligarchs. Collective courage 
and resolve will be required to re-frame ‘the Internet’ and free the ubiquitous algorithm 
from their grasp. Ways in which it can be re-designed for more respectful and constructive 
uses are already beginning to appear (Hodson, 2016). This is quite obviously not a case of 
rejecting ‘technology’ wholesale but, as several authors considered above have suggested, 
of locating it within a broader frame of understanding and value. The latter will include ‘the 
market’ but not be dominated by its current reductive and out-dated economic framework. 
An indicative example of this could be the Tesla corporation that has, in some ways, started 
to disrupt the comfortable world of the internet oligarchs by beating them at their own 
game. While it participates in mainstream projects such as the ‘self-driving car’ and ‘brain 
computer interfaces’ it is also investing in distributed power storage solutions that are 
already proving attractive around the world because they help solve a real and urgent 
problem. This shows that size and wealth do not necessarily preclude the development 
and production of truly useful innovations. 
It’s worth emphasising, however, that values do indeed sit at the core of everything. 
One of the most constructive options is therefore to understand and acknowledge how 
different values manifest, where they ‘fit’, so to speak, and how they are expressed in 
different environments. Hence the second chapter suggests that greater insight into values 
precedes effective action (Wilber, 2017; Slaughter 2012). It brings to mind a worldview 
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in which technologies have been subordinated to consciously chosen values. That is, the 
culture of the Kesh richly evoked by Ursula le Guin in Always Coming Home (le Guin, 
1986). Here the uses of high technology are certainly acknowledged but also known to be 
dangerous. The solution adopted by the Kesh is that advanced technologies are treated 
with care. They are partitioned off into specific locations where they can be used as needed 
but where their influence is kept in check. Rather than pursue technical power wherever 
its owners and inherent tendencies may lead, the Kesh chose to bring ritual and meaning 
into the heart of their culture. We would do well to remember this example and to draw 
inspiration from it. Although embodied in fiction it carries a vital message to our own time 
and culture. 
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PART II 
CASE STUDIES AND 
IMPLICATIONS 
We rely on technology for almost everything…and yet no society in 
the world has yet stood up to demand greater control over its digital 
destiny. No country has committed itself to building a technology that 
is as fair as it is convenient (Fox, 2017). 
The new technologies do not entail a radical reshaping of modes of 
doing things. A driverless car is still a car (Das, 2016). 
Google’s tools are not the objects of value exchange. They do not 
establish productive consumer-producer reciprocities. Instead they are 
‘hooks’ that lure users into extractive operations and turn ordinary life 
into a 21st Century Faustian pact. This social dependency is at the heart 
of the surveillance project (Zuboff, 2015, p.82). 
The first chapter of this book considered a sample of publications 
to explore some of the many contested issues that have arisen 
between promoters and critics of the IT revolution. It concluded 
that there are substantive reasons to believe that the Internet, in 
particular, falls short of what it was originally intended to be and, 
indeed, what it could yet become. It underperforms when assessed 
for fairness and egalitarian uses. It seriously over-reaches as a 
medium that is dedicated to selling and to extracting value from the 
general public – habitually without their knowledge or permission. 
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Hence the Internet we have is a degraded – and to some extent 
degrading – version of what it could be had it been designed and 
implemented differently. That is, according to positive values 
exercised in the public interest, rather than an oppressive, 
diversionary realm dominated by powerful corporations and 
providing unlimited opportunities for abuse. 
The upcoming pages focus on three specific case studies – the 
Internet of Things (IoT), the rise of Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) and 
the Silicon Valley. The former is already being portrayed as a kind 
of unquestioned default assumption. The latter widely promoted 
to replace standard vehicles driven directly by humans on 
conventional roads. The section then outlines salient features of 
the two most dominant Internet giants, Facebook and Google, with 
two goals in mind. First, to identify ways to improve our 
understanding of their interior human and cultural aspects and 
second, to use the insights gained to explore what should be done 
and by whom – an issue addressed in the subsequent sections. 
Taken together these sections help define a draft agenda that can 
be critiqued, modified and put to wider use. The overarching goal 
is not merely to help moderate the exploitive impacts of IT but 
to evolve strategies that better serve more constructive, humanly 
valuable ends. 
How, for example, can people begin to better understand the 
uses, abuses and limitations of algorithms? How can the vast 
potential of ‘big data’ be captured and applied in ways that support 
egalitarian uses within civil societies while avoiding the slide toward 
becoming an oppressive instrument of power and control? How 
can the ‘dark’ side of the Internet be rendered less dangerous, 
less of a continuing threat to the normal operations and general 
wellbeing of entire societies? How can the increasingly 
monopolistic and dehumanising aspects of ‘surveillance capitalism’ 
be moderated and replaced by more open and genuinely 
participatory forms of economic and social organisation? This alone 
constitutes a huge and challenging agenda. Yet, behind all such 
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IT-related questions lies another, deeper one that has arguably 
been eclipsed by the rampant and all-consuming growth of Internet 
phenomena. How can humanity employ its vast new technical 
capacities to moderate its multiple impacts on the global system 
and, over time, shift toward more far-sighted options that reduce 
the growing risk of ‘overshoot and collapse’ futures (Floyd & 
Slaughter, 2012)? This is the great question that few people – 
including Internet entrepreneurs – care to consider. Yet it arguably 
represents the greatest existential threat in history. 
There is a very real possibility that putting all this technical power 
and capacity to work primarily for the radically limited instrumental 
purposes of surveillance, advertising and selling may come to be 
seen as amongst the greatest misuses of human ingenuity ever. 
So it is time to question the existing narratives, structures and 
dominant values that continue to drive the Internet as we know it. 
Society as a whole can do far better than to proceed into a cultural 
desert operated increasingly by remote AI devices for the benefit of 
a dominant few. 
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The Internet of Things 
Most people will have heard of various forthcoming ‘next big things’ 
such as ‘augmented reality,’ ‘self-driving cars’ and the ‘Internet of 
Things’ (IoT). Yet the chances are that they won’t have heard about 
them from personal or local sources since claims about their 
alleged benefits don’t originate there. Rather, they are one of many 
campaigns that originate elsewhere – that is, from a handful of 
the world’s most powerful organisations and their associates. As 
things stand, entire populations are regularly subjected to powerful 
marketing operations intended solely to prepare them for the so 
called miraculous new services that no one has ever wanted or 
needed. As Morozov and others have suggested ‘the Internet’ is 
a domain where numerous ‘solutions’ are offered for problems 
that currently do not exist – a phenomenon he calls ‘solutionism’ 
(Morozov, 2013). Hence it is difficult to find credible evidence of 
any real ‘demand’ for an IoT. Rather, it is all about power and 
accumulation on a vast scale. Powerful organisations insist that 
these latest innovations are inevitable. They claim that ‘the genie 
is already out of the bottle’ without offering any plausible 
justification to what this ‘genie’ actually is or what kind of ‘bottle’ 
it may have escaped from. Subtlety and depth of meaning are 
uncommon in these contextualised claims. Superficial, overly 
positive views about high-tech innovation, however, not only reflect 
their pretentious assumptions, they also speak volumes about the 
overriding self-serving priorities of the organisations involved. Yet, 
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there should be no doubt that the innovation ‘push’ model is 
certainly disruptive and frequently dangerous. The reasons are 
straightforward – it constantly injects random elements into 
complex social systems that are then forced to adapt, often at 
considerable cost to people, professions and organisations at large. 
Reflecting on the 2016 US election one observer commented that: 
We have fetishised “disruption”. Governments have stood by and 
watched it take down all industries in its path – the market must 
do what the market must do. Only now, the wave is breaking on 
its shore. Because what the last week of this presidential campaign 
has shown us is that technology has disrupted, is disrupting, is 
threatening to upturn the democratic process itself – the best, most 
stable, most equitable form of governance the world has yet come 
up with (Cadwalladr, 2016). 
Despite this malaise an IoT per se should not necessarily be 
considered a categorical mistake. Well-designed devices installed 
in robust networks with appropriate technical and exacting safety 
standards would have a variety of uses. A host of specialised 
applications can be readily envisaged in education, surgery, 
disaster management and so on. The elderly, disabled and sick 
could gain greater autonomy and enhanced capability to run their 
own lives. Potentially positive uses like these may well be unlimited. 
But the dangers and costs of the IoT as envisaged by the power 
hungry appear to outweigh these benefits. 
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Standing behind the seductive merchandising are questions such 
as: who is promoting the IoT? Who stands to gain and who will lose? 
Can we be sure that it will protect privacy and enhance human 
wellbeing or will it further erode both? Answering the ‘who’ 
question is straightforward. The main drivers and beneficiaries of 
this particular ‘radically transformative innovation’ are the 
corporate tech giants from Silicon Valley, their like-minded 
associates and high-tech manufacturers ever on the lookout for 
new markets. They share this particular expansionist worldview 
that continues to be virtually unchallenged. In fact following the 
2016 US presidential election the Neo-Conservative ascendancy 
was reinvigorated. Central to its ideology is an assumption that 
equates ‘progress’ with single-minded technical innovation and 
development. Such a view, however, works against shared interests 
as it arguably rests on category errors and inadequate views of 
culture, human identity and human autonomy. Such limitations 
and costs were perhaps best expressed by Lewis Mumford who 
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declared that: ‘I have taken life itself to be the primary 
phenomenon, and creativity, rather than the “conquest of nature,” 
as the ultimate criterion of man’s biological and cultural success’ 
(Mumford, 1971). He would, of course, be unemployable in Silicon 
Valley. 
This is not because Trump supported Neo-Conservatism directly. 
His antagonism towards it is well known. Nor is it because Silicon 
Valley has entirely abandoned its leaning toward Libertarian values. 
In the former case it is rather that a rich minority has thrived 
under Trump that remains deeply immersed in the ‘Neo-Con’ world 
from which it continues to derive significant financial and other 
benefits. In the latter Silicon Valley exhibits a profound disconnect 
from Democratic politics and the growing social costs of its own 
activities. The Neo-Cons therefore remain free to go about their 
business in the absence of any serious constraints. 
DISRUPTIONS AND CONSEQUENCES 
In some ways the high-tech sector resembles a wayward child that 
challenges authority and ignores boundaries. So it is unsurprising 
that, as existing product categories become saturated, it seeks to 
invent new ones. But what’s good for Internet oligarchs and giant 
corporations may not be good for everyone else. Long before the 
IT revolution informed observers such as C.S. Lewis, Ivan Illich, 
E.F. Schumacher and many others understood that the ‘conquest 
of nature’ has a nasty habit of rebounding on people by 
compromising their humanity and riding rough shod over their 
rights. The entire high-tech sector has expanded rapidly over 
recent decades and, as a result, many of the organisations involved 
have become financially wealthy. But if they are not rich in 
humanity, perceptiveness, the ability to sustain people or cultures, 
then this becomes an empty and regressive form of wealth. 
The high-tech sector has exhibited a dangerous and apparently 
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unquenchable obsession with ‘inventing the future backwards.’ 
That’s to say, it pours millions into speculative technical operations 
with little thought as to whether the outputs are necessary or 
helpful. There’s an abiding preoccupation with beating the 
immediate competition (including other high-tech behemoths) 
regardless of other considerations. Many will remember how the 
‘information superhighway’ evoked images of openness, safety, 
productivity, social benefits spread far and wide. A range of new 
tools certainly came into wide use. Information on virtually any 
topic became almost instantly available. Useful knowledge is 
another matter entirely and wisdom may be the scarcest resource 
of all. 
None of the above can be blamed on the Internet pioneers who 
built early versions of these systems and devices. Many appear 
to have believed that what they were doing was useful and 
constructive (Taplin, 2017). Unfortunately, once the new tools were 
released into wide use the aims, ambitions, values and so on of the 
pioneers counted for little. New, poorly understood, world-shaping 
forces came into play. Yet the power apparently granted to the 
latter does not, in fact, reside with innovators and disruptors. In a 
more considered view it resides in the domain of ‘the social’ from 
which countervailing power (for example in the form of sanctions 
or legitimation) may eventually arise. 
THE ENTREPRENEURIAL MARKETPLACE AND A 
NEW ARMS RACE 
In the meantime, left to the vagaries of ‘the market,’ further waves 
of high-tech innovation will continue to generate highly polarised 
consequences. It doesn’t really matter what the high-tech gurus 
and the Internet oligarchs like to claim at any particular time in 
terms of the efficacy and usefulness of new products and services. 
Nor does it matter how glossy the marketing, how many times 
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stimulating or provocative TED talks are viewed on YouTube or how 
enticing the promises appear. The very last entities to entrust with the 
future of humanity and its world are those who make ‘innovation’ their 
ultimate value and selling their core profession. High-tech promises 
based on pragmatic, utilitarian and commercial values overlook or 
omit so much that’s vital to people and societies that they have 
little or no chance of creating or sustaining open and egalitarian 
societies. (The ideology of ‘value-free technology’ is discussed 
below.) 
Proponents of the IoT, however, seek to convince the public that 
it will be widely useful. Homes can be equipped to respond to every 
need, whim and requirement. Owners won’t need to be physically 
present since they can communicate remotely with their home 
server. What could possibly go wrong? The honest answer is: just 
about everything. Perhaps the greatest weakness and enduring 
flaw in the IoT is this: connecting devices together is one thing, but 
securing them is quite another. As one well-qualified observer put 
it ‘IoT devices are coming in with security flaws which were 
out-of-date ten years ago’ (Palmer, 2016). Naughton (2016) 
acknowledges that ‘there’s a lot to be said for a properly networked 
world.’ He adds ‘what we’ve got at the moment, however, is 
something very different – the disjointed incrementalism of an 
entrepreneurial marketplace.’ He adds that: 
There are thousands of insecure IoT products already out there. If 
our networked future is built on such dodgy foundations, current 
levels of chronic online insecurity will come to look like a golden 
age. The looming Dystopia can be avoided, but only by concerted 
action by governments, major companies and technical standards 
bodies (Naughton, 2016). 
Even now private e-mail cannot be considered secure. One slip, one 
accidental click on a nasty link, can initiate a cascade of unwelcome 
consequences. There’s no reason to believe that anyone’s wired-up 
electronic cocoon will be any different. Consider this: a creepy 
Russian website was allowing users to watch more than 73,000 
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live streams from unsecure baby monitors (Mendelsohn, 2016). In 
the absence of careful and effective system-wide redesign what 
remains of our privacy may well disappear. First world societies are 
on the cusp of being caught up in the classic unwinnable dialectic of 
an offensive / defensive arms race. Currently, few understand this 
with sufficient clarity. It’s therefore likely that many will continue 
to sign up for this new, interconnected fantasy world with no idea 
or little idea of the dangers involved or the precautions required. 
Some will ask why they were not warned. The fact is that such 
warnings have been plentiful but have fallen upon deaf ears. 
INTERNET IDEOLOGY 
No discussion of the Internet and its pervasive effects is complete 
without reference to a persistent – some would say extreme – view 
that technology is ‘value free.’ Technology is said to be ‘neutral,’ 
what matters is how it is applied. This represents a distinct 
philosophical position supporting a specific worldview that eludes 
many, especially in the U.S. where such issues tend to remain 
occluded. So it’s not surprising that the limitations, not to say 
defects, of such a view are, on the whole, seen more clearly beyond 
the U.S. and far removed from Silicon Valley (Beck, 1999). For those 
who have absorbed the pre-conscious assumptions of U.S. culture 
the ‘IT revolution’ and its products are more likely to be described 
in glowingly positive terms (tinged, of course, with varying degrees 
of national self-interest). Yet such views are far from universal. 
Wherever healthy forms of scepticism thrive it’s obvious that 
information processing – once restricted to the world of machines 
– has already colonised the interior spaces of everyday life to an 
unwise extent (see Zuboff, 2015, below). Allowing it to penetrate 
ever further into human life is clearly fraught with adverse 
consequences. 
Greenfield (2017) has considered how these processes operate 
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at three scales: the human body, the home and public spaces. To 
take just one example, in his view the rise of ‘digital assistants’ 
… ‘fosters an approach to the world that is literally thoughtless, 
leaving users disinclined to sit out any prolonged frustration of 
desire, and ever less critical about the processes that result in 
gratification’ (Greenfield, 2017). They operate surreptitiously in the 
background according to the logic of ‘preemptive capture.’ The 
services they offer are designed to provide the companies 
concerned with ‘disproportionate benefits’ through the 
unregulated acquisition (theft) of personal data. Lying behind such 
operational factors, however, is ‘a clear philosophical position, even 
a worldview … that the world is in principle perfectly knowable, 
its contents enumerable and their relations capable of being 
meaningfully encoded in a technical system, without bias or 
distortion.’ When applied to cities Greenfield regards this as: 
Effectively an argument that there is one and only one correct 
solution to each identified need; that this solution can be arrived at 
algorithmically, via the operations of a technical system furnished 
with the proper inputs; and that this solution is something that can 
be encoded in public policy, without distortion (Greenfield, 2017). 
Hence ‘every aspect of this argument is questionable.’ Similarly, 
the view that ‘anything at all is perfectly knowable’ he regards as 
perverse since so many aspects of individual and collective life 
cannot be reduced to digital data. Differences of value, identity, 
purpose, meaning, interest and interpretation – the very attributes 
that make human life so rich and varied – are overlooked or 
eliminated. It follows that, 
The bold claim of ‘perfect’ knowledge appears incompatible with 
the messy reality of all known information-processing systems, the 
human individuals and institutions that make use of them and, 
more broadly, with the world as we experience it. In fact, it is 
astonishing that any experienced engineer would ever be so 
unwary as to claim perfection on behalf of any computational 
system, no matter how powerful (Greenfield, 2017). 
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In summary, claims for ‘perfect confidence’ in the social 
applications of digital systems are ‘incommensurate with 
everything we know about how technical systems work.’ In other 
words the dominant ideology behind the rapid expansion of the 
IoT and related systems is clearly unfit for many of the purposes to 
which it is currently being applied. Or to put this differently ‘hard’ 
empiricism involves systemic reductionism that works directly 
against the wider human and social interests outlined above. 
FICTION INFORMS FORESIGHT 
It’s no secret that high-tech nightmares exploring the dark side of 
‘progress’ have been a staple of science fiction (SF) for well over 
a century. Far from being idly ‘negative’ they can be viewed as 
useful reminders to, for example, not proceed too far too fast with 
these powerful, seductively networked technologies. H.G. Wells 
attempted an early expression of this concern in his 1895 novel 
The Time Machine in the contrasts he drew between the effete and 
vulnerable Eloi and the brutal Morlocks (Wells, 1895). Then in 1909 
E.M. Forster made an even more deliberate attempt to identify 
the likely effects of becoming over-dependent on technology in his 
novella The Machine Stops (Forster, 1909). More than a century later 
it still carries a forceful message that is both credible and explicit. 
Then, in the early 1970s, J.G. Ballard began his decades-long 
explorations of ennui and decay in the ruins of high-tech 
environments – the abandoned high-rise, the empty swimming 
pool and so on. One of the most evocative is a short story in 
his 1973 collection Vermillion Sands called ‘The thousand dreams 
of stellavista’ (Ballard, 1973). It portrays a house constructed to 
exquisitely mirror the needs of its inhabitants in real time. 
Unfortunately it turns out that a previous occupant was insane. 
Over time the house begins to exhibit similar symptoms – which 
places later owners in peril of their lives. This is obviously not 
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merely a metaphor. Daniel Suarez’ Daemon picks up the familiar 
theme of runaway technology and gives it a powerful new twist. 
He draws on a wealth of information technology (IT) know-how to 
explore how a dormant entity – or daemon – is activated, becoming 
a self-replicating, highly destructive virtual menace (Suarez 2010). 
Finally Dave Eggers’ prescient 2013 novel The Circle brings the story 
up to date in a highly relevant and insightful critique of the digital 
utopianism that arguably characterises the current thinking and 
practice of IT corporations (Eggers, 2013). It’s a salutary tale in 
which human ideals become subordinated to an ever more 
dominating technical infrastructure. This is, of course, only a small 
sample of a vast literature exploring almost every aspect of 
technological dystopias. 
Futurists and foresight practitioners often recognise such 
sources as essential background. But they also earn their living by 
scanning the environment for more specific and empirically based 
‘signals of change.’ The art and science of ‘environmental scanning’ 
is, however, arguably more advanced in theory than it is in broad, 
commonly accepted, practice. In terms of social governance in a 
digital era, this is a serious oversight. Consequently the relative 
absence of high quality foresight places entire societies at significantly 
greater risk than they need to be. Here, for example, are a couple of 
‘scanning hits’ on surveillance and the IoT. 
“The Internet of Things (IoT) has particular security and privacy 
problems…it affect the physical world, sometimes controlling 
critical infrastructure, and sometimes gathering very private 
information about individuals” (Seitz, 2015). 
And again, 
The IOT “network is responsible for collecting, processing, and 
analyzing all the information that passes through the network to 
make decisions, in other words, millions of devices permanently 
connected to the Internet act and interact intelligently with each 
other to feed and benefit thousands of applications that are also 
connected to the network,” (Alvarez, 2021). 
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It will be a two-way street. Internet of Things transactions linked 
to the same identifier are traceable, and ultimately make people 
also traceable, hence their privacy is threatened. According to Ball 
(2016), this consumer surveillance is an act of corporate power, 
attempting to align individual preferences with corporate goals. 
This is seen by the increasingly widespread practice of customer 
surveillance in stores (and other points of sale) when people 
unwittingly accept offers such as ‘free Wi-Fi.’ In so doing they agree 
to ‘terms of use’ that they neither read, nor understand. This is 
clearly analogous to where entire societies now stand in relation 
to the IoT – the actual ‘terms of use’ remain out of sight and 
unavailable to all but the most persistent and technically adept. 
A PLAUSIBLE TRAJECTORY 
During these dangerous and uncertain times much is at stake – not 
least of which is how to manage a world severely out of balance. 
More competent, imaginative and far-sighted leadership would 
help, as would a growing society-wide resistance to the values and, 
indeed many of the products, of the high-tech giants. Strategies 
of this kind would contribute toward a thorough re-appraisal of 
various pathways toward viable futures (Floyd & Slaughter, 2012). 
Those who are fortunate enough to be living in still-affluent areas 
are being taken on a ride intended to distract them, to still their 
growing fears for the future, through the many diversions provided 
by new generations of technological devices. But the above 
suggests that it’s time to push back and seek answers to questions 
such as the following: 
 
• Does it make sense to accept the current, deeply flawed, 
vision of the IoT that promises so much but ticks so few 
essential boxes, especially in relation to privacy and 
security? 
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• Are whole populations really willing to passively submit to 
a technical and economic order that it grows more 
dangerous and Dystopian with each passing year? 
• To what extent should time, resources and attention be 
focused on the kinds of long-term solutions that preserve 
human and social options? (Slaughter, 2015). 
If things continue to proceed along the present trajectory the 
system is likely to misbehave, to be hacked, militarised, fail just 
when it needs to work faultlessly. In this eventuality domestic users 
may start backing out and rediscovering the virtues of earlier 
analogue solutions. Although simpler and less flexible, the latter 
could gain new appeal since they lack the ability to exact hidden 
costs and turn peoples’ lives upside down in unpredictable ways. 
Some might well opt wholesale for a simpler life (Kingsnorth, 2017). 
Early adopters of the IoT are, however, not restricted to 
householders. They include businesses, government agencies and 
public utilities. It is often forgotten that the latter are structurally 
predisposed toward greater socio-political complexity – which also 
contributes to the growth imperative. Thus, according to Tainter, 
large-scale organisations are unlikely to pursue deliberate 
simplification strategies while at the same time becoming 
increasingly vulnerable to collapse (Tainter, 1988). Given the overall 
lack of effective social foresight, as well as the parlous state of 
government oversight in general, present modes of 
implementation may proceed unabated for some time. Security 
breaches on an unprecedented scale would then take place, 
disruptions to essential services would occur and privacy for many 
would all-but vanish. The costs would be painful but they would 
also constitute a series of ‘social learning experiences’ par 
excellence. At that point serious efforts to raise standards and 
secure the IoT become unavoidable. 
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Farewell to driving? 
The advent of ‘driverless cars’ has been regularly announced for 
some time. They refer to one type of ‘autonomous vehicle’ (AV) 
tested on the streets of various cities. Others are operating in 
closed environments such as mines and industrial sites. Airports 
have used ‘autonomous trains’ for some time, safely moving 
thousands of passengers around from one terminal to another. 
Road testing of city-to-city AV fleets are not far behind. Such 
vehicles are another in a series of ‘disruptive technologies’ whose 
benefits are said to outweigh the possible costs. It’s claimed that 
the current system of independent vehicles driven by fallible 
humans is so expensive, dangerous and out-dated that it needs 
to be replaced. At first glance, it’s not hard to see why. Such a 
system could be more efficient, less wasteful and safer. The outlook 
appears sufficiently compelling that the longer-term goal of 
creating fully automated systems is being widely debated and 
planned for. 
Several levels of autonomy are envisaged. At level one single 
functions are to be carried out by the vehicle in restricted 
circumstances. At level two the vehicle can operate multiple 
functions with the driver actively monitoring. At level three the 
vehicle can cover all driving functions but refer back to the driver if / 
when needed. At this level, however, the ‘hands off’ issue becomes 
a safety concern. So at level four,  complete vehicle autonomy 
within system-wide limits becomes the preferred goal. At level five, 
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in-vehicle systems replace all driving functions in any 
circumstances, indicating true autonomy (King, 2017).  Such 
apparently positive conclusions appear to be supported by World 
Health Organisation (WHO) statistics that recorded a staggering 
1.25 million road deaths in 2015 alone (WHO, 2015). Or, as one 
writer put it: ‘the only difference between a human driver and 
a machine driver is the speed and accuracy of perception and 
reaction, and the machine wins that one easily’ (Walsh, 2016). This 
is one of several arguments. Others include the following. If AVs 
were to become standard then chaotic and crowded road transport 
systems might well be rationalised. Traffic jams could become a 
thing of the past. Car ownership per se would decline since fewer 
vehicles would be needed. Roads could be smaller and less 
intrusive. The space in cities presently devoted to parking would be 
reduced making these same areas available for other uses. Then 
again, since the new AVs would run on electric power there’d be 
an increase in energy efficiency with corresponding reductions in 
exhaust fumes and pollution. (That noted, the makeup of energy 
systems – coal, oil, gas, nuclear vs. renewables – used to power 
electric vehicles would obviously have a significant impact on the 
overall energy profile.) From a popular viewpoint, cities could 
return to being ‘clean and green.’ On the other hand all these 
assumed benefits turn out to be highly contestable. For example, 
it’s doubtful if such a multi-dimensional transition could occur as 
quickly as proponents suggest. Then there’s the huge question of 
costs – not only to manufacture smaller, lighter batteries but also 
to drive down the cost the sophisticated electronics such vehicles 
require. Equally, the question of complexity has barely figured in 
current narratives. But it will take heroic levels of reliability to keep 
such vehicles operating safely. There’s also another side to this 
story. 
UNEMPLOYMENT AND THE MYTH OF 
52 RICHARD A. SLAUGHTER
PERPETUAL INTERNET RELIABILITY 
The most obvious and immediate drawback is the rapid decline 
in employment for large numbers of people who currently earn a 
living through driving. In the UK, for example, there are close to 
300,000 Heavy Goods Vehicle (HGV) drivers alone, most of whose 
jobs would disappear (Ashley, 2017). And this is without counting 
bus and taxi drivers. Yet little is heard from policy makers or AV 
promoters about these deteriorating prospects. John Harris 
describes the issue like this: 
There are 3.5 million truck drivers in the US, as well as 233,000 cab 
drivers (an official estimate, which seems low), 330,000 Uber drivers 
and 660,000 bus drivers. In the UK, at the last count, there were 
297,600 taxi or private-hire-vehicle driver licenses in England alone, 
and 600,000 people are registered drivers of heavy goods vehicles. 
The traditional logic of the job market has made sitting behind a 
wheel a fallback option – if all else fails, you can always drive a cab. 
But no more… (Harris, 2016a). 
The beginnings of a solution are likely to involve income 
redistribution on a wide scale. Proposals for a social innovation 
– a universal basic income (UBI) - to reduce the strain on what 
Paul Mason calls ‘the precariat’ crop up occasionally but are a long 
way from being implemented (Mason, 2016). The political will is 
minimal, the economics challenging and the issues complex. Yet it’s 
fair to say that little could be further from the minds of those who 
favour the introduction of AVs. While most are caught up in the 
ever more unequal distribution of wealth, measures to moderate 
such extremes are few and far between. These are matters of 
real public concern. Yet industry innovators, and those who speak 
for them, remain preoccupied with technical issues. So they don’t 
view the structural decline in employment and a corresponding 
rise in public unrest as any concern of theirs. They are focused 
on capturing as large a slice as possible of emerging markets. So 
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questions like ‘should we do this?’ give way to ‘can we do this, how 
fast and where?’ Framing issues in such ways certainly simplifies 
things. 
Yet pursuing the single-minded pursuit of ‘innovation’ on the 
one hand, while ignoring wider consequences on the other, 
de-legitimises any pretence to objectivity or detachment. 
Acknowledging and understanding these links therefore becomes a 
vital public concern. More people would then appreciate the extent 
to which corporate and social interests have been poorly aligned 
for many years (Higgs, 2014; Klein, 2007, Klein, 2014; Bakan, 2004). 
It was suggested above that privileging technological innovation 
above all else looks increasingly like a dangerous mistake. On the 
other hand, costs and disruptions can be moderated or prevented 
if they are detected and publicised in good time. This is obviously 
one of the key functions of high quality foresight work in the public 
interest. If and when the political will is found, more equable 
solutions can emerge. 
There is, however, no ready-made solution to what may be the 
Achilles Heel of all AV systems – their dependence on perpetual 
Internet integrity. At the very time when key players are preparing 
for ubiquitous cyber warfare, the faultless continuity of IT-related 
systems remains a convenient myth. In this view, complexity 
becomes a social trap and reliable security a delusion. Yet, as things 
stand, the pragmatic worldview and raw instrumental power of the 
main players suggests that they will push ahead regardless. They’re 
uninterested in permission, regulation or negotiating any diversion 
from the humanly tragic and debased futures they are creating 
(Harari, 2015). 
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SYSTEMS RATIONALITY, ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE, PRIVACY 
Since most governments lack even the rudimentary means to 
evaluate the emerging tides of new technology – let alone make 
informed decisions about their social implications – the question 
of who will take responsibility for large-scale breakdowns, 
power-outages and disruptions, whether caused by actual 
accidents or by malign cyber-attacks, remains open. What is clear 
is that to the extent that AV systems are progressively installed the 
torrent of data that they’ll require and generate will become too 
vast and complex for humans to manage. New levels of automation 
capable of processing vast amounts of ‘big data’ in real time will be 
needed. Human control over these systems will therefore diminish. 
Humanity will have taken another step toward the era of ‘systems 
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rationality’ where notions like ‘autonomy’ and ‘choice’ become 
meaningless. 
One option that can be explored as an alternative to a full on 
‘big data’ scenario would reflect the difference between artificial 
intelligence (AI) and Intelligence Amplification (IA). In the former 
case the goal is to replace human intelligence with machine 
equivalents, whereas in the latter it is to augment human 
capabilities. Driver assisted vehicles are not merely less threatening 
and problematic, they already exist in significant numbers. So it 
may be possible to explore a similar process of augmenting human 
capability and, in so doing, bypass some of the hurdles mentioned 
here. Yet this is by no means a foregone conclusion. Within a 
‘growth at all costs’ corporate worldview optimal solutions appear 
less appealing than grand visions in which limits have little or no 
place. 
Currently we’re a long way from figuring out how society as a 
whole can begin to deal with the unending flow of data. Effective 
AV systems would necessarily be designed to eliminate as much 
uncertainty, ambiguity and choice as possible. It would record the 
full details of each and every trip, making it possible for anyone 
with access to know exactly where and when people have been. 
Unlike with today’s smart phones whose ‘tracking services’ can still 
be switched off, no such option would be available. Some criminal 
activities (such as car theft) might decline but at the cost of 
ratcheting up the level of surveillance to unprecedented levels. One 
observer sees it this way. He writes: 
Shrouded in secrecy, swallowed up by complexity and scale, the 
world is hurtling toward a new transnational electro-dystopia … 
Localisation doesn’t matter that much. The Chinese Internet model 
and the American giant server farms are proof of the dangerous 
fact that digital automation is inherently coupled with the 
efficiencies of integrate centralisation and control (Keane, 2015, p. 
33). 
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AVs are safer for whom? 
The issue of safety is one of the key drivers behind the emergence 
of AV technology. Yet the conversation thus far has taken place 
within an affluent ‘first world ghetto.’ It’s here that the finance is 
available and the greatest rewards are expected. Yet the closer 
one looks the more the whole process appears to do with notions 
of greed than of need. So it’s worth asking a different question 
– where are these promised new levels of safety most needed? 
The answer is – in the very places where they are least likely to 
occur. The WHO (2015) statistics on road deaths make this clear. 
The following sample is for deaths per 100,000 people in 2013. 
Table 1: Road deaths 
Country Deaths per 100,000 people in 2013 
Central African Republic 32.4 










United Kingdom 2.9 
If, in this already one-sided technical view, part of the ‘value 
proposition’ is that ‘human life is valuable therefore we should 
reduce the road toll’ then it’s clear that countries with the greatest 
need for technical assistance are the least likely to get it. The 
unfortunate truth is that there’s little or no profit to be made from 
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poor and destitute nations. Hence the argument about ‘making 
driving safer’ clearly rests on ‘first world’ privilege. It depends on (a) 
excluding the poorest nations and (b) therefore ramping up even 
further the already unsustainable gulf that exists between rich and 
the poor. So far as the corporates are concerned poor people can 
continue dying in their thousands so long as they gain access to 
the most profitable markets. Obscured by the growing chorus of 
approval for AVs in the rich West this sad reality has been widely 
overlooked. Yet its antecedents are well understood. They were 
described a decade ago, for example, in Klein’s detailed account of 
what she called ‘the rise of disaster capitalism’ (Klein, 2007). 
SUMMARY 
This section has argued that the full costs of any thorough going 
implementation of AV technology bring with it very significant 
costs. These include: 
 
• mass unemployment and few serious attempts to deal 
with it; 
• the further erosion of privacy; 
• an impossible commitment to the myth of perpetual 
Internet integrity; 
• the assimilation of people, societies and cultures into a 
world dominated by machines and governed by the 
abstract demands of ‘systems rationality’; and, 
• a further increase in the unsustainable gulf between rich 
and poor. 
Rationales in favour of the rapid implementation of AVs are 
therefore not as persuasive as they may first appear. It follows 
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that the rush to implementation needs to be slowed down and 
perhaps halted – at least for a while. This view is partly about 
values including prudence and compassion. It strongly supports 
the view expressed in the previous section that new technologies 
should be seen and understood in their wider contexts. They are 
not merely ‘stuff’; each has human, social, cultural and geopolitical 
consequences, and positive, negative and ambiguous outcomes. 
The arguments and justifications put forward in favour of AVs thus 
far appear to depict issues in the simplest and most positive ways, 
obscuring alternatives and understating the wider costs. 
High-tech companies have become surprisingly casual about 
embarking not merely on one or two but a whole series of frankly 
outrageous projects that, at base, serve to re-shape the world in 
their own image. But there’s sufficient evidence to take a stand 
against careless innovation with ramifying social consequences. It’s 
now clear that a high-tech world fashioned by and for the corporate 
sector becomes progressively less fit for people (Klein, 2014; Higgs, 
2014; Harari, 2015). There are many other alternatives awaiting our 
collective attention (Alexander & Mcleod, 2014; Rees, 2014; Floyd & 
Slaughter, 2012). 
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What drives Silicon Valley? 
It was suggested above that well-grounded critique opens up new 
areas of insight that can inspire viable responses and inform 
policy-making (Slaughter, 2017). This chapter suggests that further 
insights can be gained from a better understanding of the human 
and cultural interiors of organisations and individuals. After all, it is 
from the interior dynamics of values and worldview commitments 
that real-world structures, innovations and consequences emerge 
into the light of day. Developmental psychology has opened up 
many ways of achieving greater clarity regarding interior structures 
and processes and integral methods have proved particularly 
useful here. In brief, they embody a fusion of the work of many 
different people that helps us to understand more of what is 
occurring ‘beneath the surface’ of contested issues (Slaughter, 
2010). They shed new light on some of the interior sources or 
‘drivers’ that operate in Silicon Valley. 
An indicative example can be found in Mark Zuckerberg’s 
admonition to the staff of Facebook to ‘move fast and break things’ 
as it reveals much about both. Jonathan Taplin draws on this 
statement to show how such imperatives arose within the specific 
conditions of American society and culture. Three influences can be 
mentioned here – Shumpeter’s notion of ‘creative destruction’, the 
normalisation of aggressive entrepreneurial practices and, last but 
by no means least, the pervasive influence of Ayn Rand’s radically 
individualistic right wing ideology (Taplin, 2017; Freedland, 2017). 
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These are among the historical and social forces that created 
Facebook, Google, Amazon, among others, and helped them 
become what Rushkoff calls vast ‘monopoly platforms’ (Rushkoff, 
2016). These organisations currently have as much, if not more, 
wealth and power than many national governments. John Harris 
puts it like this: 
The orthodoxies of government and politics are so marginal to 
the way advanced economies work that if politicians fail to keep 
up, they simply get pushed aside…The amazing interactions many 
of them facilitate between people are now direct – with no role 
for any intermediate organisations, whether traditional retailers or 
the regulatory state. The result is a kind of anarchy, overseen by 
unaccountable monarchs: we engage with each other via eBay, 
Facebook and the rest, while the turbo-philanthropy of Mark 
Zuckerberg and Bill Gates superficially fills the moral vacuum that 
would once have pointed to oversight and regulation by the state 
 (Harris, 2016b). 
Mason comments what must be obvious to many that as 
‘monopolies (they) should be broken up.’ He adds, ‘if Facebook 
were a bank, it could not exist; nor Google if it were a supermarket,’ 
(Mason, 2017). In this view an underlying reason why that has 
not occurred is due to ‘the structure of hedge-fund-driven modern 
capitalism (which incentivises the creation of monopolies), together 
with political cronyism’ (Mason, 2017). Back in 2016 Facebook 
reportedly earned a cool US$8.8 billion and counted close to two 
billion people, or about half of the world’s Internet users, as its 
customers (Cadwalladr, 2017). Yet such gains also impose equally 
huge losses on publishers, newspapers, authors and a wide range 
of associated professions. Over time its customers become used 
to the dumbed-down alternatives that pour forth from countless 
unverified sources. Vital questions about where Facebook’s power 
ends, where its limits lie and to whom it is accountable have eluded 
successive U.S. governments that, at minimum, have failed to apply 
their own anti-trust rules and regulations. Inscrutable algorithms, 
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deep penetration into the texture of so many human lives and vast 
wealth appear to make Facebook almost invulnerable to top-down 
intervention. There are, however, other possibilities. 
While much attention has been paid to the wealth and apparent 
instrumental power of these organisations, rather less attention 
has been paid to investigating them from within, so to speak. Yet 
doing so reveals new ways of understanding them and perhaps 
reducing their dominance. Two previous examples of this kind of 
work are informative. One is Urry’s Societies Beyond Oil: Oil Dregs 
and Social Futures (Urry, 2013); another is Oreskes and Conway’s 
Merchants of Doubt (Oreskes & Conway, 2011). Urry deployed his 
considerable talent in ‘depth sociology’ to understand how ‘carbon 
interests’ became so powerful and was able to characterise the 
kinds of futures to which their continued dominance leads. Oreskes 
and Conway took on the cultural power of the exceptionally well- 
financed U.S. ‘climate denialist’ clique. They revealed in detail 
exactly where it started, the techniques and assets it employed 
and how careers were destroyed en route to establishing denialism 
as continuing disruptive force in US political life. The point is this: 
when credible efforts are undertaken by well-qualified people to 
return some of these hidden interior phenomena back into the 
limelight there’s no turning back. The hand of autocratic power, 
money and influence is revealed. Motives, purposes and outcomes 
are identified and called into question. Importantly, in the present 
context, the knowledge so gained cannot be erased. This is, in 
other words, a fair and legitimate way for societies to recover from 
multiple failures of governance and to regain from the oligarchs 
what was never theirs in the first place – an assumed social licence 
to operate as they wish. 
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INTEGRAL PERSPECTIVES AND THE SILICON 
VALLEY WORLDVIEW 
Integral methods can be used in many ways. Theorists and 
practitioners can plunge into them in such depth that their 
investigations become abstracted and lose touch with reality. Here, 
as in previous work, they are employed lightly to reveal insights 
that can be taken up and used by virtually anyone. They use three 
sets of criteria: the four quadrants (windows on reality); four levels 
of worldview complexity and six values levels (Table 2). In earlier 
work some key reasons for applying Integral thinking were 
summarised thus: 
While most people and the vast majority of civil and commercial 
organisations around the world certainly appear to have benefitted 
in the short term from the vast expansion of on-line options and 
capabilities, a much darker picture is emerging. It concerns not only 
the extraordinary cultural and economic power being wielded but 
also the nature of the underlying worldview and values – which are 
the main foci here – and where these appear to lead (Slaughter 
2015, p. 243). 
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Table 
2 Summary of quadrants, worldviews and values by Slaughter (2012) 
1 
The four quadrants (or ‘windows’ on reality) 
a. The upper left quadrant (the interior ‘world’ of human identity and self-reference); 
b. The lower left quadrant (the interior ‘world’ of cultural identity and knowledge); 
c. The upper right quadrant (the exterior ‘world’ of individual existence and 
behavior); 
d. The lower right quadrant (the exterior world and physical universe). 
2 
Four levels of worldview complexity 
a. Pre-conventional (survival and self-protection); 
b. Conventional (socialised, passive, adherence to status quo); 
c. Post-conventional (reflexive, open to complexity and change); 
d. Integral (holistic, systemic, values all contributions, works across boundaries, 
disciplines and cultures). 
3 
Six value levels 
a. Red (egocentric and exploitative); 
b. Amber (absolutist and authoritarian); 
c. Orange (multiplistic and strategic); 
d. Green (relativistic and consensual); 
e. Teal (systemic and integral); 
f. Turquoise (holistic and ecological). 
What became clear over time was that the Internet had morphed 
into something like an extreme version of Bentham’s Panopticon 
where individuals were routinely subjected to extreme surveillance. 
Today that merely looks like a first step as entire industries are now 
feeding off of data traces routinely expropriated and on-sold for 
exploitation by the advertising industry (Zuboff, 2015). There’s little 
sense among the main players of any compassion, empathy or care 
for the higher goals or aspirations of humanity. 
“The dominant paradigm is one of covert exploitation, erosion of 
individual agency and autonomy, and a sheer lack of transparency 
and accountability, reminiscent of authoritarian dynamics rather 
than of a digital well-being with equal and active participation of 
informed citizens,” (Christodoulou et al. 2021). 
What emerges overall is a picture of societies and cultures 
becoming hollowed out by extraordinary monopoly power and, at 
the same time, becoming increasingly polarised and angry. Many 
formerly proud professions are in decline, unemployment is rising 
and criminality penetrates even the most private spaces. A look 
at three key figures from Silicon Valley – Mark Zuckerberg, Ray 
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Kurzweil and work by Google’s chief economist Hal Varien – helps 
make sense of this perverse reality. In the former case an interview 
published in Time magazine clearly revealed elements of 
Zuckerberg’s interior life. It showed, for example, that he is 
dismissive of external opinion and equates critique with ‘turning 
the clock back’. He denies that pervasive advertising is in any way 
‘out of alignment’ with his customers and is ‘concerned with nuance 
and subtle shades of meaning only to the extent to which they 
are useful to him’ (Grossman, 2014). Within such a pragmatic and 
instrumental frame terms like ‘values’, ‘human nature’ and ‘society’ 
have little or no meaning. This is significant when the broad 
impacts of Facebook are considered. 
Similar issues arose in relation to Kurzweil, Chief Engineer at 
Google and well known for his views on the coming ‘singularity.’ 
This is supposedly a time when humanity merges with its 
technology and achieves a kind of disembodied immortality. There 
are fringe admirers, of course, who eagerly anticipate such 
‘post-human’ futures. Yet a review of various accounts of this work 
strongly suggest that this perspective can be characterised as ‘high 
technology and hubris’ in about equal parts. Reductionism and 
category errors abound, for example, in Kurzweil’s ‘theory of mind’ 
where the vast complexity of the latter is reduced to mere ‘pattern 
recognition’ (Pensky, 2015). Another concern is the ‘constant 
conflation of biological evolution’ with ‘technical evolution.’ For 
Kurzweil ‘biological evolution, cultural development, and the 
advancement of computing technology are all part of the same 
immutable force.’ In this view, ‘the advance of technology is as 
inevitable as biological evolution’ (Pensky, 2015). 
When technology and biology are ‘plotted on the same graph’ we 
know that those who view the world this way are living in their own 
version of what has been called ‘flatland.’ Within that diminished 
frame what is manifestly missing is any appreciation of the power 
and influence of the interior worlds of individuals and cultures. 
Also significant is that from a structural interior standpoint the 
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worldviews and values of these key figures are so similar. In terms 
of the categories outlined in Table 1 both appear to be driven 
by ‘red’ to ‘orange’ values and draw on conventional to inverted 
(incomplete or, more controversially, ‘unhealthy’) forms of 
post-conventional worldviews. 
ZUBOFF’S CRITIQUE OF THE ‘BIG OTHER’ 
Shoshana Zuboff’s magisterial treatment of Google’s pursuit of 
‘surveillance capitalism’ should be read in the original as it provides 
a paradigmatic example of an in-depth countervailing view (Zuboff, 
2015). Her article ‘Big Other’ takes the form of an extended critical 
response to, and evaluation of, material produced by Google’s chief 
economist Hal Varien. Zuboff supports the view taken above that: 
‘big data is not a technology or an inevitable technology effect. It is 
not an autonomous process… It originates in the social, and it is there 
that we must find and know it.‘ (Zuboff, 2016, p.75) . This is a crucial 
point. She continues: 
‘Big data’ is above all the foundational component in a deeply 
intentional and highly consequential new logic of accumulation that 
I call surveillance capitalism. This new form of information capitalism 
aims to predict and modify human behaviour as a means to 
produce revenue and market control (Zuboff, 2016, p.75). 
Later in the piece she contrasts Varian’s technocratic vision with 
that of Hannah Arendt who offered more nuanced humanistic view 
of. She comments that: 
In contrast to (Hanna) Arendt, Varian’s vision of a computer 
mediated world strikes me as an arid wasteland – not a community 
of equals bound through laws in the inevitable and ultimately 
fruitful human struggle with uncertainty. In this futurescape, the 
human community has already failed. It is a place adapted to the 
normalisation of chaos and terror where there the vestiges of trust 
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have long since withered and died. Human replenishment … gives 
way to the blankness of perpetual compliance (Zuboff, 2016, p.81). 
Zuboff’s calm, clear and forensic examination of Google and its 
operations lead her to conclusions that are valuable in the present 
context as they help to inspire subsequent actions. For example: 
Google’s tools are not the objects of value exchange. They do not 
establish productive consumer-producer reciprocities. Instead they 
are ‘hooks’ that lure users into extractive operations and turn 
ordinary life into a 21st Century Faustian pact. This social 
dependency is at the heart of the surveillance project. Powerful 
felt needs for an effective life vie against the inclination to resist 
the surveillance project. This conflict provides a kind of psychic 
numbing that inures people to the realities of being tracked, 
parsed, mined and modified – or disposes them to rationalise the 
situation in resigned cynicism. This … is a choice that 21st Century 
people should not have to make (Zuboff, 2016, pp.83-4). 
In summary she concludes that: 
New possibilities of subjugation are produced as this innovative 
institutional logic thrives on unexpected and illegible mechanisms 
of extraction and control that exile persons from their own 
behaviour (Zuboff, 2016, p. 85). 
Limitations of space preclude further discussion here. Next steps, 
however, could include applying this kind of exploration to other 
subjects and creating projects dedicated to revealing the inner 
worlds of the oligarchs and their leaders in much greater detail. 
The next section is devoted to this wider analysis. 
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SILICON VALLEY – BUILDING OR 
UNDERMINING THE FUTURE? 
With such examples in mind it is legitimate to ask if Silicon Valley 
in general and the ‘big three’ in particular are building the future 
or, in fact, undermining it. From an Integral viewpoint any attempt 
to ‘build the future’ from structurally deficient and reductive right 
hand quadrant (empirical) views of reality is at the very least unwise 
and almost certainly a recipe for disaster. What can be missed by 
critics, however, is that the existential risks that have been created by 
thoughtless innovation and the scaling up of these enterprises to the 
global level are as dangerous for the U.S. as they are for anywhere else. 
In summary these examples suggest a broad default or collective 
profile of the sector, namely that it: 
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• Arises from ego-, and socio-centric outlooks that serve to 
privilege ‘me, us and now.’ 
• Proceeds from a conventional level of complexity (with 
forays into post-conventional when it comes to, e.g., 
financial innovation and marketing); 
• Expresses a range of values from ‘red’ to ‘orange,’ neither 
of which provides an adequate basis from which to 
resolve the issues identified here. 
• Largely address the lower right (exterior collective) 
domain of reality, with an occasional focus in the lower 
left (for social influence) and upper right (for persuasion 
and control). 
Seen in this light the term silicon ‘giants’ appears misplaced since 
they currently operate more like ethical ‘midgets.’ It follows that 
if societies are to resolve some of the concerns expressed here 
then they will want to focus on ways to bring individuals and 
organisations at every level up and out of these diminished states 
of being. This is a core concern of humanistic and developmental 
psychology in general. Within the domain of integral methodology 
Chris Fuhs proposes a model for assessing the nature and potential 
of translative change (change within a given level) in contrast to 
transformative change (movement from one level to another). This 
work is partly motivated by a need to avoid earlier ‘growth to 
goodness’ assumptions that are now understood to be overstated 
(Fuhs, 2013). This is categorically not a question of promoting ever 
newer and more exciting technologies. Rather, it is finding ways 
to bring into play more comprehensive worldviews and more 
sustaining values. 
GROUNDS OF HOPE 
The crucial thing to note is that the current techno-capitalist 
WHAT DRIVES SILICON VALLEY? 69
worldview is by its very nature unstable and yet highly resistant 
to any kind of oversight or limitation. The Internet oligarchs have 
continued to flourish over the years when it became clear that 
humanity requires a genuine shift of state, a new dynamic (a 
transition to sustainability) and completely different direction (a 
post-growth outlook). The evidence is finally in that high-tech 
civilisation, despite its real achievements, is on a no-win collision 
course with the planet (Das, 2015; Higgs, 2014). It no longer makes 
sense to deny that the direction we should be collectively pursuing 
is one that moves decisively away from passive consumerism, the 
diminished rationality of ‘the market’ and endless growth. This is 
not to say that genuinely innovative, useful and worthwhile uses 
of IT have not emerged over this period. Rather, ‘IT revolution’ has 
been undermined and misdirected by an ideology that ignores the 
human and cultural interiors. Instead of leading to a ‘better world’ 
it inscribes the collective slide toward civilisational breakdown and 
eventual collapse (Floyd & Slaughter, 2014). 
In a more open and egalitarian world new technologies would 
not be set loose to blindly impact upon complex social systems 
through one default fait accompli after another. Rather, they would 
be subjected to rigorous questioning and testing long before they 
were widely applied. Indeed, this was a core purpose of the Office 
of Technology Assessment (OTA) that, in its brief lifetime, was 
established to advise the U.S. Congress on exactly these matters 
(Blair, 2013). During the Reagan / Thatcher era the all-powerful 
‘private sector’ in the US comprehensively abolished such initiatives 
with predictable results. This is only one of a whole series of failures 
of governance especially, within the U.S. One could imagine, for 
example, what might have occurred if, instead of repealing the 
Glass-Steagal Act (to abolish the separation of high street backing 
and high-risk speculative gaming) Bill Clinton and the US 
government had put in place the means to probe the implications 
of high-risk speculative credit-default swops and the like. The 
Global Financial Crisis (G.F.C.) would have been less serious or 
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possibly averted altogether. But no such attempt was made. 
Warnings were ignored, taxpayers of the developed world ended 
up footing the bill and Wall Street continued much as before. While 
various attempts to institutionalise technology assessment have 
occurred, it still remains uncommon (Schlove, 2010). 
Until very recently the European Community (EU) has been 
effectively alone in taking steps to ensure that ‘some things are 
not for sale’. It has taken small, but promising steps to regulate 
corporations, compel them pay more tax and create new rules 
allowing users to take charge of how their personal data is used, 
if at all (Drozdiak, 2017). It has even fined Google 2.4 billion for 
promoting its own shopping recommendations above those of 
other companies. This is a beginning. But a great deal of dedicated 
work will be required before sufficient countervailing power can be 
assembled on behalf of civil societies to design and implement IT 
systems that are secure and benefit everyone 
Fortunately there are multiple ways forward in shaping this IT 
revolution that are being pursued by people and organisations of 
intelligence and good will. In fact the seeds of many solutions to 
global dilemmas are already emerging. For example, one of many 
places to begin is Solnit’s work on the role of hope in a threatened 
world (Solnit, 2016). A different approach from Canada is Rees’ 
‘Agenda for sustainable growth and relocalising the economy’ 
(Rees, 2014). Raworth’s work on a broader and more inclusive 
model for economics looks promising (Raworth, 2017). As does 
Fry’s impressive work on what he calls ‘design futuring’ (Fry, 2009). 
Then, specifically relevant to the issues raised here, are suggestions 
by Hodson, Taylor and other actors in this virtual space on how, 
in practical terms, oversight and control can be returned from 
the Internet giants to individuals, societies and, more broadly, 
governance in the public interest (Hodson, 2016; Taylor 2014). 
Having outlined aspects of ‘the problem’ the following sections 
begin the process of focusing on possible solutions. 
 





Never has an industry attained such global dominance with so little 
effort at regulation. Search engines are like cars on motorways with 
no requirement for brakes, emission controls or seatbelts. The failure 
to regulate, let alone properly tax, these massive corporations is the 
grossest lapse of modern government (Jenkins, 2017). 
Big data … is not a technology or an inevitable technology effect. It is 
not an autonomous process … It originates in the social, and it is here 
that we must find it and know it (Zuboff, 2015). 
INTRODUCTION 
The first chapter in this book explored several accounts of the IT 
revolution. Of particular interest was the contrast between those 
who framed this process in terms of positive outcomes and those 
who considered that it had been subverted by powerful actors 
especially in Silicon Valley. The second section considered two case 
studies: the Internet of Things (IoT) and the projected rise of 
Autonomous Vehicles (AVs). It briefly employed Integral concepts to 
identify values and worldviews that appear to characterise leading 
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figures within the IT industry. These interior human characteristics 
arguably have powerful consequences yet have been widely 
overlooked in high-tech environments. It concluded that, on the 
whole, and notwithstanding some obvious practical gains, there 
is evidence to support the view that the Internet has been 
undermined and compromised by the power, wealth and reach 
of vast monopoly enterprises. Yet multiple solutions already exist 
in embryo and many more are sure to emerge. This section 
challenges the current status quo and considers revising 
assumptions and re-designing (or re-purposing) the Internet and 
associated IT applications towards more egalitarian and socially 
viable ends. The enormity and complexity of IT reflects shifts and 
changes almost daily. So, a concise account such as this cannot be 
other than a work in progress. 
A central theme of this publication is ill-considered or compulsive 
innovation. It questions fatalistic attitudes and argues that, far from 
being inevitable, concerns such as artificial intelligence (AI) or 
Chinese surveillance practices need to be brought more fully into 
the open and subjected to sustained critical enquiry. The theme of 
recovery and renewal is also addressed. Some critical ‘blind spots’ 
are briefly outlined (a distinct lack of interest in global challenges; 
a pervasive tendency to under-value ‘the social’) and reframed in 
more positive terms. The notion of ‘constitutive human interests’ is 
raised. It’s here that the positive implications of the project become 
more obvious since many of the concerns raised can also be viewed 
as positive opportunities for productive innovation and adaptive 
change. 
A variety of innovations for better managing IT-related 
innovations and re-purposing the Internet are subsequently 
discussed. They include working with three scales of innovation, 
taming algorithms and supporting human agency. The positive 
innovation theme continues where wider questions about social 
democracy, new infrastructure and regulation are discussed. 
Finally we return to the question of ‘re-humanising’ the IT 
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revolution. Here the discussion includes notions of the public good, 
moral universals (and their lack) and the vexed, ever-present 
question of the sheer ambiguity of unconstrained and rapid 
technical innovation. The conclusions are framed by a growing 
imperative to ‘disrupt the disruptors’ by investing in socially 
democratic actions and processes across the board. These could 
include changing the terms of business to rein in the oligarchs, 
breaking up monopolies (or re-constituting them as public utilities), 
subjecting proposed high-tech innovations to greater informed 
scrutiny, building new civic infrastructure and supporting the 
development of further IT capabilities in the public, as opposed to 
private, interest. 
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Compulsive innovation 
‘You can’t stop 
progress.’ 
One of the themes that 
emerges from this enquiry is 
the need and opportunity for 
large-scale, democratically 
mediated social design and a 
commitment to long-term social innovation in the public interest. 
At first sight it may appear difficult to see how the motivation for 
such efforts could arise or from whom. But these are early days and 
motivation can emerge from a variety of sources. To begin with, in 
a context of radically ambiguous technical innovation, with its 
accompanying upheavals and disruptions the widely held view that 
‘you can’t stop progress’ clearly lacks credibility when used 
fatalistically, and should be set aside. Modifying this slightly to ‘you 
can’t stop technical innovation’ is a small step forward but doesn’t 
take us very far. Of far greater value is a more nuanced 
understanding of what terms such as ‘progress’ and ‘innovation’ 
actually mean, what values they spring from, whose interests are 
represented (or extinguished) and what longer term impacts and 
consequences may plausibly occur. 
Such issues are hardly part of common conversation but if 
society is to regain any say in its own prospects, these issues need 
to be brought into the open and debated much more widely. 
Similarly, the social, political, technical and environmental 
consequences of neo-liberal formulas of economic growth along 
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with ever increasing inequality are no longer in doubt across the 
globe. People are becoming ever more concerned about these 
issues and, moreover, the Earth system itself is responding to 
multiple human impacts with glacially slow, but unstoppable, 
momentum. The faulty notions of ‘progress’ in this context clearly 
need to be unpacked as they are fraught with ambiguity and 
increasingly divorced from genuine human interests (Metcalf, 
2017). Australia’s Gold Coast illustrates this dilemma rather well. 
The mode of development on display is a living testament to a 
worldview characterised by profit-seeking, denial and 
short-termism. These are not characteristics that bode well for the 
future (Slaughter, 2016). 
‘Progress’ is often seen as synonymous with technical innovation 
but such notions do not withstand close scrutiny. Similarly, a 
continuing free-for-all dialectic of innovation and counter 
innovation quickly becomes irrational in our currently divided 
world. In what may be an inexact but tellingly perverse reversal 
of Moore’s Law the stakes grow ever more extreme with each 
new level of technical capability. Yet business leaders and decision 
makers seem largely unaware of this. We can see this in the current 
breakout of IT company investments in powerful real-world 
applications such as automation and advanced robotics that look 
set to destroy most, if not all, semi-skilled jobs (Murphy, 2017). We 
see it in the irrationality of emerging autonomous weapon systems 
(Begley & Wroe, 2017). We also see it on the mid-term horizon in 
the systemic threats that plausibly arise from quantum computing 
(Majot & Yampolskiy, 2015). A more immediate example is the rise 
of GPS spoofing. The early development of this technology was 
undoubtedly useful as it introduced precise, reliable navigation 
into countless transportation applications. Now certain features 
in its design are being quite deliberately employed to disable it. 
According to reports anomalous results were first spotted by 
PokemonGo players near sensitive sites in Moscow and then began 
appearing elsewhere. For example, alarms began to sound when 
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the master of a ship in the Black Sea discovered that his position 
was over 30 kilometres away from where it was supposed to be. 
Russia is thought to be one entity experimenting with the 
technology. But of equal or perhaps greater concern is that 
spoofing software can now be downloaded from the Internet and 
employed by anyone with the knowledge and will to do so 
(Hambling, 2017). 
A similar dialectic is apparent in countless other examples, 
sometimes even in advance. Actively scanning the environment 
for signals of change does, in theory, provide time to respond. 
Separate scanning hits may interact to reveal previously hidden 
possibilities. For example, public media announce that trials of 
driverless ‘autonomous vehicles’ (AVs) will occur along a public 
motorway. A UK Minister of Transport announces that AVs will 
be in use by 2021 (Topham, 2017). Such developments are now 
becoming technically feasible. Yet around the same time a radical 
group publishes details about how, with a little imagination, 
vehicle-derailing devices can be easily and cheaply constructed and 
set in place leaving those responsible to disappear without trace 
(Thiessen, 2017). Little imagination is required to suggest that both 
high-, and low-tech devices will be developed to intervene and 
disrupt the smooth operation of AV technology wherever it is 
deployed. Once again, we are reminded that new technologies are 
never ‘value free;’ they always come with hidden weaknesses and 
costs, winners and ‘losers’. Those who put their faith in complex 
systems will eventually need to recognise that the latter are not 
infallible. Those with different values and what one might call 
‘oppositional’ social interests will continue to take advantage of 
any weaknesses or blind spots (Bartlett, 2017). It follows that the 
‘hidden’, non-material side of any technology is at least as 




Bill Gates and Stephen Hawking are among many who have warned 
of the dangers of artificial intelligence (AI) and the very real 
possibility that it may represent an existential threat to humanity. 
Fresh impetus to this debate was provided when Mark Zuckerberg 
and Elon Musk clashed over this issue. While Musk echoed 
previously expressed concerns, Zuckerberg would have none of 
it. For him such talk was ‘negative’ and ‘irresponsible.’ He’s dead 
against any ‘call for a slowdown in progress’ with AI (Frier, 2017). 
So it fell to director James Cameron, director of Terminator 2 and 
other movie blockbusters, to inject some reality into the 
proceedings by reminding everyone of the mammoth in the room. 
Namely that it is ‘market forces (that) have put us into runaway 
climate change, and the sixth mass extinction.’ He then added that 
‘we don’t seem to have any great skill at not experimenting on 
ourselves in completely unprecedented ways’ (Maddox, 2017). 
What is significant here is that it falls to a movie director to 
draw attention to links between the products of an advanced 
techno-economic system and the growing likelihood of irrational 
outcomes. Such concerns are fundamental to the maintenance of 
public safety and wellbeing. Yet, careful consideration of the social 
implications of technical change by public authorities has declined 
even as the need for it has increased. The race to create artificial 
intelligence is being pursued in many places. Yet, few of the key 
players appear willing to pull back and rigorously assess the risks or 
seek guidance from wider constituencies. Whether East or West, to 
passively ‘follow the technology wherever it leads’ is technological 
determinism writ large. It’s clearly an inadequate basis upon which 
to make decisions, let alone to gamble with the future of humanity. 
We cannot assume that advanced AI will take over the world and 
either destroy humanity or render it redundant. Such outcomes 
are certainly possible but there are genuine differences of opinion 
on these very questions (Caughill, 2017; Brooks, 2017). Of more 
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immediate concern is that various agencies have been looking to 
AI for military and security ‘solutions’ for some years. Roboticised 
figures have been common in the entertainment industry for 
several decades. But wider appreciation of risks involved in their 
use in real-world situations has been minimal thus far. Now, 
however, robot soldiers are being designed and tested. In 2017, for 
example, a group called the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots met 
at the United Nations in New York. Part of the program included 
a film illustrating the potential of ‘assassin drones’ to sweep into a 
crowded area, identify targets using facial recognition, apply lethal 
force and vanish. Concerned scientists were attempting to 
‘highlight the dangers of developing autonomous weapons that can 
find, track and fire on targets without human supervision’ (Sample, 
2017). This may sound like science fiction (SF) but a leading AI 
scientist offered at least two reasons for believing that such devices 
are closer than one might think. In his view: 
The technology illustrated in the film is simply an integration of 
existing capabilities. It is not science fiction. In fact, it is easier to 
achieve than self-driving cars, which require far higher standards 
of performance. (Also) because AI-powered machines are relatively 
cheap to manufacture, critics fear that autonomous weapons could 
be mass produced and fall into the hands of rogue nations or 
terrorists who could use them to suppress populations and wreak 
havoc (Sample, 2017) 
This is merely one branch of a rapidly evolving area of research 
and innovation but the prospects are clearly terrifying. Another 
key question raised was: who or what locus of authority provided 
the green light to arms manufacturers, the disruptors of Silicon 
Valley, or indeed anyone else to carry out these unprecedented 
experiments? Reinventing the world in a high-tech era – whether 
by innovation or disruption or both – is a non-trivial matter. To 
routinely and relentlessly create new dangers and hazards cannot 
do other than threaten the viability of humanity and social life. 
Yet somehow these entities continue to operate openly and with 
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confidence, yet lacking anything remotely like a social license. Some 
consider that the development of AI could be the test case that 
decides the matter once and for all. Here is Taplin again on how 
what he regards as the benign legacy of Engelbart – an Internet 
pioneer – was turned toward darker ends. He writes that the latter 
‘saw the computer as primarily a tool to augment – not replace – 
human capability’. Yet ‘in our current era, by contrast, much of the 
financing flowing out of Silicon Valley is aimed at building machines 
that can replace humans’ (Taplin, 2017, p. 55). At this point, the 
ghost of Habermas might well be heard whispering something 
along the lines of ‘whatever happened to our communicative and 
emancipatory interests?’ To what extent does their absence from 
dominant technical discourses mean they are also missing from the 
products and outcomes they produce? 
THE PANOPTICON RETURNS 
The original panopticon as envisaged by Jeremy Bentham in the 
18th Century was a design for a prison in which all the inmates 
could be continuously monitored without their knowledge. Since 
they could never know whether they were being observed or not 
they were constrained to act as if they were at all times. Hence 
they became adept at controlling their own behaviour (Wikipedia, 
2017). During recent years newer versions have arisen that bring 
this oppressive model to mind. One is in China; the other much 
more widely distributed. Chinese intentions to use IT for social 
control are revealed by Kai Strittmatter (2020), who states: “China’s 
new drive for repression is being underpinned by unprecedented 
advances in technology”, including: 
• Facial and voice recognition 
• GPS tracking 
• supercomputer databases 
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• intercepted cell phone conversations 
• the monitoring of app use, and; 
• millions of high-resolution security cameras 
“This digital totalitarianism has been made possible not only with 
the help of Chinese private tech companies, but the complicity of 
Western governments and corporations eager to gain access to 
China’s huge market,” (Strittermatter, 2020). 
This may not seem like a particularly significant departure from 
what’s already occurring elsewhere. What is different is that China 
already has totalitarian tendencies since it is ruled by an inflexible 
party machine that shows no interest in human rights or related 
democratic norms. While the US has itself long been hamstrung 
by deadlocked and ineffectual governments it does have a 
constitution that protects certain core rights (such as free speech). 
Despite systematic predation (through copyright theft and 
monopoly power) by Internet oligarchs, the US also retains 
elements of a free press and it certainly has an independent 
judiciary. Furthermore, the European Economic Community (EEC) 
has already taken the first steps to establishing a more credible 
regime of regulation. In so doing it has shown that it is willing and 
able to take on the Internet oligarchs and force them to change 
their behaviour. So in the West there are real prospects of reining 
in at least some of the excesses. 
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But China is a very different story. According to reports its 
oppressive ‘grid system’ of systematic surveillance has been 
operating in Beijing since 2007. Aspects of this oppressive new 
system were summarised as long ago as 2013 in a Human Rights 
Report.  For example: 
The new grid system divides the neighbourhoods and communities 
into smaller units, each with a team of at least five administrative 
and security staff. In some Chinese cities the new grid units are as 
small as five or ten households, each with a “grid captain” and a 
delegated system of collective responsibility … Grid management is 
specifically intended to facilitate information-gathering by enabling 
disparate sources into a single, accessible and digitized system for 
use by officials. … In Tibet the Party Secretary told officials that 
‘we must implement the urban grid management system. The key 
elements are focusing on … really implementing grid management 
in all cities and towns, putting a dragnet into place to maintain 
stability. … By 2012 the pilot system was in ‘full swing’ (as it had 
stored) nearly 10,000 basic data’ (and collected) hundreds of pieces 
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of information about conditions of the people (Human Rights 
Watch, 2013). 
By 2015 this vast modern panopticon was ready to be rolled out to 
enable the full-on mass surveillance of China’s 1.5 billion citizens. 
According to the Metamorphosis Foundation (2020): 
Any society that looks to stratify people based on how they look, 
based on their health, based on their data and things about them, 
is an incredibly authoritarian and sinister society. The societies 
throughout history that have tried to separate and stratify people 
based on data about them are (those) that we want to stay as 
far away as possible from…Collaboration of all stakeholders and 
demand for public debate are key to preventing situations in which 
the power to decide is taken from citizens and lies only in the hands 
of private companies or police forces… 
Since then further details of this oppressive and inescapable 
surveillance system in China have emerged. For example, a wired 
article by Rachel Botsman revealed that two Chinese data giants – 
China Rapid Finance and Sesame Credit – had been commissioned 
by the government to create the required infrastructure using 
copious amounts of big data. Free access to this vast resource 
means that people can be monitored, rated and evaluated in depth 
throughout their normal lives. It turns out that ‘individuals on 
Sesame Credit are measured by a score ranging between 350 and 
950 points.’ While the algorithms remain secret the five factors 
employed are not – credit history, fulfilment capacity (or ability 
to abide by contractual arrangements), personal characteristics, 
behaviour and preferences and, finally, interpersonal relationships. 
Those with high scores get consumer choices, easy credit and the 
chance to travel; those with low scores become the new underclass 
with few meaningful choices at all. These are described as ‘private 
platforms acting essentially as spy agencies for the government.’ 
The author then adds that ‘the government is attempting to make 
obedience feel like gaming. It is a method of social control dressed 
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up in some points-reward system. It’s gamified obedience’ 
(Botsman, 2017). 
What’s particularly curious here is the inevitability of non-trivial 
perverse outcomes, foremost among which are the immense 
cultural and human costs. Masha Gessen’s mesmerising and 
sometimes painful account of life in post-revolutionary Russia 
clearly demonstrates how hard it is to imagine that a cowed and 
passive population could retain sufficient awareness or creativity 
to contribute much of value to any culture, however instrumentally 
powerful it may appear (Gessen, 2017). In Botsman’s view ‘where 
these systems really descend into nightmarish territory is that the 
trust algorithms used are unfairly reductive. They don’t take into 
account context.’ Yet without a keen sense of context meaning 
becomes free-floating and elusive. Finally there’s the inevitable 
emergence of ‘reputation black markets selling under-the-counter 
ways to boost trustworthiness’ (Botsman, 2017). Overall, this may 
turn out to be the world’s prime contemporary example of a 
‘deformed future’ in the making. 
A second and equally subversive example over the last few years 
is the growing use of voice-activated ‘digital assistants’. Skillfully 
packaged as mere ‘assistants’ and ‘helpers’ they are ‘on’ all the 
time and thus set to respond to every request and whim. Some 
of are equipped with female voices that are intended to exert 
a distinctly seductive effect as shown in Spike Jonez’s 2013 film 
Her. What is less obvious (at least to the user) is that with each 
and every use the individuals reveal ever more information about 
their not-so-private lives. Before long comprehensive profiles are 
assembled, preferences noted and rich fields of data produced. 
As things stand, the operators of these systems own this treasure 
trove of information and suggest new products and services in 
the light of those already consumed. Sales go up but consumers 
become ever more tightly bound to their own induced impulses 
and proclivities. Thus, instead of having open-ended learning 
experiences, of responding to challenges, of deepening their 
86 RICHARD A. SLAUGHTER
knowledge and understanding of their own authentic needs and 
human qualities, those who succumb can end up having ‘feelings’ 
for, and an ersatz fictional bond to, a remote impersonal network 
that exists only to exploit them. A further consequence of 
becoming over-reliant on such ‘immersive’ technologies is that the 
real-world skills and capacities of human beings start to atrophy. 
Memory, time keeping, spatial awareness are among the 
capabilities that wind down over time leaving people ever more 
dependent and at risk (Aitkin, 2016). People are seduced into 
becoming a core component of the ‘product’ being sold. As the 
human interiors shrink and fall away, identity itself becomes 
elusive and problematic. 
In summary, leaving the high-tech disruptors in any field to their 
own devices, so to speak, simply means that the human enterprise 
is subjected to random shocks and abuses that end up placing it 
in ever-greater peril. For Naomi Klein this is part of a deliberate 
playbook designed to provide a minority with greater dominance 
and power (Klein, 2007). But it’s also the result of a certain kind 
of blindness that comes from over-valuing the technical and 
under-valuing the human and the social. If there’s a consistent 
theme here it’s that power in the wrong hands creates more 
problems than it solves. So high-tech innovation needs to be 
separated from simple notions of ‘progress.’ It is fundamentally 
a question of values and power – instrumental, cultural and 
symbolic. If humanity wants to avoid dystopian outcomes, human 
societies will need to find new ways to retain their power and 
control and part only with what they judge necessary to 
governance structures that meet their real needs. In other words, 
it’s time to disrupt the disruptors. They’ve had their moment in the 
sun and the clouds are gathering. It’s time for them to stand aside 




Blind spots as opportunities 
It has been suggested throughout this book that worldview 
limitations are complicit in supporting a widely shared and selective 
blindness that prevents many of the key players from perceiving 
what is strikingly obvious to others. Three brief examples are 
provided here. One concerns the implications of Earth changes 
now under way. Another is how heedless commitments to 
empiricism, technical determinism and neoliberalism have eroded 
key modalities of human and social existence. Finally there is a 
significant, but seldom appreciated, underlying concern regarding 
the nature and implications of constitutive human interests. 
GLOBAL CONTEXT, GLOBAL LIMITS, GLOBAL 
ACTION 
Macro views of the contradictory and unsustainable condition of 
human civilisation have gained little or no traction with US 
corporations, the giants of Silicon Valley and their wealthy 
associates. This ‘condition’ obviously has multiple facets and there 
are many ways of coming to grips with it. For some observers 
a primary concern is the way humanity has laid waste natural 
resources at the expense of outgrowing the physical capacities of 
the global environment (Higgs, 2014). In this view issues around 
global warming, the scarcity of fresh water and the sixth extinction 
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loom large. The accumulation of planetary impacts has given rise 
to the term ‘Anthropocene’ or era of human-related changes 
(Carrington, 2016; Slaughter, 2012; Steffen, 2015a). The term has 
slowly become accepted over recent years as those dedicated to 
‘Earth science’ have provided numerous insights into the nature of 
large-scale processes of change. 
Well-grounded knowledge about changing parameters of the 
global living space available to humans and other species has 
become both plentiful and increasingly reliable. It has, for example, 
provided valuable inputs to policy and decision-making at all levels. 
Work by Steffen and others on planetary boundaries is of particular 
salience (Stockholm Research Centre, 2017; Steffen, et al 2015; 
Steffen, et al 2004). It shows how humanity has exceeded safe 
limits in three areas (flows of phosphorus and of nitrogen; loss of 
genetic diversity) and is set to exceed them in two others (land 
system change and climate change). Yet vital global concerns of 
this kind are not only widely overlooked by many high-tech 
entrepreneurs they are also actively denied by some of their most 
wealthy backers (Mayer, 2016). The very last thing the latter are 
prepared to recognise is the reality of global limits (Higgs, 2014). 
Coming to grips with limits, the extent of human impacts and 
the choices and options available to humanity also provide many 
positive opportunities. Among these is the increased breadth and 
capability that flows from adopting more progressive values and 
broader, more inclusive worldviews (see below). Taking global 
issues seriously opens up a plethora of actions and strategies that, 
properly understood, significantly enhance our individual and 
collective ability to navigate through the rough weather that 
undoubtedly lies ahead (Monbiot, 2017; Raworth, 2017). The New 
Economy Network Australia (NENA) is one of many organisations 
that demonstrate in practical terms how new economic structures 
and processes can be created both with, and without, official 
sanction (NENA, 2017). Other examples are discussed below. 
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RE-VALUING THE HUMAN AND SOCIAL 
INTERIORS 
 
Figure 1. Four quadrants of Integral enquiry (Slaughter, 2010). 
The empirical-analytic methods employed to create powerful 
technologies and to understand track macro phenomena both 
emerge from the ‘exterior collective’ quadrant of Integral enquiry. 
Yet taken in isolation they cannot grasp the nature of related 
human and cultural realities since they spring from very different 
sources and invoke different kinds of knowledge. Integral 
perspectives seek greater balance by adding an ‘interior’ dimension 
to both individual and collective phenomena (Figure 1). The general 
lack of such distinctions helps explain (and indeed to resolve) some 
of the confusion and conflict that occurs when, for example, new 
waves of high-tech innovation (exterior collective) impact on 
human life worlds (interior individual) and pre-existing ways of life 
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(interior collective). As noted, people, social systems and cultures 
are all deeply affected. Jobs are destroyed, professions disappear 
and machines primed to take over operations that were previously 
understood to exist solely within the domain of human action. Yet 
the study of history, the foundations of personhood, society and 
culture are only marginally accessible to empirical enquiry and are 
therefore routinely dismissed. Which is not to say that they cannot 
be studied and understood by those with the requisite skills, insight 
and methods (Esbjorn-Hargens, 2012). 
CONSTITUTIVE HUMAN INTERESTS 
German philosopher Jurgen Habermas produced a series of works 
that made significant demands on readers yet also produced 
insights of continuing value. Of direct relevance here is his account 
of ‘constitutive human interests.’ Unlike much of his work the 
essence of such interests are easily grasped and usefully illuminate 
a number of vital social processes that tend to be overlooked in 
high-tech environments. Table three provides an outline of 
Habermas theory. In this account, the technical interest relates 
to ‘work’ and the empirical/analytic sciences that are centrally 
concerned with production and control (i.e. the application of 
technical rules to instrumental problems). The practical interest is 
about human interaction. Here the concern is not with control, 
nor with technical processes, but with communication and 
understanding, both of which are grounded in language and 
culture. The point is to clarify the conditions for clear and 
unobstructed communication between participating subjects. 
These are seen as interpretive tasks requiring appropriate skills. 
The third and perhaps ‘highest’ interest is the emancipatory 
interest. This relates to questions of power and the universal drive 
for emancipation and freedom of action (Habermas, 1971). 
Table 3:  Habermas’ constitutive human interests (1971) 
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 Life Dimension 
Form of 
Knowledge Criteria Type of Problem 
Emancipatory 
Interest Power Critical 
Emancipation and 
liberation 
Normative: critique of 
domination, repression and 
distorted communication 
Practical 














Technical and instrumental 
At no point does Habermas denigrate the technical interest per 
se since civilisation depends upon the maintenance of effective 
and efficient technical processes. Rather, what he is set against is 
the over-extension of the technical into areas that he considers 
illegitimate – as, for example, when decisions about new 
technologies are made on the basis of ‘can it be done?’ rather 
than ‘should it be done?’ One is a pragmatic issue concerned with 
technique; the other is value-laden and grounded in ethical 
considerations. This distinction has been widely overlooked in the 
present context. Then concerning the practical interest, there are 
many non-technical factors (such as power, ideology, marketing 
and direct exploitation) that impede and prevent true 
communication taking place between individuals and groups. The 
issue then becomes that of defining the conditions under which 
communication can be optimised. This again is not a technical 
question but one that relates to the richer and more complex 
world of human intersubjectivity. Finally, the emancipatory interest 
is engaged in the critique of domination, repression, mystification 
and institutional inertia. It tries to define the conditions within 
which people can create an authentic existence for themselves. 
Unfortunately however, questions of limits, of the character and 
requirements of ‘the social’ and the whole question of underlying 
human interests – actual human needs and qualities – mean little 
or nothing to techno-enthusiasts and Internet entrepreneurs. As 
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we’ve seen their speech patterns, metaphors, discourses were, and 
remain, focused on the single-minded pursuit of power, 
exploitation, expansion and accumulation of immense financial 
rewards. These features go a long way towards explaining why the 
Internet and many associated technologies became debased and 
also why they parted company from authentic human and social 
needs. The rise of homo economicus and the rapid expansion of 
humanly arid technical systems could not but produce a 
generalised dystopian sense that human affairs were spinning out 
of control. During the second decade of the 21st Century traditional 
research, scholarship and the scientific method itself were also 
being undermined by the diminished rationality of technical 
innovation coupled with denialism at an astonishing scale. 
Moreover, the tendency of traditional disciplines toward subject 
compartmentalism made it difficult to address the growing 
complexities of macro-change. Many people began to experience 
a sense of the coming-apart of earlier structures and assumptions, 
often expressed as multiple failures. For example: 
 
• A near-universal failure to resolve major environmental 
issues. 
• Unwillingness on the part of global elites to rein in growth 
or reduce over-consumption. 
• Unresolved questions about the Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC) and its aftermath. 
• The related failures of globalisation and ‘trickle down’ 
economics to create a fairer and more equitable 
distribution of wealth. 
• Growing instability and upheaval in the Middle East 
consequent upon the Iraq war and the abortive ‘Arab 
spring’. 
• Multiple failures of the US government to regulate or 
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reform Wall Street, apply its own anti-trust regulations to 
the Internet oligarchs, develop appropriate policies on 
high-tech innovation and respond effectively to global 
warming. 
• New waves of high-tech innovation were and are 
undermined by corporate power, mass surveillance and a 
newly enfranchised criminal underclass (Glenny, 2011; 
Zuboff, 2015). 
The environment created by these interrelated and ever-shifting 
phenomena was and remains complex and challenging to say the 
least. Governance virtually everywhere has become more difficult. 
So it is regrettable, but not entirely surprising, that high-tech 
innovators have had little of value to say about the world they 
have been attempting to create. So long as their own innovations 
made it to market, these ‘straws in the wind’ were held to be 
of little significance. A variety of non-empirical and broad-based 
approaches to understanding were quietly developing in the 
background. Since they are too numerous to receive adequate 
attention here they might well form the basis of a separate work. 
Yet the task of grasping some of the interior aspects of social 
change in the post WW2 era was taken up by interdisciplinary 
scholars such as Lewis Mumford, Hannah Arendt, Ulrich  Beck, 
Zigmunt Bauman and Jurgen Habermas, among many others. More 
recent perspectives shedding further light on these matters include 
accounts of hypernormality (Hooton, 2016), anticipation theory 
(Poli, 2010), the ‘de-growth’ movement (Cattaneo, 2012; Videira, 
2014) postnormal studies (Sardar, 2015) new economic paradigms 
(Raworth, 2017) and the wider use of Integral methods (Egmond & 
de Vries, 2011). 
Overall, the selective blindness of the high-tech sector is less an 
indication of strength and power than of ‘thin’ and, in the long run, 
unproductive views of reality. The entire sector – and those who 
seek to reinvigorate it –  would do well to re-direct their attention 
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toward blind spots such as those outlined here. Properly 
understood, they provide creative springboards, stimuli for new 
thinking and new opportunities such as the following. 
 
• Grasping the reality of global limits and the vast number 
of opportunities for values development, creativity, design 
and adaptation that they imply. 
• Re-valuing aspects of ‘the social’ such as empathy, care, 
respect and in-depth communication between equals. 
• Consciously seeking to understand and enable 
fundamental human interests, without which it is doubtful 
if advanced and vibrant human societies can endure. 
In short, careful and genuine investments in richer worlds of 
meaning and significance foreshadow completely different 
outlooks and a radically renewed palette of options. 
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Transcending reductionism, 
re-purposing the Internet 
INTERIOR DRIVERS, SCALES OF 
IMPLEMENTATION 
Virtually everyone outside the Silicon Valley bubble who has 
paused to consider the complex tangle of issues thrown up by 
the IT revolution in general and the Internet in particular tends, at 
some point, to reach a key conclusion – that the key issues before 
us are not primarily technical. Technology provides the physical 
substrate and software an artificial ‘nervous system’ that reaches 
ever more deeply into human lives. But merely following technical 
capabilities as far as they can be driven appears to confine 
humanity on a fast train to Dystopia and perhaps the end of human 
civilisation itself. Juval Harari unintentionally provided a rehearsal, 
or test case, for that thesis in his book Homo Deus (Harari, 2015). 
Here the main driver of change was considered to be the ingenuity 
of large groups of people and their most significant achievements, 
indeed, were said to be those associated with high technology. 
Yet by relentlessly following this technologically determinist path, 
what the author refers to as ‘unaugmented’, humans are expected 
to fall by the wayside and become the ‘road kill’ of history. It is 
severe and uncompromising conclusion but unavoidable with the 
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starting assumptions. If, on the other hand, the uses of high-tech 
are shaped and conditioned by progressive social drivers – such 
as life-affirming values and expanded worldviews – the outcomes 
would certainly be very different. So in playing a reductionist game 
with the very forces that moderate raw technical power degrades 
language, values, worldviews and similar culturally derived sources 
of meaning and capability – Harari actually demonstrates how 
vitally necessary they really are (Slaughter, 2017). Nor is this the 
only source that confirms this vital insight. As mentioned above, 
the idea that repressing or turning away from human qualities 
and social phenomena is exceptionally damaging receives powerful 
support from Masha Gessen in her book The Future is History 
(Gessen, 2017). 
There are clearly many aspects to this story and a growing 
number of informed observers of this rapidly changing scene. 
Greenfield, for example, is by no means alone in viewing the IT 
revolution as a full-on invasion. So he is alert to the implications 
of what he calls ‘the colonisation of everyday life by information 
processing.’ As with other critical approaches he is interested not 
merely in raw outcomes but also in the motives of promoters, 
the ideas behind the hardware and the social interests involved. 
Working at a more fine-grained level and acknowledging such 
interests helps to re-frame core assumptions within corporate and 
business environments. In 2015 John Naughton reported on work 
by Doc Searles on what he calls the ‘intention economy.’ Of direct 
relevance to the issue of there being human interests beyond the 
purely technical is the following view. Namely that ‘many market 
problems … can only be solved from the customer side: by making 
the customer a fully-empowered actor in the market place, rather 
than one whose power in many cases is dependent upon exclusive 
relationships with vendors, by coerced agreement provided 
entirely by those vendors’ (Naughton, 2015). 
From considering the IoT at three scales of implementation 
Greenfield wants to probe more deeply into what they mean 
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through actual case studies (Greenfield, 2017). As we have seen 
repeatedly, the marketing of high-tech devices commonly assert 
assumed benefits to users but obscure underlying corporate 
benefits. So at the individual human scale biometric devices such 
as the Fitbit and the Apple Watch monitor a variety of health and 
fitness indices. Yet, these personal data are valued, analysed and 
used as inputs to advertising and sales. Insurance companies have 
vested interests in these skewed transactions such as offering 
reductions in premiums in exchange for such personal data. Truck 
and public service drivers are especially vulnerable to the 
imposition of more heavy-handed versions. Then, unless this trend 
is halted, the intensive collection of personal data may be required 
of all drivers and other persons responsible for vehicles and related 
machinery. The logical end this insidious process is akin to the 
imposition of total surveillance. 
That these observations are not ‘merely’ theoretical or personal 
but extend to other scales is confirmed by the emergence of 
‘Google Urbanism,’ an ambitious plan by the company’s Alphabet 
subsidiary to reconfigure cities in its own image. Its pilot project 
on the Toronto waterfront sought to ‘reimagine urban life in five 
dimensions – housing, energy, mobility, social services and shared 
public spaces.’ However, what caused most concern was a 
proposed ‘data-harvesting, wi-fi beaming digital layer’ to provide 
a ‘single unified source of information about what is going on.’ 
This was intended to gather ‘an astonishing level of detail’ such 
that ‘each passing footstep and bicycle tire could be accounted 
for and managed.’ Issues of privacy and the blurring of public and 
private interests were set aside confirming the suspicion that ‘the 
role of technology in urban life is obvious: It is a money-maker’ 
(Bliss, 2018). Fortunately, opposition to this project grew to the 
point where it was eventually cancelled. For Morozov, ever on the 
alert for new forms of Internet solutionism, heavy-handed 
developments of this kind signal ‘the end of politics.’ He comments 
that: 
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Even neoliberal luminaries like Friedrich Hayek allowed for some 
non-market forms of social organisation in the urban domain. They 
saw planning as a necessity imposed by the physical limitations 
of urban spaces: there was no other cheap way of operating 
infrastructure, building streets, avoiding congestion. For Alphabet, 
these constraints are no more: continuous data flows can replace 
government rules with market signals. (Morozov, 2017c) 
Seen in this light the emergence of high-end ‘smart cities’ 
represents a further incursion of technical expertise into the 
lifeworlds of people, the ethos of cultures and the character of the 
settlements where much of humanity lives. More recently Sadowski 
has suggested that such environments may best be referred to 
as ‘captured cities’ (Sadowski, 2020). Such conclusions clearly 
challenge the legitimacy of this entire process. Greenfield’s own 
recommendations include the following. 
 
• The use of algorithms to guide the distribution of public 
resources should be regarded as a political act. 
• Claims of perfect competence in relation to ‘smart city’ 
rhetoric should be rejected. 
• Any approach the whole IT domain should include a 
healthy dose of skepticism. 
• Commercial attempts to gather ever more data about 
people should be resisted (Greenfield, 2017). 
TAMING THE UBIQUITOUS ALGORITHM 
Standing at the core of a vast number of IT processes is the 
ubiquitous algorithm. Its relative obscurity and foundation in 
mathematics means that for many people it remains a mystery. 
But this need not continue. Cathy O’Neil was originally employed 
as a ‘quant’ in the heart of the New York financial district prior 
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to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). She saw first-hand, how the 
algorithms that exploit ‘big data’ can be used productively or as 
instruments of power and exploitation. In her view most people 
are unaware of how these new capabilities have proliferated. 
Consequently the reliance of bureaucratic systems on them is 
seldom appreciated. In the US she notes that ‘getting into college, 
getting a job, being assessed as a worker, getting a credit card 
or insurance, voting, and even policing are in many cases done 
algorithmically.’ She adds that: 
The technology introduced into these systematic decisions is 
largely opaque, even to their creators, and has so far largely 
escaped meaningful regulation, even when it fails. That makes the 
question of which of these algorithms are working on our behalf 
even more important and urgent (O’Neil 2016). 
She uses a ‘four-layer hierarchy’ in relation to what she calls ‘bad 
algorithms.’ At the first level are those with ‘unintentional problems 
that reflect cultural biases’. Next are those that ‘go bad through 
neglect.’ Third are those that she regards as ‘nasty but legal’ and 
finally ‘intentionally nefarious and sometimes outright illegal 
algorithms.’ In relation to the latter she adds that: 
There are hundreds of private companies…that offer mass 
surveillance tools. They are marketed as a way of locating terrorists 
or criminals, but can be used to target and root out citizen activists. 
And because they collect massive amounts of data, predictive 
algorithms and scoring systems are used to filter out the signal 
from the noise  (O’Neil 2016). 
The scam run by Volkswagon to conceal the results of emissions 
tests is, in her view, perhaps the most well-known example; but 
the sale of surveillance systems to repressive regimes looms larger 
as a serious future threat.  In her 2016 book Weapons of Math 
Destruction she looks into numerous context only to find the same 
dynamic at work. In one case a school district attempted to identify 
the weakest teachers and designed a set of tests of ‘teacher 
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effectiveness’ using algorithms. Many of the criteria, however, such 
as how well students were learning year to year, could not be 
measured directly. The use of unverifiable proxies resulted in wildly 
varying results – but teachers were sacked anyway. From this and 
other cases O’Neil concluded that many algorithms are poorly 
designed and proxies used in place of real data invisibly distort 
the results. Another oft-experienced trap is where hidden feedback 
loops render data meaningless the more often they are run within 
a system. What is also significant about this account is that the 
underlying issues are less about mathematics, statistics or data, 
than they are about transparency (or its lack) power and control. 
Currently in the US, for example, the well-off can usually afford 
human representation whereas the poor are left with poorly 
performing data and a bureaucracy they can neither influence nor 
communicate with. In summary, used well algorithms can be tools 
that usefully extract value from big data. Used poorly, they can 
certainly ramp up the efficiency of operations but at the cost of 
unreliable or unjust results and increasing inequality. 
O’Neil (2016) suggests a number of solutions, none of which 
are short term or particularly easy to implement without wider 
social support. ‘First and foremost’, she suggests, ‘we need to start 
keeping track.’ For example, ‘each criminal algorithm we discover 
should be seen as a test case. Do the rule-breakers get into trouble? 
How much? Are the rules enforced, and what is the penalty?’ She 
continues: 
We can soon expect a fully-fledged army of algorithms that skirt 
laws, that are sophisticated and silent, and that seek to get around 
rules and regulations. They will learn from how others were caught 
and do it better the next time. They will learn how to do it better 
the next time. It will get progressively more difficult to catch them 
cheating. Our tactics have to get better over time too (O’Neil, 2016). 
Finally she suggests that: 
We need to demand more access and ongoing monitoring, 
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especially once we catch them in illegal acts. For that matter, entire 
industries, such as algorithms for insurance and hiring, should be 
subject to these monitors, not just individual culprits. It’s time to 
gird ourselves for a fight. It will eventually be a technological arms 
race, but it starts, now, as a political fight. We need to demand 
evidence that algorithms with the potential to harm us be shown to 
be acting fairly, legally, and consistently. When we find problems, 
we need to enforce our laws with sufficiently hefty fines that 
companies don’t find it profitable to cheat in the first place. This is 
the time to start demanding that the machines work for us, and not 
the other way around (O’Neil, 2016). 
O’Neil’s program for re-purposing algorithms is certainly ambitious 
but, given the plethora of unresolved issues in this area, it seems 
entirely appropriate. In her book she also calls for a ‘model builder’s 
pledge’ (similar to the Hippocratic Oath taken by medical 
practitioners) a full-scale regulatory system, algorithmic audits and 
greater investments in research. In light of this she speaks 
approvingly of Princeton’s Web Transparency and Accountability 
Project and European approaches (noted below) that are, starting 
to dictate a new raft of terms and conditions that the Internet 
giants will have to recognise. Ultimately, she returns to the same 
ground that others have indicated in arguing that such choices are 
fundamentally moral, hence also ethical and social. 
DEFENSIVE MEASURES, KEY QUESTIONS 
Many options are available to those who are willing to invest the 
time and effort in responding to these issues and concerns. In 
mid-2017, for example, Australian reporter Rose Donahue 
interviewed Helen Nissenbaum in New York about the 
‘obfustication movement.’ This was described as a ‘David and 
Goliath’ strategy that relied on the fact that David had more 
freedom to act than his opponent (Donahue, 2017). Donahue noted 
that Nissenbaum had developed tools specifically designed to 
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disrupt Google’s tracking and ad delivery systems. One called 
‘TrackMeNot’ allows users to browse undisturbed under the cover 
of randomly generated searches. Another dubbed ‘AdNauseum’ is 
a tool that collects data from every site visited by the user and 
stores them in a vault. This vastly overstates the user’s activity and 
therefore serves Google false information. While such tools may 
at present appeal only to a minority there are undoubtedly many 
more to come. A high-tech defensive war against the overreach 
of Internet oligarchs is increasingly likely. Many of these tools will 
become easier to use and personal agency will be enhanced as 
more people avail these tools. 
In summary, the present Internet has evolved – or ‘de-evolved’ – 
into its present condition over an extended period. It will therefore 
not easily be prised from the grasp of giant corporations. 
Repurposing the Internet will take time. It will take concerted social 
and political action as well as extensive technical backup. Charles 
Arthur credits online rights activist Aral Balkan with the following 
insight: ‘If you see technology as an extension of the self, then what 
is at stake is the integrity of our selves’. He continues: ‘Without that 
– without individual sovereignty – we’re looking at a new slavery’ 
(Arthur, 2017). So key issues include the following. 
 
• What kind of society do we want to live in? 
• What visions of human life, society and culture do we 
believe in? 
• What kinds of futures arise from our collective decisions? 
These are exactly the kinds of questions that have driven futures 
/ foresight thinking and practice for several decades. As the wider 
implications of IT revolution cause more and more people to focus 
upon them so new players will need to become more involved in 
the search for solutions. Governments, city authorities and civic 
administrators at all levels will need to be open to new forms of 
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social engagement. They, in turn will also need greater support 
from an informed public. 
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Productive innovation 
SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 
Many of the decisions and practices of the high-tech innovators and 
oligarchs have gained support from prevailing assumptions about 
the market, the consumer, a minimal role for government and so 
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on. Yet despite its broad influence the durability of neoliberalism 
as a guiding ideology should not be overstated. An in-depth review 
of neoliberalism by Metcalf refers to a 2016 paper published by 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that explicitly connects the 
former with some of its most significant consequences. These 
include ‘pushing deregulation on economies around the world … 
forcing open national markets to trade and capital, and for 
demanding that governments shrink themselves via austerity or 
privatisation’ (Metcalf, 2017). While such insights may appear 
unremarkable in themselves they represent a startling admission 
by the IMF whose policies have long supported such practices. The 
author also suggests that the ideology should not be seen merely 
a ‘standard right wing wish list’ but rather ‘a way of reordering 
social reality, and of re-thinking our status as individuals’ (Metcalf, 
2017). Viewed in this light the main premise – that ‘competition is 
the only legitimate organising principle for human activity’ – seems 
unlikely to remain viable over the longer term since it rules out 
and overwhelms vital human capacities. These include care, 
compassion, philanthropy and the like which all healthy societies 
need in order to function at all. The decline of neoliberal values and 
assumptions would also mean that previously unthinkable options 
would emerge, as would new strategies to reform the system. A 
‘new normal’ would have its chance to become established. 
In the UK a then resurgent Labour Party raised the possibility 
that just such a development could occur through the rise of social 
democracy. Rundle (2017) summarised what he considered to be 
some of the wider implications. In this distinctively optimistic view 
local, national and global societies could be run as a tripartite 
process of state, market and community institutions, with a 
“democratically enabling” state enforcing limits to the private 
sector, mandating social-economic spaces into which community 
/ open / free / collective activities could expand, with democratic 
socialised ownership, whole or part, of key economic sectors. Such 
a shift would have major implications for all sectors of the economy 
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– including IT systems and the Internet. As other essential social 
resources (including water, energy, finance) transitioned to shared 
ownership and control, Google, and other large companies could 
be regarded as having self-socialised (Rundle, 2017). As such there’s 
no good reason why they could not be subjected to the very same 
institutional arrangements. 
Such raw suggestions have a long way to go before they can be 
rendered into widespread practice. Yet they make a good deal of 
sense in the current context. Google / Alphabet, for example, may 
thus far have avoided the rigours of US anti-trust regulations but 
this may turn out to be a temporary ‘victory’ as other governments 
step in to take actions based on alternative assumptions and views 
(see below). Rundle’s (2017) piece also demonstrates yet again why 
so many observers and critics of the IT revolution argue that the 
central issues are not primarily technical but social and political. 
Society as a whole needs to take part in multi-faceted 
conversations of this kind. 
NEW INFRASTRUCTURE 
There’s no shortage of ideas and proposals regarding ‘what needs 
to be done’ to re-design and re-direct the Internet and, by 
extension, high-tech innovation in general. Helen Magretts of the 
Oxford Internet Institute is no exception. In order to deal with 
aspects of Internet aggression she suggests that: 
Any successful attempt to prevent extremist, abusive and hateful 
behaviour online must be multifaceted, thoughtful and 
collaborative. It will involve ethical and legal frameworks to guide 
as well as mandate good behaviour; working with tech companies 
rather than making enemies of them; smarter policing of activities 
that are already illegal; and crowdsourcing safety, so that people 
and social enterprises play a role (Magretts, 2017). 
Cathy O’Neil (2016) puts a strong case for the establishment of a 
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new infrastructure to deal with the uses and misuses of algorithms. 
She seeks to create reliable records of how these tools are used 
and by whom. She also knows that to do so will not be easy as 
powerful organisations normally resist being called to account. As 
noted before Cathy O’Neil calls for the establishment of a new 
infrastructure to deal with the uses and misuses of algorithms. She 
seeks to create reliable records of how these tools are used and by 
whom. She also knows that to do so will not be easy as powerful 
organisations normally resist being called to account. Taplin (2017), 
however, goes even further in proposing what he calls a ‘digital 
renaissance.’ This has various features that include: 
• a shorter working week and the establishment of a 
universal basic income (UBI); 
• measures to get the technical and creative communities 
working together; 
• revisions of the ‘safe harbour’ provisions in the DMCA act; 
• the Library of Congress issuing new guidelines as to the 
‘fair use’ of creative and copyrighted material; 
• revisions to, and wider application of, anti-trust 
regulations (to break up monoplies); and, 
• a proliferation of co-operatives, non-profit companies, 
and what he calls ‘zero-marginal-cost distribution 
systems. 
In this respect Taplin (2017) echoes suggestions by Rushkoff (2016). 
Rushkoff is interested in exploring a range of social and economic 
inventions in the context of re-thinking what money is and is for 
(Rushkoff, 2016). Finally Morozov (2017), whose work has 
contributed substantially to this enquiry, suggests that a single 
data utility would be best placed to make the best use of material 
from divergent sources. In the light of current experience with 
commercial entities it would need to be non-commercial and 
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publically owned, much as Rundle (2017) has suggested. Given that 
progressive governments could set up such utilities quite easily the 
next step would be to ensure that ‘whoever wants to build new 
services on top of that data would need to do so in a competitive, 
heavily regulated environment while paying a corresponding share 
of their profits for using it,’ (Morozov, 2017a). Morozov (2017a) adds 
that ‘such a prospect would scare big technology firms much more 
than the prospect of a fine’. 
EFFECTIVE REGULATION 
When the European Union (EU) handed Facebook a $120 million 
fine in May 2017 and Google a heavy $2.4 billion in June, both for 
market abuses, many wondered what the next step would be. By 
mid-2017 the answer came in the form of another acronym – the 
GDPR (or general data protection regulation). Long-time observer 
of the IT scene, John Naughton, emphasised that GDPR was not a 
directive but a regulation so it would become law in all EU countries 
at the same time. Some of the implications follow: 
 
• The purpose of the new regulation is to strengthen and 
rationalise data protection for all individuals within the 
EU. It also covers the export of personal data to outside 
the bloc. Its aims are to give control back to EU residents 
over their personal data and to simplify the regulatory 
environment for international business by unifying 
regulation. 
• The GDPR extends EU data-protection law to all foreign 
companies that process the data of EU residents. So even 
if a company has no premises or presence within the EU, 
if it processes EU data it will be bound by the regulation. 
And the penalties for non-compliance or infringement are 
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eye watering, even by Internet standards: fines up to 
€20m and/or 4% of global turnover. 
• More significantly, the GDPR extends the concept of 
“personal data” to bring it into line with the online world… 
The regulation gives important new rights to citizens over 
the use of their personal information… Valid consent has 
to be explicitly obtained for any data collected and for the 
uses to which it will be put. 
• Citizens will now have the right to request the deletion of 
personal information related to them (Naughton, 2017a). 
This was obviously what pundits call a ‘game changer’ as it 
fundamentally changed the rules for how these organisations 
collect, use and manage private data. Naughton (2017a) called it an 
‘existential threat’ to those currently operating beyond the reach 
of existing data regulation laws. It certainly helped to resolve a 
situation in which people’s private lives everywhere are regarded 
as ‘fair game’ to entities whose sole interests lie in sales, profit 
and power. And it went a long way toward resolving some, but 
by no means all, of the concerns expressed so clearly by Zuboff 
(2015) and others. At the same time public service sectors such as 
education and health need to adjust their own procedures which 
will involve considerable costs. 
THE TECHNICAL IS POLITICAL – THE RETURN 
OF ANTI-TRUST 
As the oligarchs have steadily penetrated ever more areas of 
human and economic life they’ve become so powerful that they 
abjure regulation by elected bodies and are frequently said to be 
way ‘ahead’ in terms of their products and services. But this is a 
mistake. If we accept that the technical is political it is harder to 
confuse technical mastery with other forms of expertise. As ever, 
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Morozov (2017b) nails the core of this confusion by reference to 
underlying social interests. He poses the following question: 
How could one possibly expect a bunch of rent-extracting 
enterprises with business models that are reminiscent of feudalism 
to resuscitate global capitalism and to establish a new New Deal 
that would constrain the greed of capitalists, many of whom also 
happen to be the investors behind these firms? (Morozov, 2017b.) 
During mid-to-late 2017 it was clear that, while the Internet giants 
were not about to collapse, social and political forces on both sides 
of the Atlantic were beginning to line up in broadly the same 
direction. Signs were emerging that might be called their ‘golden 
age’ could be coming to a close. In September, for example, the 
Guardian editorialised that ‘Amazon’s dominance of the eBook 
market may not have raised prices, but it left the sector anaemic 
and competition floundering’. Another commentator was quoted 
as saying of the oligarchs that he did not think ‘any credible 
economist who isn’t an Ayn Rand lunatic would accept that these 
are not monopolies’. More people than ever are becoming aware of 
the fact that something is very wrong with this picture. 
During the same month Ben Smith, a well-regarded Buzzfeed 
writer, was among the first of many to confirm what he called 
a ‘palpable, perhaps permanent, turn against the tech industry,’ 
(Smith, 2017). He added that ‘the new corporate leviathans that 
used to be seen as bright new avatars of American innovation are 
increasingly portrayed as sinister new centres of unaccountable 
power,’ (Smith, 2017). In his view this constituted ‘a transformation 
likely to have major consequences for the industry and for 
American politics’ (Smith, 2017). He also reported on how 
politicians of widely differing views were urging ‘big tech’ to be 
considered less as private companies than as ‘public utilities,’ 
(Smith, 2017). After years of denying the value or relevance of 
treating the high-tech giants in the same way that Bell Telephone 
and Microsoft had been treated in earlier years (i.e. broken up into 
small units) anti-trust legislation was finally back on the agenda. 
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Similarly Washington senators Elizabeth Warren and Claire 
McCaskill both became involved in making anti-trust regulations 
part of the Democratic agenda over the next four years. Overall, the 
gap between ideas and effective action was perceptibly closing. 
 








Humanising and democratising 
the IT revolution 
A People’s Internet is possible … Silicon Valley loves a good disruption, 
so let’s give them one (Scholz, 2016). 
History is made by humans not by machines (Taplin, 2017). 
PUBLIC GOODS AND MORAL UNIVERSALS 
If anything has become clear during the present enquiry it is that 
humanising the IT revolution requires something other than 
technical innovation. It obviously has many technical implications 
but the key drivers of a multi-faceted shift toward a different 
modus operandi are not technical but found within human, social 
and cultural contexts. 
The current ‘de-evolved’ Internet and explosion of radically 
ambivalent high-tech innovations provide clear evidence of an 
extended and continuing cultural failure. Despite its many positive 
aspects we cannot avoid the fact that the US has become 
enmeshed in its own downward spiral. Countless words have been 
written on this topic but one core concern is its singular lack of 
success in creating viable ‘public goods’ such as free health care, 
quality education, protection from random violence and public 
wellbeing on a broad scale. Umair Haque (2017) argues that the 
lack of such goods separates the US from all other advanced 
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nations. The former spring from ‘moral universals’ that he suggests 
are largely absent from the US but which are needed to ‘anchor 
a society in a genuinely shared prosperity.’ Such universals don’t 
simply ‘spread the wealth’ but help to civilise people. They ‘let 
people grow to become sane, humane, intelligent human beings’ 
– all characteristics upon which democracy depends. Any society 
lacking these characteristics simply runs out of steam. In this view, 
what happened in the US is that: 
They have never seen – and still don’t see – the benefits: the 
civilising process that democracy depends on. Thus, in America 
today, there are no broad, genuine, or accessible civilising 
mechanisms left. … The natural consequence of failing to civilise is 
breaking down as a democracy – democracy no longer exists in the 
sense of “people cooperating by voting to give each other greater 
prosperity”. They have merely learned to take prosperity away from 
one another (Haque, 2017). 
Such suggestions must be treated as debatable, yet Haque is not 
alone in advancing this general argument. Noted Australian 
journalist, Peter Greste is in broad agreement. In his opinion ‘since 
America’s founding, its leaders have recognised that the country’s 
real authority – as opposed to power – rests on its moral standing,’ 
(Greste, 2017). Yet the routine outpouring of ignorance by the 
former US president ‘placed the US on the same moral plane as 
some of the world’s most ruthless tyrants.’ He finds this ‘deeply 
troubling’ because ‘without a clear moral framework, the world 
becomes a snake pit of competing national interests’ (Greste, 2017). 
Such sentiments provide yet another factor that helps to account 
for the debased version of Internet usage and commerce that 
became normalised over recent years. 
VALUES, WORLDVIEWS, RESEARCH 
Taken together, the views discussed above go a long way toward 
116 RICHARD A. SLAUGHTER
explaining why the Internet became compromised. It not only failed 
to deliver on the idealism of its early proponents but also became 
a source of exploitation, danger and oppression. The many and 
varied uses of IT are divided between the genuinely helpful and 
those that are routinely misused. At least two underlying rationales 
can be briefly mentioned here. One springs from value and 
worldview considerations. An outlook typified by greed, selfishness, 
exploitation and an underlying disregard for real human and social 
needs will produce, and has produced, applications adapted to 
these uses. On the other hand positive values such as generosity, 
care and respect, especially when coupled with socio-centric or 
world-centric outlooks, will be directed toward more widely useful 
and constructive uses. This identifies a core difference between, 
say, monopoly platforms that treat people like mindless sheep by 
driving them into the arms of the advertising industry, and socially 
useful innovations such as local currencies, that respect and build 
local economic and social wellbeing. 
As noted above, a different, but related, rationale can be drawn 
from evidence-based Earth science that makes it abundantly clear 
that humanity is under real and unrelenting pressure to re-think 
the conditions of its tenancy on this small planet. Here values such 
as caring, foresight and obligations to future generations come 
to the fore. They simply make better sense in this context. Roger 
Dennis (2017) is not alone in suggesting that leaders in technology 
need broader and deeper views of the world. In fact he suggests 
that ‘the industry doesn’t need more programmers, it urgently 
needs more women, ethicists and philosophers’. Political 
decision-making about the uses and abuses of all classes of high 
technology need to be returned from ‘defence’ contractors, 
specialised labs and private corporations to well-staffed and 
properly equipped locations firmly placed within the governance 
and related structures of civil societies. This process will certainly 
include private initiatives that draw both on progressive values 
and emerging technologies to help break the multi-monopolies of 
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over-dominant players (Ahmed, 2017). It follows that effective and 
helpful innovation does not necessarily mean expanding the size 
of governments per se, but it will certainly require overturning any 
residual notion that ‘markets rule.’ Clearly they don’t and can’t. 
Another way to ‘humanise the future’ is to ensure that sufficient 
human and economic resources are directed toward high quality 
evaluation and research. In late 2017, for example, the Oxford 
Internet Institute found clear statistical evidence that during the 
previous US election ‘the balance between freedom of speech and 
election interference has been tipped.’ Specifically ‘Twitter users 
got more information, polarising and conspiratorial content than 
professionally produced news’ and ‘average levels of 
misinformation were higher in swing states than in uncontested 
states’ (Howard & Kollanyi, 2017). Junk news is an ideal medium 
for the further propagation of junk science. So the researchers 
came up with a short list of actions to deal with the abuses they 
uncovered. These include: 
 
• Up-dating the Uniform Commercial Code … forcing 
companies to adhere to basic anti-spam and 
truth-in-advertising rules; 
• Ensuring that paid political content on social media is 
accompanied by the disclosure of backers; 
• Social media platforms be required to file political 
advertising and bot networks with election officials; and, 
• Bots in general be clearly identified to users (Howard & 
Kollanyi, 2017). 
Not long after this, The Economist magazine (not particularly well 
known for having a progressive outlook) ran a ‘leader’ story that 
posed the question ‘Do social media threaten democracy?’ One 
reason provided was that ‘far from bringing enlightenment, social 
media have been spreading poison’ (Economist, 2017). Clearly 
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disquiet with social media is not limited to a few marginal sources. 
During 2017 disruptions to vital democratic processes – especially 
during the US election and the ‘Brexit’ referendum – carried out by 
Russian and other sources were acknowledged and documented 
in detail (Cadwalladr, 2017). Unfortunately these concerns were 
amplified many times over during the disastrous 2020 US election 
campaign and its violent aftermath. Clearly there is still a vast 
amount of work yet to be done in order to ‘clean up’ and re-orient 
social media toward more constructive ends. Some of the latter are 
briefly outlined below. 
SHARING CITIES, PLATFORM COOPERATIVISM 
Nowhere is the potential for new kinds of IT-enabled organisations 
and practices more timely and useful than in relation to cities and 
cooperatives. For example, in Darren Sharp’s (2016) view the notion 
of Sharing Cities – rather than merely ‘smart’ ones lacking a social 
contract with citizens – can serve as ‘an antidote to top-down 
technologically deterministic visions of the future.’ His vision is one 
in which existing infrastructure such as wi-fi and spaces within 
public buildings are made more widely available. He looks to Seoul 
and Amsterdam for examples of how a sharing approach is actually 
working. In summary he suggests that ‘Sharing Cities create 
pathways for participation that recognise the city as a commons 
and give everyone the opportunity to enjoy access to common 
goods and create new forms of shared value, knowledge and 
prosperity’ (Sharp, 2016). That this is not an isolated example and 
should be seen in a much wider context is demonstrated in a fine 
collection of 137 case studies. This is much more than a ‘how-to’ 
reference work as it presents a vision for cities that situate people 
(rather than the market, technology or governance) at the core of 
what cities are and how they operate (Shareable, 2017). 
In a similar vein Rushkoff (2016) explores the potential of 
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democratically focused social and economic innovations. Drawing 
inspiration from existing examples he highlights possible 
characteristics of IT-enabled ‘steady state’ enterprises, ‘platform 
cooperatives’ and ‘genuinely distributist businesses.’ Such features 
include the need to ‘reclaim values’ in support of ‘women’s equality, 
integrative medicine, worker ownership and local currency’ 
(Rushkoff, 2016, p. 215-37). Platform cooperatives are among the 
most promising of new IT-enabled and democratically constituted 
organisational forms. One of the most thorough treatments of this 
emergent phenomenon is provided by Trebor Scholz. As with many 
other observers he is clear about the need for change. For example 
he writes that: 
We cannot have a conversation about labour platforms without 
first acknowledging that they depend on exploited human lives all 
along their global supply chains, starting with the hardware without 
which this entire “weightless” economy would sink to the bottom of 
the ocean. … (Similarly) this isn’t merely a continuation of pre-digital 
capitalism as we know it, there are notable discontinuities – new 
levels of exploitation and concentration of wealth for which I 
penned the term crowd fleecing. Crowd fleecing is a new form of 
exploitation, put in place by four or five upstarts, to draw on a 
global pool of millions of workers in real time (Scholz, 2016, p.3-4). 
In Scholz’ (2016, p18-21) view what he calls ‘platform cooperativism’ 
is the coming together of three elements: the existing technical 
know-how of existing monopoly platforms, a sense of solidarity 
and reframing concepts like ‘innovation’ with a view to sharing the 
rewards. He also provides a typology of platform cooperatives and 
a useful list of guiding principles: 
 
• Ownership. 
• Decent pay and income security. 
• Transparency and data portability. 
• Appreciation and acknowledgement. 
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• Co-determined work. 
• A protective legal framework. 
• Portable worker protections and benefits. 
• Protection against arbitrary behaviour. 
• Rejection of excessive workplace surveillance. 
• The right to log off. 
For Scholz (2016) the core of the issue is ‘a new story about sharing, 
aggregation, openness and cooperation.’ Equally significant is that 
his view of the present incumbents may be iconoclastic but it is 
certainly not punitive. Rather: 
The importance of platform cooperativism does not lie in “killing 
the death star platforms.” It does not come from destroying the 
dark overlords like Uber but it comes from writing over them in 
people’s minds, and then inserting them back into the mainstream 
(Scholz, 2016, p.26). 
This is clearly a human and social process that seeks to recover 
values that were cast aside in the single-minded pursuit of growth 
and profit. This, it seems, is the very foundational work that can 
help to rehumanise and democratise both the Internet and the IT 
revolution on which it is founded. 
VALUES AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT 
This and the previous chapters have commented on certain values 
and worldview limitations that arguably characterise both the 
ethos of Silicon Valley and some of its leading figures. In 2017 John 
Naughton took up the issue of what he calls the ‘astonishing naivety 
of the tech crowd’. For him a plausible explanation can be found 
in the restricted nature of the latter’s educational backgrounds – 
mainly mathematics, engineering and computer science. He noted 
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that these are ‘wonderful disciplines’ but then went on to suggest 
that: 
Mastering them teaches students very little about society or history 
– or indeed about human nature. As a consequence, the new 
masters of our universe are people who are essentially only 
half-educated. They have had no exposure to the humanities or the 
social sciences, the academic disciplines that aim to provide some 
understanding of how society works, of history and of the roles that 
beliefs, philosophies, laws, norms, religion and customs play in the 
evolution of human culture (Naughton, 2017b). 
Some may regard these as contentious topics yet there are quite 
straightforward ways of addressing them in this context. One is to 
go back to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) that 
was signed off by the United Nations (UN) in 1948. Here there are 
a couple of specific articles that speak directly to the themes of this 
paper, as follows: 
Article 12 
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and 
reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such 
interference or attacks. 
Article 22 
Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and 
is entitled to realisation, through national effort and international 
co-operation and in accordance with the organisation and resources of 
each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his 
dignity and the free development of his personality (United Nations, 1948). 
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These statements clearly established that the nations of the world 
were firm in their belief that the privacy and dignity of all human 
beings were to be respected and maintained in perpetuity. After 
the horror of two disastrous world wars they were deemed to be 
of particular value and significance. Yet the high-tech sector almost 
everywhere seems to have lost sight of these vital commitments. 
Wendell Bell later took up the theme of ‘universal human values’ in 
volume two of his masterwork The Foundations of Futures Studies. 
Bell reminds us that what might be called the ‘near-universals’ 
of human life have never been restricted to a particular time or 
place. Values that promote survival imperatives are widely adopted 
because they support human well-being and civilisational progress. 
He continues by discussing four values that he considers of 
major importance: ‘knowledge, evaluation, justice and 
cooperation,’ (Bell, 1997). He also mentions those from a survey 
carried out by Kidder: ‘love, truthfulness, fairness, freedom, unity, 
tolerance, responsibility and respect for life’ (Bell, 1997, p.181). 
Taken out of context such lists mean very little but they do indicate 
general orientations that have been highly regarded by most 
cultures over long periods of time. As such they are not to be 
readily dismissed. The picture becomes clearer still when Bell 
reviews Kohlberg’s stages of moral development, summarised in 
Figure 2. (Kohlberg, et al, 1983). 
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Figure 2. Social perspectives at six stages of moral development (Bell, 1997; 
Kohlberg et al., 1983). 
Bell (1997, p.218) summarises some of the features of these stages 
in the following way. 
Stage 6: Universal principles of justice, the equality of human rights and 
respect for individual human dignity are deemed to transcend the law 
itself. In this view it is rational to believe that ‘doing the right thing’ is based 
on an understanding that universal moral principles are valid. Personal 
decisions to uphold such principles affirm their continued salience over 
time. 
Stage 5: A contractual perspective requires impartial support for agreed 
124 RICHARD A. SLAUGHTER
core values, including that of trust in fulfilling contractual obligations. To 
this end it is helpful to recognise fundamental rights, such as the right 
to life and liberty, while not necessarily being constrained by fashion or 
transient opinion. Defensible ethical behaviour involves freely accepting 
such obligations and actively seeking the greatest benefit for the common 
good. 
Stage 4: Embodies a focus on large and more dominant social 
institutions and the wider society as a whole. Group welfare is a primary 
concern, and it is in this context that obligations need to be fulfilled. 
Stage 3: The need to be, and be seen as, a good person. Sustained 
loyalty is related primarily to particular groups and organisations. 
Individuals are keenly alert to the expectations of others in most 
situations. They are self-critical within these limited domains. 
Stage 2: A bi-directional stance in which individuals pursue their own 
agendas while also remaining open to, and accepting of, those of others. 
Behaviour is, however, socially sanctioned since it is dependent upon on 
approval and reinforcement from others. 
Stage 1: The locus of decision-making is largely external and, as such, 
lies beyond the individual. Motivation is therefore focused on routine, 
convergent behaviour and the avoidance of sanctions. ‘Doing right thing’ is 
identified with successfully following pre-existing rules and procedures. 
It is for the reader to consider how well or badly the values and 
human qualities suggested here may apply to specific individuals 
and organisations that have colonised the Internet for their own 
limited purposes. But at the very least Bell and Kohlberg provide 
us with clear and reliable criteria that can legitimately be used 
as an evaluative scale. So in terms of moral development thus 
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defined, some organisations and their executive leaders may find 
themselves hard pressed to provide adequate answers. Which has 
huge social implications. When the question of re-negotiating social 
contracts is raised – and it will be repeatedly – then interlocutors 
can legitimately seek evidence for the fulfilment of these criteria at 
the highest levels. Possibly the most useful guidance and overall 
summary is provided by Bell himself when he suggests that ‘ People 
live best who live for others as well as for themselves’ (Bell, 1997, 
p.275). Finally Figure 3 summarises some of the key suggestions 
made throughout this series back to an Integral perspective. 
Figure 3. Humanising and democratising IT. (Adapted from Slaughter, 2010, p. 
153) 
A straightforward four-quadrant analysis illustrates how various 
right hand quadrant phenomena (including technology, 
infrastructure and exterior actions) can usefully be related back to 
various left hand quadrant equivalents (values, worldviews, stages 
of development etc. as expressed through a variety of cultural 
norms and conditions). It follows that one way of promoting more 
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humanised and democratic uses of any technology is to simply 
open to these left-hand quadrant realities and take them fully into 
account. 
The story thus far has shown how the early Internet was shaped 
and conditioned by specific human and cultural forces within the 
U.S. After a fairly benign, government-funded start, a handful of 
entrepreneurs took over and, with little or no thought for wider 
consequences, actively fashioned the conditions for their own 
success. Tax laws were revised. Anti-trust regulations that had 
earlier been applied to Microsoft and the Bell Telephone Company 
were set aside. Strategies were undertaken through which private 
monopoly platforms would grow unhindered into the 
world-spanning behemoths of today. The rise of neoliberalism 
turbo-charged this process. Following Hayek, it viewed the 
government as an impediment to ‘progress’ and the market as an 
unquestioned good. These tendencies, along with Rand’s nihilistic 
view of human existence, all helped to bring the present 
constellation of rootless and invasive entities to its present 
condition. 
In an alternative world, competent far-sighted governance would 
have set the conditions for such enterprises and modified them 
progressively over time. Human rights (including the right to 
dignity, privacy and freedom from oppression) would have been 
respected and consciously built into the foundations of the 
Internet. Corporations would have learned to respect users and 
therefore to ask before expropriating creative work and private 
data wholesale for commercial gain. Tax laws that mediated fairly 
between corporate and social needs would have helped to ensure 
a steady flow of income for social expenditures. When entities grew 
too large they would have been broken up or otherwise compelled 
to adapt. Currently, however, we do not live in that world. 
Yet, as can be seen from some of the many examples outlined 
above, there are a host of reasons to support informed optimism 
and hope, the framing of real solutions. Furthermore, it is helpful 
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to remember that some aspects of our situation are not entirely 
new. When Martin Luther hammered a copy of his 93 theses onto 
the Wittenberg church door some five centuries ago, he set himself 
against the oligarch of the day – the all-powerful Catholic Church. 
He questioned the legitimacy of that vast institution and, at the 
same time, began a process that both destroyed its business model 
and made way for alternatives. Today the underlying dynamic is 
suggestive but there are also clear differences. Luther’s stripped 
down version of Christianity was a radical change but it still 
provided people with a sturdy moral framework to guide their 
thinking and behaviour. Such foundational certainties are more 
elusive in our own time. On the other hand this very fact arguably 
provides a rationale for recovering, re-valuing and applying some 
of the universal human values outlined above. The latter are 
perhaps among the most viable sources of strength and continuity 
available during times of transformation and change. 
The legitimacy of the Internet oligarchs is now in doubt from 
many quarters and for a variety of reasons, so limits and conditions 
are likely to be progressively imposed. Similarly, the business 
model that daily abuses countless human beings is unlikely to 
survive without major changes being wrought by newly 
enfranchised, democratically constituted cooperatives and civil 
authorities. While government actions may be slow and, at times 
uncertain, this study suggests that a host of responses, innovations 
and alternatives is under active development. It is inconceivable 
that these will not change the nature of digital engagement over 
time. So it is indeed possible to look ahead with qualified optimism 
and to anticipate a new and different renaissance. A renaissance 
that sets aside technological adventurism and wild, unconstrained 
innovation, in favour of positive human values and cultural 
traditions that balance human dignity and rights on the one hand 
with the enhanced stewardship of natural systems on the other. 
 
 







The IT revolution reassessed 
Technology…is not intrinsically bad. Much of it … is brilliant and 
beneficial – at least to humans. But invention often originates in 
short-term or siloed thinking. And even more frequently, its application 
fails because of political and economic decisions taken with little heed 
for non-humans and future generations. … The old idea of conquering 
nature has never really gone away. Instead of changing ourselves, we 
adapt the environment … The United States, though, pays little heed 
to its pre-industrial history. The country’s identity is deeply enmeshed 
with technology, which is treated as the great enabler of progress and 
freedom (Watts, 2021). 
A successful society is a progress machine. It takes in the raw material 
of innovations and produces broad human advancement. America’s 
machine is broken. The same could be said of others around the world. 
And now many of the people who broke the progress machine are 
trying to sell us their services as repairmen (Giridharadas, 2019). 
This book began with a literature review and the identification of 
emerging issues and case studies. The latter included the Internet 
of Things (IoT) and the prospect of ‘driverless cars.’ Related 
evidence from these and other sources suggested that the broad, 
rapid and largely unreflected-upon adoption of Silicon Valley’s 
high-tech offerings, while impressive in many respects, evolved 
from surprisingly narrow and inherently problematic foundations. 
A wide variety of human and social concerns have emerged that 
cast serious doubt on the viability of this trajectory and outlook. 
Among them are: 
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• Questionable values (unbounded profit, growth of 
monopoly power, size and over-reach in multiple 
domains). 
• The calculated use of strategies intended to conceal how 
high tech and the growth of corporate power compromise 
and degrade many aspects of public and private life. 
• Inadequate conceptions of human identity and purpose 
that contradict standards of safety, respect and dignity as 
defined, for example, in the UN Declaration on Human 
rights. 
• Equally thin and instrumental views of socially vital 
concepts such as ‘friends’, ‘communication’ and ‘progress.’ 
• One-dimensional views of high tech that bestow upon it 
an assumed and unquestioned ontological status that can 
neither be justified nor sustained. 
• Failure to question self-serving practices that permit 
high-tech innovations to be released into social and 
economic contexts without due regard for unintended 
effects, drawbacks and long-term implications. 
• How foresight and provident care have been overtaken by 
the naked power of speculative investments in 
ill-considered innovation, marketing and the resurgence 
of monopoly practices on a global scale (Slaughter, 
2018b). 
Chapter three considered some features of ‘compulsive 
innovation,’ took a brief look at artificial intelligence (AI) and also 
drew attention to the apparently unstoppable rise of surveillance 
systems around the world. Its main emphasis, however, was to 
begin the task of ‘framing solutions.’ It was proposed that certain 
‘blind spots’ that afflict Silicon Valley, its investors and supporters, 
could be reconceptualised as opportunities to reframe and 
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re-direct the entire enterprise. A four-quadrant model from 
Integral enquiry re-focused attention away from the over-hyped 
exteriors of IT systems to highlight dynamic but widely overlooked 
interior phenomena such as worldviews and values. Habermas’ 
insistence on the primacy of what he calls ‘constitutive human 
interests’ also served to anchor the discussion in these vital 
domains. The chapter reviewed a variety of strategies for better 
understanding and intervening in systems that undermine 
humanity’s autonomy and well-being. They included: 
 
• Transcending reductionism and re-purposing the Internet; 
• Productive innovation; and, 
• Humanising and democratising the IT revolution 
(Slaughter, 2018c). 
It is universally accepted, however, that the IT revolution is anything 
but static. It is therefore unsurprising that a multi-faceted 
‘pushback’ against the continued expansion and power of the 
Internet oligarchs has continued to grow and develop. In an Atlantic 
essay during mid-2019, Madrigal outlines 15 entities that he refers 
to as ‘an ecosystem of tech opponents.’ (Madrigal, 2019). This 
chapter draws on some of these newly emerging insights to extend 
the scope of the critique and provide further support for possible 
solutions. It begins with a view of the ‘fractured present’ and 
continues with four contrasting accounts by individuals who have, 
in quite specific ways, acted as ‘witnesses’ to this unprecedented 
upheaval. The upcoming chapters also employ a metaphor from 
The Matrix film trilogy to consider how the real-world matrix of 
high-tech entities and systems can be better understood, or 
‘decoded.’ Overall, it suggests that the clarity of insight now 
emerging from such sources  may begin to resolve the digital 
dilemmas we collectively face. It helps to establish the grounds 
for hope and effective action. Finally, we should not be under any 
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illusion that we are dealing with a stable situation or outlook. The 
over-reach of high-tech innovation and its thoughtless 
implementation has multiple costs and brings with it quite new 
dimensions of hazard and risk. In other words, we are treading 
unstable grounds ripe for change. But what kind of change and 
whose interests will prevail? 
THE FRACTURED PRESENT 
Many features of human history are known to work against 
integration and the smooth functioning of society. They include 
poverty, revolution, war, disease, the exhaustion of physical 
resources and imagination (Tainter, 1988). During recent centuries, 
and especially since the Industrial Revolution, new forms of human 
organisation and technology progressively extended this list, giving 
rise to new versions of old problems as well as entirely new ones. 
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During the early 21st Century, a particularly perverse combination 
of IT capability and capitalist values created powerful waves of 
change and dis-integration that now permeate our own fractured 
present. While it suited the institutional beneficiaries of the IT 
revolution (Silicon Valley behemoths, associated start-ups, 
investors, certain government agencies) to evoke the myth of 
progress and portray this ‘revolution’ as a broadly liberating force, 
that view has steadily lost credibility. A particular series of events 
occurring within a very specific historical context, sometimes 
known as the ‘Neoliberal ascendancy,’ unfortunately arrived at 
precisely the wrong moment. As global dilemmas became 
increasingly evident, the view that ‘markets’ should prevail over 
‘governance’ was used to repeatedly delay or destroy many of the 
very adaptive responses upon which more far-sighted policies 
could have been based.  US governments in particular failed to fully 
comprehend or restrain the aggressive, monopolistic strategies 
that arose in their midst. Consequently, no-one in positions of 
power and authority succeeded in subjecting these developments 
to sufficiently thorough-going assessment, technological or 
otherwise. 
In retrospect, few people paused to consider the repercussions 
of these developments in future. Some may argue that this 
apparent blindness should be attributed to inherent human 
limitations, including plain, old fashioned naivety. Yet the fact 
remains that the Internet oligarchs intentionally obscured the 
growing costs of their activities behind a wall of self-serving 
propaganda, marketing glitz, for distraction and outright deception 
of the general public. The costs include undermining human 
agency, weakening democracy, destroying livelihoods, fracturing 
social systems and creating new sources of conflict and violence. 
The following vignettes evoke the ‘lived quality’ of situations replete 
with disturbing human consequences (Fazzini, 2019). 
 
THE IT REVOLUTION REASSESSED 135
• A mother discovers that her 12-year-old son has become 
addicted to the hard porn he first encountered via friend’s 
‘phone in a school playground. 
• A student who’d sent intimate images of herself to her 
boyfriend finds herself being ogled and trolled months 
later by school acquaintances as well as strangers on the 
internet. 
• New parents who’d installed a video monitor on their 
child’s crib find out later that the feed was intercepted by 
thieves who used it to compromise their home network. 
• A young man is hauled before a court for furiously 
striking his pregnant partner because she challenged his 
addiction to multi-player online gaming. 
• The owners of any organisation with an online presence 
can switch their computers on one morning only to find 
that they’ve become a victim of ‘ransom ware’ and have 
been ‘locked out’ of all their data. To have any chance of 
retrieving it they are required to pay a sum of money in 
Bitcoin to a remote and unknown entity. Help is available 
but there’s no guarantee the data will ever be recovered. 
• A mature affluent woman falls for a good-looking former 
soldier on the internet who has run into hard times. As 
their relationship develops, he asks for financial help. 
After several such transactions the victim discovers that 
she has been sending money to a 20-something scammer 
in Nigeria. 
• The would-be purchasers of a new property discover that 
the deposit paid into their lawyers’ authorised account 
was diverted elsewhere by scammers and could not be 
recovered. The bank denies all responsibility. 
These and countless similar examples have occurred, and are 
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occurring, almost everywhere. Table four provides an indicative 
overview under three broad headings. 
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Table 4 Human, Social and Geopolitical Costs of the IT Revolution 
Human 
costs 
• The loss of privacy on a vast scale. 
• Loss of control over private data and the uses to which it is put. 
• A steady decline in respect and tolerance for ‘others’ and other ways of being. 
• A growing tendency to stereotype, blame, exploit and attack from a distance. 
• Misuse of passwords to threaten, steal and control.; the rise of identity theft. 
• The rise of hacking, phishing, cyber-bullying and scams of every possible kind. 
• The rise of on-line predatory behaviour, including the sexual abuse of 
children. 
• Diminution of the right to be free of such abuse, and of the right to 
sanctuary. 
• Evisceration of the inner lives of countless individuals, especially in 
developing nations. 
• Propagation of false solutions and solutions to problems that do not exist 
(solutionism). 
• Propagation of vacuous ‘entertainment’ that degrades human life and 
experience. 
• The rise of equally vacuous ‘influencers’ who are richly rewarded for 
showcasing trash. 
• The active promotion of outrage as a means of creating ‘user engagement.’ 
• Careless and repeated abrogation of the 1946 UN Declaration of Human 
Rights. 
• Denial of the right to an open and ‘surveillance free’ life now and in the 
future. 
Social costs 
• Repeated assaults on the value of truth and the integrity of scientific 
knowledge. 
• The consequent weakening of social integration and clear-sighted decision 
making. 
• Radical questioning / undermining of precedence and authority in almost 
every domain. 
• The compromising of core human institutions such as: government, health 
and education. 
• The decay of social capital, traditions and ways of life built up over 
generations. 
• The deliberate or careless resourcing of ‘bad actors’ at every level and in 
every country. 
• The broadcasting of demeaning ideas, memes, narratives and images of 
every kind. 
• The curation, replication and use of anti-social ‘performances’ (including 
sexual assault and mass killings) that in turn promote further violence and 
destructive responses. 
• The deliberate use of dopamine reward responses to create and sustain 
addiction for commercial gain. 
• The deliberate and systematic appropriate of creative work – including that of 
artists, writers, musicians and journalists without any or adequate payment. 
• The associated ‘starvation’ of traditional news through direct theft of material 
and loss of funding through declining advertising income. 
• The attempt to replace government services funded by formal taxation with 
commercial for-profit costs levied by private companies in their own interests 
(for example, age care, health care, education and related social services). 
• The re-orientation of intra-nation security services from protection of native 
populations to the wholesale invasion of their privacy and autonomy. 
• The corresponding inability of governments to protect themselves or their 
citizens from random external cyberattacks. 
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Table 4 Human, Social and Geopolitical Costs of the IT Revolution 
Geopolitical 
costs 
• A continuing shift from the Internet as positive enabler of legitimate civil 
functions to a multi-dimensional liability, i.e. an expanding series of hard-to-fix 
vulnerabilities. 
• The willingness of nation states to develop increasingly powerful surveillance 
capabilities and high-risk interventions in the IT systems of other countries for 
purposes of intimidation and control. 
• The resulting ‘dismal dialectic’ by which competing nation states seek 
temporary advantage over others by pursuing ever more dangerous and 
threatening internet- and satellite-enabled offensive capabilities. 
• The growing likelihood of autonomous ‘soldiers,’ ‘smart’ drones and the like, 
bringing the prospect of cyber warfare ever closer. 
• The asymmetric benefits that accrue to ‘bad actors’ at every level. For 
example, Internet-enabled crime such as money laundering, financial scams, 
illegal transfers to and from rogue administrations. As compared with the very 
high costs of pursuing any kind of wrong-doing or criminal activities via 
Internet means. The costs of the latter tend to be very low, while the costs of 
pursuing it in terms of time, money and expertise are prohibitively high. 
• Multiple vulnerabilities arising from the lack of coordination and cooperation 
in the digital arena between the three largest centres of power and control: 
China, Russia and the USA. 
• The global emergency, however, recognises no political boundaries 
whatsoever. Although IT systems have achieved global reach few or no 
effective human / political organisations have emerged that are capable of 
providing integration and coordination on a similar scale. 
• Effective global governance appears to be a remote possibility at present. 
These examples demonstrate how profoundly the IT revolution – 
as implemented by Silicon Valley and its clients – has helped to 
fashion the dangerous and unstable world that we now inhabit. It 
is a world that blunders into new dilemmas while failing to resolve 
those it already has. What many have overlooked, for example, 
is that to maintain what are now considered ‘normal’ operations, 
the high-tech world can no longer function without recourse to 
vast numbers of very complex devices operating silently in the 
background. The entire system is, in principle, vulnerable and 
needs to be constantly protected from entropic malfunction and 
deliberate on-line aggression (Galloway, 2020).   Assurances 
regarding these endless liabilities have never been fulfilled. It is 
unlikely that they ever will be (Gent, 2020). 
To summarise, Western civilisation has embarked on a process 
of high-tech development with certain well-known benefits and 
other less well-known costs for which there are apparently very few 
easy or ready-made solutions. It is therefore, worthwhile to enquire 
if the IT revolution itself may constitute a new and dangerous 
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progress trap (Lewis and Maslin, 2018).  So instead of passively 
accepting the technology onslaught, it needs to be subjected to 
sustained critical enquiry. Exactly how does this historical condition 
affect life, culture, tradition and meaning? How, under these 
chaotic circumstances, can solutions be crafted that hold out real 
hope of recovering the collective future? In order to de-code the 
matrix we first need to understand how it developed and why. 
UNDERSTANDING THE MATRIX 
RED PILL, BLUE PILL? 
In the first Matrix movie the lead character, Neo, is offered a choice 
between red and blue pills (Warner Bros, 1999). One will wipe his 
memory and return him to the world of conventional surfaces with 
which he is familiar. The other will open his eyes so that he can not 
only see The Matrix for what it is but penetrate into, and perhaps 
even influence it. He opts for the former and as the mundane world 
slumbers begins his ‘deep dive’ into reality. The trilogy narrative 
may not be entirely coherent, but it certainly tapped some deep 
and perhaps obscured aspects of human psychology. In so doing 
it arguably triggered half-conscious questions or fears about ‘what 
is really going on’ with succeeding waves of technology over which 
we appear to have little or no control. The key word here is ‘appear’ 
since what is at stake are not immutable, natural forces or God-like 
injunctions handed down from above. Rather, the high-tech world 
has been created by individuals making critical decisions at the 
behest of people in real time and places with vested interests and 
imperatives. 
In the ‘blue pill’ version of ‘the real’ the global monopoly 
platforms created by Google, Facebook and others are believed 
to exist to help us access information, explore human knowledge 
and connect with others around the world. We are led to believe 
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that the power of modern technology is at everyone’s fingertips 
to do with as they will. In exchange for what are described as 
‘free’ services, personal data from everyday lives and activities is 
scanned, recorded, used and sold. This information helps 
ever-attentive suppliers to better know and anticipate human 
needs. By drawing on as much information as possible dedicated 
Google users are, it is said, enabled to more efficiently navigate 
their way through an ever more complex world. For reasons best 
known to themselves some appear happy to install various ‘digital 
assistants’ that record their daily conversations. Some choose to 
unburden themselves of familiar low-grade tasks such as 
remembering train times, navigating a city or knowing what 
groceries to buy when. Which encourages them to use these 
services in real time. Dedicated ‘always-on’ monitoring devices that 
connect the young to their parents and friends and the elderly to 
medical support seem to have wide appeal. Yet prying on everyone, 
even in most private moments, are hidden armies of ‘data 
aggregators’ that sift and sort and organise the flood of information 
about what people do, where, how and even why they do it. It can 
be claimed that such technologies protect individuals from external 
harm and perhaps protect society from certain kinds of criminal 
activity. Overall, it is presumed that the ‘blue pill’ provides a pretty 
fair bargain. 
Such passive and generalised assumptions that the technology 
and the systems they are embedded in are benign and useful 
have been widely accepted. We know this because the monopoly 
platforms (and their investors) have grown so immensely rich and 
powerful on the proceeds (Bagshaw, 2019). A ‘business-as-usual’ 
view simply assumes that these arrangements are broadly 
acceptable – albeit requiring routine upgrades and related changes 
from time to time (improved ‘personalisation’, longer battery life, 
sleeker handsets etc). In the absence of countervailing perspectives 
and clear evidence, alternative views of high-tech modernity can be 
difficult or impossible to articulate. This is especially the case in less 
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affluent nations where Facebook, for example, and its subsidiary 
‘WhatsApp,’ are used by large numbers of people who confuse 
these invasive and heavily monetised apps with the Internet per se. 
Given the strong tendency of social media to exacerbate dissent, 
extremism and even direct violence the consequences can be 
tragic. This has been seen in mass shootings, some of which have 
been streamed in real time. But a similar dynamic has occurred in 
other situations where social dissent has risen to such extremes 
that community violence and ‘ethnic cleansing’ have resulted. Two 
examples are the descent of the ‘Arab Spring’ into chaos and the 
expulsion of the Rohingya from their homes and villages in 
Myanmar to a precarious existence in nearby Bangladesh. Nor, 
given recent events, is the US immune from such consequences. 
Clearly a ‘red pill’ account requires real effort over time and 
a certain tolerance for discomfort and uncertainty. It raises 
disturbing questions that not everyone may be ready or able to 
pursue. It acknowledges the reality of what some regard as a true 
existential crisis with ‘forks in the road’ and pathways to radically 
different future outcomes. This view also suggests that the 
continuation and further development of surveillance capitalism 
leads directly to the kind of over-determined dystopian oppression 
already emerging in China (Needham, 2019).  It therefore seeks to 
clarify just how the juggernaut works, to identify and name hidden 
factors, to expose the intangible forces that are working behind the 
scenes to shape our reality, and ourselves, in a variety of perverse 
ways. Yet before it can be tamed or directed toward different ends 
society needs to understand in some depth how we arrived at 
the point where societies are confronted by deformed versions 
of high tech and a fundamentally compromised Internet. Such an 
account clearly goes beyond the critique of technical arrangements 
to questions of purpose, history and context. 
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MISCONCEPTIONS, MERCHANDISING AND ADDICTION 
The view explored here is that the IT revolution owes at least as 
much to human and cultural factors as it does to purely technical 
ones. For example, the barely qualified optimism with which it 
has been associated arguably owes more to marketing and 
merchandising – America’s great unsought ‘gifts’ to the world – than 
it does to the services and distractions of any device whatsoever. 
The close association that’s claimed to exist between technical 
innovations on the one hand and human progress on the other 
tells only part of the story and therefore remains problematic. Such 
generic ‘optimism’ is, perhaps, little more than a handy distraction 
used to conceal the predations of corporate power in this singularly 
heartless industry. As digital devices continue to penetrate nearly 
every aspect of human life, the forces driving them need close 
attention. They are shaped and enabled every bit as much by 
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unconscious pre-suppositions and cultural myths as they are by 
computer chips, hard drives and servers. Such underlying 
intangibles – values, cultures and worldviews – powerfully 
determine what forms technologies take and the uses to which 
they are put. 
John Naughton, a seasoned observer of the shifting IT landscape 
has identified what he refers to as ‘two fundamental 
misconceptions.’ The first is ‘implicit determinism’ which he 
describes as: 
The doctrine that technology drives history and society’s role is to 
adapt to it as best it can… that capitalism progresses by “creative 
destruction” – a “process of industrial mutation that continuously 
revolutionises the economic structure from within (Naughton, 
2020). 
In this view the second critical flaw in the worldview of Silicon Valley 
is ‘its indifference to the requirements of democracy:’ 
The survival of liberal democracy requires a functioning public 
sphere in which information circulates freely…Whatever public 
sphere we once had is now distorted and polluted by… Google, 
YouTube, Facebook and Twitter, services in which almost 
everything that people see, read or hear is curated by algorithms 
designed solely to increase the profitability of their owners 
(Naughton, 2020). 
The ’determinism’ and ‘indifference’ that Naughton refers to are 
two of many unacknowledged features that characterise this 
particular high-tech culture and degrade so many of its offerings. 
Another is the addiction to digital devices and the services they 
provide. Their appeal was ‘designed in’ with enormous care and 
strenuously promoted using every available marketing tool and 
technique. The language of advertising is, quite obviously, a 
projection of corporate interests and, as such, has no place for 
what might be called ‘autonomous needs.’ Its intrinsic conceptions 
of human beings, human life, are irredeemably reductive. The fact 
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that advertising has become the central pillar of the Internet is not 
something to be passively accepted. It requires an explanation. 
During the post-war years, routine sales were regarded as too 
slow and uncertain, meaning that profits were always going to 
suffer. The advertising industry was a response to this highly 
‘unsatisfactory’ situation.  The whole point was to boost ‘demand.’ 
The strategy was so successful that over subsequent years 
‘consumer demand’ became a ‘meta-product’ of this particular 
worldview (growthism) that expressed specific values (materialism, 
envy, consumerism etc). Buying and selling in this high-pressure 
mode made a kind of sense in the heady years of post-war America. 
The big mistake was to allow it to become so embedded, so much 
part of the ‘American way of life’ that it became normalised 
thereafter (Packard, 1962). Clearly times have changed, and those 
early imperatives make less sense than ever. Yet the present wave 
of IT-related selling continues to draw heavily on the very same 
manipulative tradition. One clear difference, however, with this 
new flood of products and services, is that entirely novel features 
appeared that seemed to by-pass rational thought and ethical 
evaluation. Compelling new devices and the apparently ‘free’ 
services that they enabled seemed to meet peoples’ authentic 
needs for organisation, communication, and agency and so on. At 
the time they were mistaken for gifts. More recently, however, the 
nature, extent and costs of addiction to digital devices, especially 
for children and young people, have become impossible to ignore 
(Krien, 2020). Yet even now responses to such concerns remain 
slow, uncertain and largely cosmetic (Exposure Labs, 2020). 
Heavily curated projections of IT as a neutral or positive enabler 
have clearly succeeded up to a point. But as more people 
experience the social, cultural and economic ramifications the 
legitimacy of digital manipulation will likely attract ever greater 
scrutiny. Societies permeated by powerfully networked digital 
devices not only operate along unconventional l lines, they also 
overturn earlier ways of life (Klein, 2020). The era of large-scale, 
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targeted and pervasive merchandising may not be over, but it does 
face new challenges that emerge from lived experience and the 
deep, irrepressible need for human autonomy. As people seek 
to understand their reality, their world, in greater depth they will 
be more willing to look beyond the photo app, the chat group 
and those innocent-looking Facebook pages where powerful AIs 
stare coldly back right into their soul. They will want to know why 
this unauthorised invasion happened and how it can be prevented 
from recurring. They will need a clearer understanding of the 
nuances of innovation and demand more honest explanations 
from those who shaped this revolution without regard to the 
consequences. 
MONETISING DATA, INVENTING ‘BEHAVIOURAL SURPLUS’ 
Google was incorporated in the USA in 1998 soon after the Mosaic 
web browser that opened up the Internet to the public.  Data 
collected at that early stage was seen merely as raw research 
material for which authorisation was neither sought nor granted. 
Indexing the World Wide Web (WWW) provided reams of data 
which was analysed and fed back into the system for users’ own 
benefit. It allowed users, for example, to fine tune their own 
searches. This arrangement recognised what had long been a 
standard feature of commercial practice – the inherent reciprocity 
between a company and its customers. But since Google did not 
have a distinctive product of its own the company was considered 
insufficiently profitable (itself a social judgement based on 
particular values and priorities). Subsequent discoveries, such as 
‘data mining’ constituted a ‘tipping point’ that changed everything. 
Rich patterns of human behavior were progressively revealed but 
the research interest no longer applied; it was overtaken by 
commercial imperatives. These covert profit making operations 
were regarded as highly secret and were shielded from public view. 
A further critical shift occurred when it was realised that the 
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avalanche of new data could be manipulated and monetised. The 
vast potential was eagerly welcomed by Google’s equity investors 
who, as Google announced at a 1999 press conference, had 
contributed some US$25 million to the company. These investors, 
with their value focus on money, expansion and profit, brought 
strong pressures to bear with the sole aim of boosting the 
company’s financial returns in which they now held a powerful 
interest. None of these activities apparently broke any laws or 
regulations as they existed at the time, so were not considered 
illegal. The best that can be said is that they were, perhaps, 
‘non-legal’ in that they took place in secret and within a regulatory 
vacuum. 
Very few understood at the time that this constituted a critical 
point of transition from one form of commercial activity to another. 
But it was consistent with Google’s priorities which had never been 
on improving peoples’ lives or contributing to society in any 
meaningful way. A couple of years later one of Google’s founders, 
Larry Page, spoke about further options that lay beyond mere 
searching operations. This was made explicit when he declared 
that ‘People will generate huge amounts of data… Everything you’ve 
heard or seen or experienced will become searchable… Your whole 
life will be searchable’ (Zuboff, 2019, p. 98). As Zuboff (2019, 
p.68-69) notes ‘Google’s users were not customers – there is no 
economic exchange, no price and no profit. Users are not products 
but sources of raw-material supply.’ She adds that: 
Google turned its growing cache of behavioural data, computer 
power and expertise to the single task of matching ads with 
queries… It would cross into virgin territory. Search results 
were…put to use in service of targeting ads to individual users… 
Some data would continue to be applied to service improvement, 
but growing stores of collateral signals would be repurposed to 
improve profitability both for Google and its advertisers. These 
behavioural data available for use beyond service improvement 
constituted a surplus, and it was on the strength of this behavioural 
surplus that the young company would find its way to the 
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“sustained and exponential profits” that would be necessary for 
survival (Zuboff, 2019, p.74-5). 
To achieve this ambition the company simply ignored social, moral 
and legal issues in favour of technological opportunism and 
unilateral power. These were and are all human decisions, human 
inventions, not ‘an inherent result of digital technology nor an 
expression of information capitalism.’ This was an ‘intentionally 
constructed at a moment in history (that represented) a sweeping 
new logic that enshrined surveillance and the unilateral 
expropriation of behavior as the basis for a new market form. 
(It) resulted in a huge increase in profits on less than four years’ 
(Zuboff, 2019, p.85-7). 
Greed and opportunism were, however, not the only factors 
involved. The dominant Neoliberalist ideology succeeded in 
reducing the scope and power of government regulation and 
promoting a structural shift toward market-led practices. Anti-trust 
strategies that had previously been used to constrain monopolies 
were also set aside leaving companies to expand seemingly without 
limit. As mentioned below, Zuboff and Snowden both refer to the 
aftermath of the 9/11 disaster when the CIA and other government 
agencies formed a powerful but hidden alliance with Google. The 
former made a fatal choice to draw as fully and deeply as possible 
on the very surveillance techniques pioneered commercially by 
Google. These two highly secretive entities then found ways to 
conceal their surveillance operations not merely from the public 
but also from Congress. The immediate result was a decisive shift 
away from ‘privacy’ toward a new and dangerous type of ‘security,’ 
(Snowdon, 2019; Greenwald, 2015). Earlier aspirations for an ‘open 
Internet,’ and the long-standing value assumption that human 
rights were paramount, were abandoned. The scope of these 
changes was admitted in 2013 by former CIA Director Michael 
Haydon when he acknowledged that ‘the CIA could be fairly 
charged with militarising the World Wide Web’ (Zuboff, 2019, 
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p.114). These developments arguably set the stage for the present 
dangerous and unstable geopolitical situation we now face. 
Google became progressively stronger. Its targeted advertising 
methodology was patented in 2003 and the company went public 
in 2004. Profits rose precipitously and it soon became one of the 
world’s richest companies. In its rush for dominance and profit 
it pursued a series of unsanctioned, non-legal projects such as 
Google Earth (2001), an eventually unsuccessful attempt to ‘digitise 
the world’s books’ (2004); (Guion, 2012) and Street View (2007). 
While all have their uses, the company’s supreme over-confidence 
and ignorance of common values repeatedly demonstrated its 
complete lack of interest in seeking or gaining legitimate approval. 
What it did obtain within the US was ‘regulatory capture’ of 
government policy. The question that will not go away, however, 
is whether any private company should be allowed to have this 
power and whether that power is better invested in public utilities 
charged with pursuing social well-being rather than private profit. 
Such distinctions matter a great deal and have implications beyond 
IT. In 2012, for example, Google paid its dues to its ideological 
friends by bestowing generous grants upon conservative 
anti-government groups that opposed regulation and taxes and 
actively supported climate change denial (Zuboff, 2019, p.126). 
Hence the regressive aspects of Google’s business model and 
sense of entitlement clearly extend far beyond the surveillance 
economy per se. 
Having opened out vast new and undefended territories of 
‘behavioural surplus,’ Google’s model was emulated by many 
others, beginning with Facebook (Taplin, 2017). Today Google’s 
penetration into nearly every aspect of social and economic life is 
more extensive, more powerful than that of any nation state. Yet 
the legitimacy of these operations remains as problematic as ever. 
In order to understand and confront the Matrix cultural factors, 
powerful individuals and obscure decisions all need to be taken 
into account. 
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PART VI 




Witnesses to the revolution 
The application of Hayek’s Big Idea to every aspect of our lives negates 
what is most distinctive about us. It assigns what is most human about 
human beings – our minds and our volition – to algorithms and 
markets, leaving us to mimic, zombie-like, the shrunken idealisations of 
economic models… As a result – the space where we offer up reasons 
and contest the reasons of others – ceases to be a space for 
deliberation, and becomes a market in clicks, likes and retweets. The 
internet is…magnified by algorithm; a pseudo-public space that echoes 
the voice already inside our head. (Metcalf, 2017). 
 You only have to spend billions marketing something if its worth is in 
doubt (Meadows, 2001). 
The steady emergence of publications and new sources of insight 
into the substantive character of the IT revolution arguably 
constitutes a counter trend in its own right since understanding 
precedes action. Although it is beyond the scope of any single 
paper to survey these in detail, four sources qualify particular 
attention. They are Permanent Record (Snowden, 2019), The 
Psychology of Silicon Valley (Cook, 2020), The Age of Surveillance 
Capitalism (Zuboff, 2019) and How to Destroy Surveillance Capitalism 
(Doctorow, 2020).  Snowden’s (2019) focus is primarily on his 
experience as a trusted member of the US security apparatus. He 
explains how, in the normal course of his work, he was confronted 
by critical changes in the way his government reacted to 
geopolitical shifts and events. He was shocked to discover how 
the surveillance options enabled by newly emerging technologies 
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were turned upon the American people. Cook’s career began as 
co-founder of a non-profit organisation focusing on the effects 
of technology. This, in turn, led her to consider how high tech 
affects society more generally. From here it was a short step to 
exploring the psychological dimensions of Silicon Valley, the single 
most influential incubator of these changes. Her conclusions add 
compelling detail to the overall picture. 
Zuboff’s (2019) was a university business professor with 
long-standing interests in how new technology affected workers 
and organisations. This earlier focus provided a sound basis for 
her detailed investigation into how the Oligarchs were created. Of 
greatest significance, perhaps, was her in-depth exposure of the 
stealth methods embedded in their business models that allowed 
them to successfully avoid detection and regulation for so long. 
From here she provided a rich account about how they 
undermined democracy and social norms in the pursuit of larger 
profits. Doctorow (2020), on the other hand, is a radical thinker 
with strong and well-established links within the IT subculture. His 
work embraces fictional and non-fictional approaches to IT-related 
issues. Thus, he has a distinctive ‘insiders’ view both of the tech 
itself and the critiques advanced against it. As such he provides 
his own critique of Zuboff’s contention that the main culprit here 
is ‘rogue capitalism.’ For Doctorow (2020) the main issues concern 
the resurgence of monopolies and the need for far more 
comprehensive digital rights. 
Taken together the authors of these works qualify as ‘witnesses 
to the revolution.’ As such, they serve as a corrective to the 
prevailing view that this revolution is primarily about technology 
and the growing array of high-tech digital devices.  Readers of 
earlier works will also be aware that Integral approaches 
distinguish between inner and outer realities as well as individual 
and collective ones. Hence much of our interest here is how this 
revolution has affected, and is continuing to affect, the inner lives 
of people, organisations and cultures. 
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SNOWDON’S DILEMMA 
In contrast to other, more in-depth treatments, Snowden’s account 
is straightforward, almost banal. After being injured during army 
training his proficiency in IT enabled him to begin working in the 
security sector. He worked his way up through various government 
agencies and eventually earned the envied ‘most trusted’ status. 
With an unquestioned belief in the goals and purposes of this work 
he became adept at handling highly classified material. Until 9/
11; after which everything changed. He discovered incontrovertible 
evidence that, contrary to accepted practice and in direct 
contravention of the US constitution, the US government had 
started spying on its own people. Back in 2004/2005 he’d been 
aware of an unclassified report that outlined some superficial 
details of the President’s Surveillance Program (PSP). This allowed 
for ‘warrantless wiretapping’ of citizens’ communications and was 
supposed to wind down within a couple of years. Several years 
later, however, the classified version intended only for a very highly 
restricted group turned up on his desk. It described a secret 
program known as STELLARWIND which described how ‘the 
agency’s mission had been transformed from using technology to 
defend the country to using it to controlling it.’ This had been 
achieved by ‘redefining citizens’ private Internet communications 
as potential signals intelligence.’ He realised that ‘the activities it 
outlined were so deeply criminal that no government would ever 
allow it to be released unredacted.’ The National Security Agency 
(NSA) argued that ‘the speed and volume of contemporary 
communication had outpaced, and outgrown, American law … and 
that a truly global world required a truly global intelligence agency.’ 
This, in turn, and according to ‘NSA logic,’ led to ‘the necessity of 
the bulk collection of internet communications’ (Snowden, 2019, 
p.177). In summary, the way that STELLARWIND was being used 
meant that instead of working to defend the US and its citizens, 
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the NSA had started to identify their private communications as 
standard ‘intel’ ripe for unlimited collection and analysis. 
What Snowden had unwittingly discovered was what he called 
a ‘culture of impunity’ that had somehow circumvented the 
Legislative Board, the Judiciary, Civil Society representatives and 
even the US Executive Branch. Notions of ‘privacy’ that, as noted 
earlier, had supposedly been enshrined in the post-war UN 
Declaration of Human Rights, had been trashed without any real 
public justification, debate or explanation. These were political 
decisions taken under the protective cover of ‘security’ – but that 
was not all. There was something about the technology itself that 
opened it to such egregious misuse. Snowden realised that while 
regulatory regimes were specific to each country, technology 
crossed borders with impunity and remained largely intact. This 
meant that the spread of personal data was, in principle, unlimited. 
Moreover, its unconstrained proliferation extended throughout 
and beyond individual lives. It also struck him forcefully that no 
previous generation had ever had to face such a profound symbolic 
assault on their privacy and continued well-being. Since we were 
the first, it was essential that we faced up to what was happening 
and dealt with it. 
Such conclusions are decidedly ‘non-trivial.’ They indicate global 
changes of state that cannot but affect humanity in powerful but 
little-understood ways. Among these are that the overreach of high 
tech and unconstrained power appear to lead, in Snowden’s words, 
to ‘a vision of an appalling future.’ He is therefore justified in asking: 
is this indeed what we are willing to impose on present and future 
generations? In this view humanity appears to have reached what 
might be called ‘a historical pivot’ of unknown dimensions. While 
Snowden has been portrayed as a ‘whistle blower’ or even ‘traitor’ 
it’s clear that he is neither speaking for himself, nor pursuing 
merely personal interests. He seeks to act on behalf of humanity 
and, indeed, of future generations. As such the values being 
expressed here are clearly world-centric in scope and the 
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worldview post-conventional. His decision to leave the US for what 
could well become a lonely and isolated life in exile became a moral 
imperative. Robert Mann’s (2014) account of the Snowden story is 
exemplary. It not only accurately captures other personal aspects 
but also shows how decisions after the 9/11 attack at the very 
highest levels of the US government contradicted the constitution 
and normalised criminal uses of the internet. This, in turn, 
established a series of precedents that made it that much easier for 
other nations to follow suit. It was, at heart, a fatal abnegation of 
world leadership with immense long term costs into the future. 
Two points stand out here. First, his view from the inner recesses 
of the US security apparatus raises deeply concerning questions 
about just what values are operating there. Second, if those values 
and their associated motivations serve to undermine, rather than 
protect civilised life, the capacity of US governance to deal firmly 
and decisively with the many dilemmas raised by its own agents 
of high-tech innovation can also be compromised.  It follows that 
the identity, values and culture of Silicon Valley (SV) are central 
and need to be taken fully into account. The myths and stories 
it tells, the narratives it projects upon the wider world have real 
consequences, some of them contradictory and severe. A 
psychological profile of the Valley helps to provide a more nuanced 
understanding of how we arrived at this particular point in history. 
Equally, such a profile, if credible, might well provide useful insights 
into just what changes in its culture and worldview may be 
required. 
PSYCHOLOGY OF SILICON VALLEY 
Katy Cook’s decision to explore the psychology of Silicon Valley 
began with questions that have occurred to many others. How, 
for example, was it that so many people were becoming addicted 
to successive waves of high-tech devices? What might be the 
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cumulative effects on health, wellbeing and relationships? Where 
is all this unregulated innovation taking us? Her initial involvement 
was with a non-profit organisation that considered the effects of 
technology and ran awareness campaigns on possible responses. 
The perspective she later developed is useful here because, in 
contrast to more common everyday external views of the IT 
revolution, she focuses on internal aspects that normally remain 
implicit, out of sight, and thus seldom considered. Viewed from a 
psychological perspective, however, the Valley and all it represents, 
looks decidedly darker and more problematic than the upbeat 
public persona it presents to the world. It highlights, for example, 
the fact that there are major differences between what this 
world-shaping entity would like others to believe and what it 
actually is. Cook’s view is essentially that SiliconValley has been 
‘corrupted’ because it prioritises the wrong (i.e. socially damaging) 
things. These include making profit and growth the ultimate values, 
owners and shareholders the ultimate beneficiaries and the use of 
outright lies and manipulative evasions as core strategies. At heart, 
she believes, the Valley fails to understand itself. This may seem an 
obvious point, but it has real implications. It means, for example, 
that in spite of its wealth and power (or perhaps because of them) 
it lacks the qualities that psychologists have long associated with 
‘emotional intelligence.’ These are serious charges so it’s worth 
summarising the evidence. 
Under ‘identity’ she notes that the Valley sees itself as an ‘ideas 
culture.’ Whereas in earlier times this was linked with 
counter-cultural aspirations for a more open and democratic 
future, established businesses and their investors remained 
doggedly focused on the same old ‘extractive’ culture. Big ideas 
are said to thrive in Silicon Valley but they are narrowly applied in 
the search for technical solutions. This makes greater sense when 
key traits of programmers and computer specialists are revealed. 
A considerable body of evidence shows that they are skilled at 
puzzle solving but they neither like, nor are much interested in, 
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people. Moreover, the industry actively selects for ‘anti-social, 
mathematically inclined males’ (Cook, 2020, p.24). The author is 
not alone in suggesting that the ‘high-fliers’ of Silicon Valley should 
be considered, in some crucial respects, as ‘under-educated.’ This 
initially startling conclusion is supported by evidence that their 
educational backgrounds are strongly associated with science, 
maths and engineering but lacking when it comes to the human 
sciences. With this in mind we need look no further to explain what 
Cook (2020) regards as ‘a staggering amount of unconscious bias.’ 
In summary, she identifies three key issues: 
 
• Tech tends to be an uncommonly homogenous culture, 
marked by a lack of diversity and an unwillingness to 
embrace pluralism. 
• It is rife with discrimination, including sexism, ageism, and 
racism, as well as harassment. 
• There is a disturbing level of immaturity that permeates 
many corporations, often emanating from the highest 
levels (Cook, 2020, p.39). 
For these and related reasons the author concludes that, 
industry-wide, there’s evidence of a ‘working environment that is 
fundamentally broken and unhealthy.’ It’s entirely consistent with 
this view that the myths and stories promulgated by Silicon Valley 
have been carefully curated at huge expense by marketing experts 
with the sole purpose of exerting desired effects on affluent, but 
distinctly naïve, populations. A litany of manufactured ‘sound bites’ 
familiar to many, reveal attempts to portray Silicon Valley’s major 
companies in a more positive light. They include ‘Bring the world 
closer together’; ‘Give everyone a voice’ (Facebook); ‘Organise the 
world’s information’ (Google); ‘Broadcast yourself (YouTube); ‘Make 
tools that advance humankind’ (Apple); ‘Work hard. Have fun. Make 
History’ (Amazon) etc. (Cook, 2020).  Thus, while they may claim 
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to reflect ‘lofty aspirations’ and ‘benevolent ideals’ they are just 
as likely to be ‘false and toxic aphorisms designed to mask the 
true intentions of the companies who craft them.’ Such slogans 
are intended to distract attention from the underlying aims of the 
industry which are to ‘bring in the largest amount (SIC) of users, 
for the longest period possible, at the most frequent rate.’ Hence, 
overall CV ‘has managed to paint a self-serving picture of itself 
that fails to reflect the reality of its priorities and intentions’ (Cook, 
2020, p.70). The key point to note is the divergence between what 
Silicon Valley says and what it actually does. ‘Capital’ she notes, 
‘doesn’t want to change the world. (It just) wants to make more 
capital,’ (Cook, 2020). And this really is the heart of the issue. Many 
of the claims that emerge from Silicon Valley seek to promote 
‘desirables’ such as engagement, connection, friendship and the 
like. But behind such pronouncements there is a barely concealed 
moral vacuum. There is no reality at all in shared ‘background 
myths’ such as ‘tech knows best’ or that these companies can in 
any way be considered ‘trustworthy custodians.’ The motivations 
and values underlying what they actually do clearly point in a quite 
different direction. 
Cook (2020) points to the tension between ‘socially liberal values 
and techno-capitalist incentives’ noting that the latter remain 
focused on the kinds of limited short-term profit-oriented values 
mentioned above. But what she calls the ‘transgression’ of Silicon 
Valley ‘is not so much a result of ‘for-profit’ and ‘corporate priorities’ 
so much as a ‘gross misrepresentation of its motives,’ (Cook, 2020). 
Sufficient time has now passed for some of the consequences to 
become clear. She adds: 
SV has spent years and billions of dollars persuading the public to 
worship an industry that claims to have its best interests at heart. 
(However) the tech industry is driven by the same market forces 
as any other market-driven industry … Placing greater importance 
on making money than on taking care of people’s needs results 
in a society with deeply unhealthy values, in which people come 
second to financial objectives. A society built on such values loses 
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a great deal of its capacity for humanity. We have allowed the 
tech industry, through a lack of regulation and the proliferation 
of unhealthy behavioural norms, to become the bastion of an 
economic order that has abandoned morality in favour of dividends 
for an elite few. (Furthermore), ‘research has found evidence of 
an inverse relationship between elevated social power and the 
capacity for empathy and compassion’ (Cook, 2020). 
The divergence between what Silicon Valley claims to have 
delivered and what it has actually achieved is undoubtedly one of 
the chief underlying causes of the deep social divisions, disunity 
and perpetual conflict that have sadly become among the 
distinguishing features of American society. Having failed to rein in 
the Oligarchs and related financial and corporate interests the US 
appears to have suffered a ‘collective breakdown of order, truth, 
and the psychological orientation they provide.’ The profit and 
ad-driven business model that Silicon Valley adopted thrived on 
the back of social trends that have progressively undermined the 
coherence and status of truth, respect and fact-based debate. 
Those trends include radical individualism, market 
fundamentalism, polarisation, volatile dissent and a callous 
indifference to the well-being of others. Hence, ‘digital 
disinformation’ now constitutes a serious global risk not only to the 
US but also to the whole world. 
Clearly, the spread of such disruptions and distortions across 
entire populations does not end at the level of damaged individual 
lives. The deliberate and forceful ramping up of ‘engagement’ by 
any means deemed necessary ensured that the overall costs 
continued to mount such that a full accounting is unlikely to ever 
be rendered. While the potential for good certainly existed at the 
outset, the combination of naivety, greed and lack of oversight 
/ regulation allowed a toxic ecology of dangerous 
technology-enabled innovations not merely to emerge but also be 
normalised. Collectively these drove the overall costs of the IT 
revolution into quite new territory. It was no longer simply a 
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medium for individuals and powerful groups. it swelled with ‘bad 
actors’ of every kind, from petty criminals to nation states. What 
has since emerged even exceeds what the ‘dark market’ could 
achieve (Glenny, 2011). Both the disastrous 2016 US election and 
Brexit demonstrated that entire societies are no longer protected 
from digital manipulation. Which helps to explain why during 
2019-2020 the world found itself backing uncertainly into a state of 
geopolitical instability and the ever-growing threat of global cyber 
war (Zappone, 2020). 
FINDING OUR BEARINGS, CHALLENGING 
LEGITIMACY 
Close to 700 pages The Age of Surveillance Capitalism is not, by any 
means, a ‘quick read.’ The language makes few concessions and 
the barely concealed passion behind some sections is perhaps not 
entirely consistent with standard academic conventions. Yet the 
effort to come to grips with this revelatory and courageous work 
could hardly be more worthwhile. In effect the author re-frames 
key aspects of the last few decades, the time when IT took on new 
forms and, literally invaded human awareness, ways of life, before 
anyone grasped the significance of what was happening. Now, that 
the details of this invasion have been documented in compelling 
detail, a fundamental reorientation (both to the high-tech systems 
and, more importantly, to those in whose interests the present 
deceptions are maintained) can be envisaged. Which is no small 
achievement. At the macro level revised understandings of the 
recent past allow for a re-consideration of the present from which 
may emerge distinctively different futures than earlier, more 
anodyne, default views had perhaps allowed. For example, Peter 
Schwartz’ over-optimistic vision in The Long Boom (2000) is one of 
many that saw the coming IT revolution in highly overwhelmingly 
positive terms. 
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One question answered early on is: who was responsible for this 
invasion? There’s a distinct cast of characters, prominent among 
which are the owners and investors of Google, Facebook and 
similar companies. Behind these organisations, however, are many 
others including neo-liberal ideologists, venture capitalists, several 
US presidents and powerful agencies closely associated with the US 
government. Yet even that’s too simple. As is clear from Snowden’s 
account, Bin Laden, the prime mover of the 9/11 attack, also had 
an influence since it was this event that led US security agencies 
to pivot away from earlier concerns about ‘privacy’ in favour of a 
particularly invasive form of ‘security’. It’s a bit like the ‘rabbit hole’ 
featured in the Matrix film trilogy: the further down you go, the 
more you find. Zuboff, however, is far from getting lost. She locates 
dates, events, players and consequences in a highly disciplined and 
comprehensible way. Her almost forensic methods open up the 
possibility of knowing what has happened, understand it and gain 
clarity about what responses may be needed. 
Part of Zuboff’s contribution is terminology. She provides a 
language and a framework that serves to reveal much of what’s 
been hidden and to resource the projects and actions that are 
clearly needed. It’s necessary to note, however, that no language 
is objective and early attempts to create one based on quite new 
phenomena are bound to require critique and modification over 
time. Language is, of course, anything but static. A couple of 
examples will suffice to demonstrate the relevance of these 
interventions. One is a notion of the ‘two texts;’ while a second is 
about learning to distinguish between ‘the puppet’ and ‘the puppet 
master.’ In the former case she makes a strong distinction between 
what she calls the ‘forward text’ and the ‘shadow text.’ The forward 
text refers to that part of the on-line world that users of, say, 
Google and Facebook, can see, use and be generally be aware 
of. This embraces the whole gamut of design features intended 
to keep people in the system where their actions and responses 
can be constantly harvested and sold to others (data processors, 
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advertising companies, political parties and the like). The simplest 
way to think of this ‘text’ is to view it as the ‘bait’ that keeps people 
returning for repeated dopamine hits. The ‘shadow text’ refers to 
the vast hidden world owned by, controlled by, and singularly 
benefitting from what Zuboff (2019) calls the ‘extraction 
imperative’. This is a secretive world that, even at this late stage, 
has experienced minimal regulatory oversight, especially in the US, 
the country of origin. Similarly, in the second case, a so-called 
‘smart phone’ can be regarded as ‘the puppet’ that appears to 
operate according to its proximate owner’s bidding. Whereas the 
remote owners of hidden intelligences (a vast network of dedicated 
AI applications) are the invisible and currently unaccountable 
masters. Knowing how to use the former as a tool and enabler 
is one thing. Coming to grips with the hidden imperatives of the 
puppet masters is quite another. The separation between the two 
is corrosive, sustained and entirely deliberate. Knowing this can 
provide part of the motivation to respond by acting in defence of 
human autonomy itself. 
The author carefully explores how this system became 
established and how it morphed from being something useful that 
initially supported peoples’ authentic needs (for connection, 
communication, identity, location etc.) into an all-out assault on 
each person’s interior life. The shift from serving customers with 
high quality search functions to ruthlessly exploiting their personal 
details is described in detail. Even now, following the Cambridge 
Analytica and similar scandals, few have yet grasped just how far 
this process of yielding their interiority to what Zuboff (2019) calls 
‘Big Other’ has gone. For example, she documents how it exerts 
particularly savage consequences on young people at the very time 
when their identities, sense of self etc. are already unstable as they 
proceed through the upheavals of adolescence. She has strong 
words for what is involved (Zuboff, 2019). For example: 
Young life now unfolds in the spaces of private capital, owned and 
operated by surveillance capitalists, mediated by their ‘economic 
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orientation’ and operationalised in practices designed to maximise 
surveillance revenues… (Consequently) …Adolescents and 
emerging young adults run naked through these digitally mediated 
social territories in search of proof of life… (Zuboff, 2019, p456 & 
p.463). 
Immersion in social media is known to be associated with a range 
of symptoms such as anxiety and depression but this particular 
rabbit hole goes deeper. Viewed through the evidence presented 
here a combination of ‘rogue capitalism’ with the far-reaching 
capabilities of digital technology are bearing down on matters of 
primary and non-negotiable interest to all human beings. That is, 
the capacity of everyone to know, value and, indeed, to maintain 
their inner selves. It’s here that Zuboff (2019) introduces a pivotal 
concept – the primacy of what she calls ‘the latency of the self’. She 
writes: 
What we are witnessing is a bet-the-farm commitment to the 
socialisation and the normalisation of instrumental power for the 
sake of surveillance revenues… In this process the inwardness that 
is the source of autonomous action and moral judgement suffers 
and suffocates (Zuboff, 2019, p.468). 
Thus far from being the fulfilment of humanity’s aspirations and 
dreams, what she calls surveillance capitalism leads to ‘the 
blankness of perpetual compliance,’ (Zuboff, 2019). Attentive 
readers may well ask ‘have we not seen this before?’ We have, not 
only in the great dystopian fictions of our time but also in recent 
history. History shows that when entire populations are deprived 
of their inner lives, their deepest sense of self, they become 
depressed, diminished and even disposable. Zuboff gives credit to 
some of the early responses, many by the European Union and 
some member states. Yet there’s a long way to go before the myths 
promulgated by the Internet oligarchs are recognised by entire 
populations (and the politicians who represent them) and seen 
for what they are: a sustained assault by secretive but radically 
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indifferent private entities on the very foundations of their 
humanity. 
PERILS OF MONOPOLY 
Zuboff’s opus has obviously contributed much to the process of 
‘de-mythologising’ the IT revolution and revealing the practices of 
some of its key players. It is both an analytic triumph and, at to 
some extent, a personal crusade. It is to be expected that other 
observers will exhibit different and contrasting responses. E.L. 
Doctorow’s account is informed by a more close-up, participant 
view of what the IT revolution is and does. His detailed view of 
how the new media actually work in practice suggests that the 
‘surveillance’ side of the story, while dangerous and objectionable, 
may not be quite as trouble-free and all-powerful as it may first 
appear. In his understanding it is also, to some extent, a kind of 
double-edged sword with its own distinct weaknesses. So, rather 
than take on the Internet Oligarchs in a kind of ‘frontal assault’ he 
considers some of the traps and issues that make them appear 
less monolithic and somewhat less threatening. Specifically, he 
suggests that the primary focus needs to shift from surveillance 
per se to the raft of problems he associates with monopolies. For 
example: 
Zuboff calls surveillance capitalism a ‘rogue capitalism’ whose 
data-hoarding and machine-learning techniques rob us of our free 
will. But influence campaigns that seek to displace existing, correct 
beliefs with false ones have an effect that is small and temporary 
while monopolistic dominance over informational systems has 
massive, enduring effects. Controlling the results to the world’s 
search queries means controlling access both to arguments and 
their rebuttals and, thus, control over much of the world’s beliefs. 
If our concern is how corporations are foreclosing on our ability 
to make up our own minds and determine our own futures, the 
impact of dominance far exceeds the impact of manipulation and 
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should be central to our analysis and any remedies we seek 
(Doctorow, 2020). 
Or again: 
Data has a complex relationship with domination. Being able to spy 
on your customers can alert you to their preferences for your rivals 
and allow you to head off your rivals at the pass. More importantly, 
if you can dominate the information space while also gathering 
data, then you make other deceptive tactics stronger because it’s 
harder to break out of the web of deceit you’re spinning. 
Domination — that is, ultimately becoming a monopoly — and not 
the data itself is the supercharger that makes every tactic worth 
pursuing because monopolistic domination deprives your target of 
an escape route (Doctorow, 2020, p.10). 
From this point of view the very real dangers and dysfunctions that 
Facebook, for example, imposes on users have a simple solution: 
break the company up into smaller elements and divest it of those 
it has monopolistically acquired. Of great interest in the present 
context, however, is that while Facebook’s surveillance regime is 
‘without parallel in the Western world’ and constitutes a ‘very 
efficient tool for locating people with hard-to-find traits,’ it cannot 
allow normal discussions to run unmolested. This is because the 
latter cannot deliver sufficient ads (or hits on ads) in the 
high-intensity mode demanded by the business model. The 
company therefore chose to boost what it calls ‘engagement’ by 
injecting streams of inflammatory material in order to create 
‘artificial outrage.’ The fact that these can be dangerous and costly 
in the real world accurately demonstrates the perversity of the 
model and completely undermines any pretence that Facebook 
might contribute to social well-being. Thus, the writer is less 
concerned about the data capture per se than he is about the way 
the growth of monopolies forces people to consume the kind of 
material that makes them miserable! In this account the ‘big four’ 
(Facebook, Google, Amazon and Apple) all rely on such positions in 
order to dominate their respective market segments. In summary: 
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• Google’s dominance isn’t a matter of pure merit – it’s 
derived from leveraged tactics that would have been 
illegal under ‘classical’ (pre-Reagan) anti-trust regulations. 
• Similarly, Amazon’s self-serving editorial choices 
determine what people buy on that platform. Consumers’ 
rights are overwhelmed because the company’s wealth 
and power enable it to simply buy up any significant and 
rivals or would-be competitors. 
• On the other hand, Apple is the only retailer permitted to 
sell via its products on its own platforms. It alone controls 
what products are allowed into its ‘secret garden’ (the app 
store). It monitors its customers and uses its dominance 
to exploit other software companies as ‘free-market 
researchers’ (Doctorow, 2020, p16). 
The fact that these monopolistic conditions have remained for well 
over a decade with little or no regulation once again reveals the 
inability of successive US governments to understand or respond 
to what has been happening in their midst. As Doctorow (2020) 
notes ‘only the most extreme ideologues think that markets can 
self-regulate without state oversight.’ He suggests three reasons for 
this: 
1. They’re locked in to (a) ‘limbic system arms race’ with our 
capacity to reinforce our attentional defence systems that seek 
to resist the new persuasion techniques. They’re also locked in 
an arms race with their competitors to find new ways to target 
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people for sales pitches. 
2. They believe the surveillance capitalism story. Data is cheap 
to aggregate and store, and both proponents and opponents 
of surveillance capitalism have assured managers and product 
designers that if you collect enough data, you will be able to 
perform sorcerous acts of mind control, thus supercharging 
your sales. 
3. The penalties for leaking data are negligible (Doctorow, 2020, 
p17). 
This is where things can appear confusing because, as Snowden’s 
account suggested, state surveillance that had earlier been focused 
outward on the wider world was re-purposed to focus on the 
American people. In the process public / private distinctions 
became blurred. Similarly, big tech regularly ‘rotates its key 
employees in and out of government service’ meaning one or two 
years at Google could easily be followed by a similar time at the 
Department of Defence (DoD) or the White House, etc… This 
‘circulation of talent’ leads to what’s known as ‘regulatory capture.’ 
It indicates a diffuse but powerful sense of mutual understanding 
which emerges between organisations that previously had clear 
and distinct boundaries and quite different purposes. One of the 
consequences of such capture is that liability for questionable 
security practices can be shifted on to the customers of big tech 
and thence to the wider society. The question ‘who is responsible?’ 
then becomes more difficult to answer. 
Doctorow (2020, p. 21-22) asserts that ‘big tech is able to practice 
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surveillance not just because it is tech but because it is big;’ also 
that (it) ‘lies all the time, including in their sales literature’. It got 
this way not because it was tech but because the industry arose at 
the very’ moment that anti-trust was being dismantled,’ (Doctorow, 
2020). The role that Robert Bork played in this process has been 
told by Taplin and others (Taplin, 2017). In essence, it meant that 
some 40 years ago, when anti-trust regulations were being framed, 
Bork ensured that they focused less on limiting corporate size and 
power than on attempting to restrain the costs of products to 
consumers. This judgement, and the legislative loophole in section 
230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (which ensured 
that media companies were protected from the consequences of 
any material that might appear on their sites) along with the lack 
of effective Congressional oversight, are essentially what allowed 
these companies to grow beyond any reasonable limit. The key 
clause in the legislation reads ‘No provider or user of an interactive 
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of 
any information provided by another information content provider’ 
(Harcher, 2020). The fact, as Cook noted, that ‘capital wants to 
make more capital’ supplied the motive and the rationale. And as 
Zuckerberg once pronounced, this also enabled them to ‘move fast 
and break things.’ 
Doctorow (2020) differs most clearly from other commentators 
in his tendency to see surveillance capitalism as anything other 
than plain, old-fashioned capitalism. Thus, in his view, it does not 
need to be ‘cured.’ Rather, what needs beefing up and applied 
more widely is ‘trust-busting’ and bans on monopolistic mergers. 
For him, big tech is not as powerful as it would like others to 
believe and, although it has largely escaped thus far, it cannot 
actually overturn the rules to protect itself from the resurgence 
and renewal of anti-trust measures. For him the issue is – are 
we up to it? It’s clear that the ‘we’ he has in mind is considerably 
wider than that of government agencies and the technically adept. 
For Doctorow (2020) the ‘fake news’ generated by monopolistic 
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systems that have shredded what was earlier regarded as shared 
reality is not merely an irritant but ‘an epistemological crisis.’ A 
widespread breakdown of shared meanings, and the radical 
uncertainty it creates suggest the ‘terrifying prospect’ of a 
widespread loss of control and capability. Yet, one of the distinctive 
points of this account is that at the heart of any technologically 
advanced society is a need for integration. This, according to 
Doctorow (2020), is what he calls ‘the hard problem’ of our species. 
If we can’t coordinate different activities across multiple domains 
such a civilisation cannot but fail. 
While for Zuboff (2019), the high-tech path to the future is what 
she calls a ‘bet-the-farm-commitment’ or choice, here it is 
portrayed as the only real option. But it is framed through two 
different strategies. Ultimately, Doctorow (2020, p. 33) believes, ‘we 
can try to fix Big Tech by making it responsible for bad acts by its 
users, or we can try to fix the internet by cutting Big Tech down to 
size. But we can’t do both’. In this view and outlook the preferred 
option is for a broad-based coalition spanning government and civil 
society to break up the monopolies, reform big tech and drive ‘up 
and out’ of the present dilemma. 
 







Resistance and renewal 
The most interesting puzzle in our times is that we so willingly sleepwalk 
through the process of reconstituting the conditions of human existence
(Winner, 1986). 
RE-CONSTITUTING THE PRESENT 
This book has considered various aspects of the real-world matrix 
in order to know it, to deepen our understanding of what it is 
and what it means. The previous chapters provided substantive 
rationales and various proposals for taking informed action. This 
chapter discusses some of the innovations and responses now 
under active consideration. Table 5 provides a summary of various 
propositions and proposals that have surfaced in this space. The 
specifics of each will evolve and more detailed treatments no doubt 
follow. Yet even this limited sample provides clear evidence of an 
increasingly credible shared agenda. To the extent that if worked 
out, developed, valued and resourced it can become a valuable 
source of actions and strategies that can lead away from a 
high-tech Dystopia toward more desirable futures. 
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Table 5: Suggested actions 
Cook (2020) 
Remember that ‘tech cannot fix itself.’ Understand what went wrong inside 
Silicon Valley (SV). Understand its psychological deficiencies and the full 
implications of the values it has chosen to follow. Monitor its (lack of) 
emotional intelligence and its structural biases. Promote healthier 
psychological norms and revise its ethical foundations. 
Snowden 
(2019) 
Question the widespread use of illegal surveillance. Challenge its legitimacy 
and that of those employing it. Enact new laws to prevent it re-occurring. To 




Recognise ‘fake news’ as an existential threat to social integration and the 
well-being of society as a whole. Rather than be distracted by arguments 
about surveillance per se, re-focus on the raft of issues that arise from the 
unrestrained re-growth of monopolies. Reduce or eliminate these using 




Introduce legislation to force companies to pay for the data they extract. 
Improve citizens’ rights to access data obtained from public sources (such as 
CCTV). Combine data protection with a proactive social and political agenda. 
Use the ‘data debate’ to re-think other utilities and services (such as welfare, 
unions and bureaucracy). 
Howard 
(2020) 
Establish the principle that ‘public life belongs to the public.’ Require 
companies to routinely contribute such data to archives, libraries and similar 




Regulate in relation to four main categories. I. Safety. No product should be 
sold / shipped until it demonstrates safety and is free from obvious bias. 2. 
Privacy. Treat all private data as a human right, not an asset. 3. Honesty. 
Remove the oligopolistic power now exercised by companies such as 
Facebook and Google, especially as they affect ad networks. 4. Competition. 
Strengthen and enact the relevant anti-trust laws that encourage 




Don’t see IT issues as separate. Human beings have co-evolved with 
technologies over time. The focus should therefore be on ‘humanity/
technology co-evolution.’ Society is not served well by having technologies 
imposed (or sold) from above. Society as a whole should be involved in 
deciding how to live with technology. IT companies should follow specific rules 
that retain democracy as a guiding principle 
Lavelle 
(2018) 
Invert operating principles of Facebook, Google etc. Users to opt in rather than 
search for escape routes. They should be provided access to clearly 
documented and user-friendly tools for managing their data. Calibrated fines 
needed to deal with knowing misuse of data. Users have option of retaining all 




In 2019 Tim Berners-Lee, an early internet pioneer, drafted a ‘contract for the 
web.’ It sought to protect human privacy, provide access to individuals’ data 
and establish a right to not have the latter processed. It argued for community 
consultation prior to products being launched, for the web to be safe and 
remain open for all users. Berners-Lee has also created Solid, a more 
person-centred data system. 
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Table 5: Suggested actions 
Deibert 
(2020) 
New laws to restrain how tech companies gather, process and handle 
personal information. Companies required to open up algorithms etc to 
external scrutiny and public interest auditing. Legal protection of worker’s 
rights in the ‘gig’ economy. Repeal section 280 of the1996 Communications 
Decency Act. Apply ‘Retreat,’ ‘Reform’ and ‘Reset’ procedures grounded in 
strong underlying principles. 
Eggers 
(2018) 
Update the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and add two new 
amendments. 1. Assert that all surveillance is inherently abhorrent and 
undertaken only by law enforcement with judicial oversight. 2. Resist placing 
everything online. Ensure that human beings can continue to live real 
analogue lives offline as much as possible. 
Zuboff’s (2019) magisterial critique led her to articulate two 
fundamental needs of supreme and vital importance to all human 
beings. They are the need to recover the future tense and the need 
for sanctuary. Both are clearly of great significance to Futurists and 
foresight practitioners. In relation to the former she frames her 
decision to spend seven years working on this book as an act of will 
that constitutes part of her own personal claim to the future. She 
states: 
Will is the organ with which we summon our futures into 
existence…The freedom of the will is the bone structure that carries 
the moral flesh of every promise…These are necessary for the 
possibility of civilisation as a ‘moral milieu’…(They are) the basis of 
contracts…collective decisions to make our vision real (Zuboff 2019, 
p.331-333). 
The notion of ‘civilisation as a moral milieu’ is a powerful and 
compelling one. By contrast, the conditions and agreements 
demanded by Google, for example, require centuries of human 
legal practice to be set aside in favour of what she calls 
‘Uncontracts,’ (Zuboff, 2019). These are forced ‘agreements’ created 
by the “positivist calculations of automated machine processes.” In 
place of human qualities such as dialogue, problem solving and 
empathy, the ‘Uncontract’ leads back to ‘the blankness of perpetual 
compliance’ referred to above (Zuboff, 2019, p. 334-6). The ‘right to 
sanctuary’ is also of primary significance (Zuboff, 2019). It is among 
the most ancient of human rights and thus of vital and enduring 
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value. But it is far from impregnable when ‘physical places, 
including our homes are increasingly saturated with informational 
violations as our lives are rendered as behaviour and expropriated 
as surplus,’ (Zuboff, 2019). Moreover, the power of Big Other 
‘outruns society and law in a self-authorised destruction of (this 
right) as it overwhelms considerations of justice with its tactical 
mastery of shock and awe,’ (Zuboff, 2019). What is required, 
therefore, are ‘new forms of countervailing authority and power,’ 
(Zuboff, 2019). In place of a swelling ‘social void’ this depth critique 
envisages both ‘direct challenges’ to the power of Surveillance 
Capitalism and a commitment to ‘new forms of creative action’ 
(Zuboff, 2019, p.479-86).  Zuboff (2019) also advances a number of 
broad suggestions about what, in her view, needs to be done to 
rein in Surveillance Capitalism (SC). In summary they include: 
 
• Naming and establishing our bearings, re-awakening our 
astonishment and sharing a sense of righteous dignity. 
• Giving voice to our collective outrage and refusal of the 
diminished futures on offer. 
• Becoming alert to the historical contingency of SC by 
calling attention to ordinary values and expectations that 
existed before it began its campaign of psychic numbing. 
• Establishing new centres of countervailing civic power 
equipped with laws that reject the fundamental legitimacy 
of SC’s declarations and interrupt its most basic 
operations (Zuboff, 2019, p.395-421). 
A new regulatory regime equipped with adequate laws will clearly 
take time and effort to achieve. Of the three key suggestions that 
Zuboff makes at least two are based on historical precedents: 
First, interrupt and outlaw surveillance capitalism’s data supplies 
and revenue flows. This means, at the front end, outlawing the 
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secret theft of private experience. At the back end, we can disrupt 
revenues by outlawing markets that trade in human futures 
knowing that their imperatives are fundamentally 
anti-democratic… Second, research over the past decade suggests 
that when ‘users; are informed of surveillance capitalism’s 
backstage operations, they want protection, and they want 
alternatives. We need laws and regulation designed to advantage 
companies that want to break with surveillance capitalism… Third, 
lawmakers will need to support new forms of collective action, just 
as nearly a century ago workers won legal protection for their rights 
to organise, to bargain collectively and to strike. Lawmakers need 
citizen support, and citizens need the leadership of their elected 
officials (Zuboff, 2019b). 
Kathy Cook’s exploration of the psychology of Silicon Valley 
identified similar points of clarity and reached similar conclusions. 
She confirmed that we are facing an ‘unprecedented transition,’ 
(Cook, 2020). Related to this is a strong belief that that ‘tech cannot 
fix itself.’ For her ‘the notion that more tech is the answer to bad 
tech is psychologically curious, irrational and self-serving; yet it 
happens constantly, not only within the tech industry, but within 
society,’ (Cook, 2020). She adds that ‘our increased reliance on 
technical solutions is rooted in a cultural narrative that purports 
the boundless power of technology’ (Cook, 2020, p.233). Clearly the 
embedded symbolic power of such cultural narratives also needs 
to be accounted for and moderated. What might be called the ‘dual 
nature’ of technology also helps clarify why the values, beliefs and 
practices that drive its use in these forms won’t be corrected by 
its promoters and developers. A staff writer for The Atlantic who 
attended a 2020 Las Vegas consumer electronics show concluded 
that all available ‘solutions’ on offer involved the use of yet more 
technology. Given that most existing forms have known faults and 
costs, she emerged with a strong sense that this high-tech industry 
was  less concerned with solving real problems than ‘capitalising on 
the anxieties of the affluent.’ As such it clearly fits a wider pattern. 
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(Mull 2020). To be at all useful initiatives must originate elsewhere. 
Hence Cook’s (2020) instance on: 
 
• Understanding what went wrong in the first place. 
• Understanding the psychology and values driving the 
industry … (in the belief that) that the world can be a 
better place; and, 
• Working to ensure the industry moves forward with 
better values and healthier psych norms (which, in turn) 
requires a revisioning of the tech industry’s ethical 
foundations. 
Snowdon’s (2019) account originated within the privileged spaces 
of the intelligence community. He saw how, under the pressure of 
the 9/11 attack and a renewed sense of threat, the character of 
that ‘intelligence’ gained new and problematic features (Snowdon, 
2019). This is where events in Silicon Valley connect back directly 
to themes, narratives, values and priorities in the wider culture of 
the US. It is a nation that has a long track record of sponsoring 
ideologies, trends and, indeed, technologies without paying a great 
deal of attention to the likely consequences.  Snowdon (2019) is 
far from alone in wanting us to ‘reclaim our data’ and, in so doing, 
take active steps to avoid the kind of diminished future that his 
own experiences have led him to fear. As noted, Doctorow (2020) 
has a closer, more fine-grained view of the structures, processes 
and products of the IT revolution and he sees ‘fake news’ as a 
particularly serious existential crisis. His main concern is to bring 
back anti-trust regulation in order to reduce or eliminate the 
extremes of monopoly power. 
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TURNING THE TIDE? 
Steps are slowly being taken that seek to challenge and limit the 
power of the Internet Oligarchs. They’re driven by actors in several 
countries working on behalf of governance and civil society. For 
example, during 2019 the French data watchdog fined Google 
Euro50m ‘for failing to provide users with transparent and 
understandable information on its data use policies’ (Hern, 2019). 
The European Union (EU) has flexed its regulatory muscles on 
several occasions in relation to privacy, taxation and monopolistic 
behaviour and especially via General Data Protection Regulation 
(Wikipedia, 2020). The UK has begun the process of establishing 
critical infrastructure to enforce a new raft of regulations. It 
includes a new Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) that 
contains a dedicated Digital Markets Unit (DMU) with the power 
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to levy serious fines upon companies that fail to abide by the 
new rules. Even the USA, which has been so slow to react, has 
shown signs of following suit. For example, in October 2020 the US 
justice department sued Google for illegal monopoly in the online 
search market. In December the US Federal Trade Commission 
sued Facebook for breaking anti-trust laws and threatening to 
break it up into smaller units (Canon, 2020). Only time will tell if 
Congress will have the courage to repeal the infamous Section 230 
of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 mentioned above. In 
the absence of strong and coordinated regulatory efforts, however, 
attempts by individual nations to enforce a comprehensive 
international tax regime upon the oligarchs have proved ineffectual 
thus far. 
During 2020 the Australian government took several small but 
significant steps. It confronted Google and Facebook and forced 
them to compensate news organisations for the loss of their 
advertising income and the illegal use of their material (Spears, 
2020). Concerns were also expressed about how children and 
young people in particular are exposed to both the opportunities 
and the very real dangers of the on-line world. Cyber bullying is 
of particular concern (Ham, 2020). Very young children are 
particularly vulnerable since they have no defence against the 
digital incursions that have occurred through children’s TV 
programs, games, YouTube and so on. During late 2020 a report 
surfaced about the fact that ‘always on’ digital assistants in the 
home were attracting the attention of very young who were 
unconsciously providing family information to the remote listeners 
(Tapper, 2020). In response the Australian government announced 
that it would create an ‘online harms bill’ to augment other 
measures such as its existing ‘e-safety’ site. The very real threat 
of direct exploitation of children and young people for criminal 
purposes also led to increased support to the Australian Federal 
Police (AFP). This was part of an even larger grant of AUD$1.66 
billion for a cyber-security package provided to the AFP to help 
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the nation defend itself from the growing threat of cybercrime and 
cyberwar (Galloway, 2020). Tangible results did not take long to 
appear. 
In mid-2021 the AFP, in collaboration with the FBI, revealed an 
undercover sting operation known as ‘Ironside’ that severely 
disrupted prominent drug cartels, uncovered large amounts of 
illegal drugs and of money and led to multiple arrests both in 
Australia and overseas. Instead of being frustrated by the co-option 
of encryption technology by criminals, law enforcement had turned 
it to positive use by clandestinely making the AnOm app available 
to them. Messaging between criminal networks previously 
considered ‘secure’ proved to be anything but. The operation not 
only led to many arrests it also demonstrated that law enforcement 
would, henceforth, be there in the background using the very latest 
tech themselves. It was a watershed moment. While what Peter 
Harcher calls the ‘cat and mouse game’ will certainly continue, 
criminal organsations everywhere were placed on notice that they 
were no longer as safe as they’d assumed (Harcher, 2021). 
Taken at face value such practical responses on the part of 
various Western governments may appear to support the notion 
that the ‘tide’ may indeed be turning. Yet 2020 was not merely 
another year. Covid-19 pandemic was a classic ‘wild card’ familiar 
to futurists and foresight practitioners. As is well known it impacted 
humanity with all the force of an unstoppable biological hurricane. 
Under the pressure of necessity large numbers of people were 
driven online. Almost everyone learned how to use Zoom but few 
grasped how increased dependence on an already dysfunctional 
system would place them at greater long term risk. In the midst 
of a torrent of unwelcome change it’s all too easy to lose one’s 
bearings. All of which evokes a playbook and a text that is decidedly 
less optimistic. As Klein (2017) explains in her analysis of ‘disaster 
capitalism,’ it is during just such times of shock and disruption, 
while public attention is diverted, that powerful entities quietly but 
actively pursue their own specific interests. 
RESISTANCE AND RENEWAL 183
As Covid-19 proceeded physical money almost disappeared only 
to be replaced by digital alternatives such as card and ‘contactless’ 
payments. Few were disposed to consider the longer-term costs 
of a cash-starved society, but they are considerable, especially for 
informal uses and the poor (Kale, 2020). They include greater 
anxiety for, and increasing exploitation of, unbanked people; fewer 
options for women fleeing abusive relationships; and reduced 
funding for for charities that previously relied on physical money 
for their cash flow. Overall, the wider public becomes more fully 
locked into a private banking system from which they have no 
escape and decreasing autonomy (Kale, 2020). Many organisations 
dispensed with offices requiring decision-makers and other 
employees to work from home and meet ‘virtually.’ Once again, the 
products and services offered by the Internet giants took centre 
stage and few involuntary ‘customers’ had time or opportunity to 
think beyond the moment. Journalist Anna Krien (2020), however, 
took a close look at the online ‘distance learning’ arrangements 
adopted by many schools during the pandemic. She found 
disturbing connections between companies like Apple and 
Microsoft, whose dedicated delivery platforms and content were 
widely taken up by schools and parents alike. During school visits 
she expressed her growing concerns, but to little avail. Since these 
companies had been courting them quietly for years it was easy 
for schools to slip all-too-readily into using commercially designed 
packages rather than those created by educators according to 
educational criteria (Krien, 2020). 
Ronald Deibert (2020) and the Citizen Lab at the University of 
Toronto have considered these and similar questions. In their view 
too much attention has been focused on micro-issues, such as 
the uses and misuses of particular apps. Meanwhile, ‘an entire 
landscape has been shifting beneath our feet.’ Specifically, and in 
relation to the pandemic they suggest that: 
This explosion of pandemic-era applications will invariably amplify 
the defects of the mobile marketing and location tracking industry 
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– a sector made up mostly of bottom-feeder companies whose 
business model relies on collecting billions of user-generated data 
points, later sold and repackaged to advertisers, law enforcement, 
the military, customs and border agencies, and private security 
services (not to mention bounty hunters and other dubious 
characters). A shocking number of entrepreneurs and policy 
makers are nonetheless turning to this cesspool of parasitic firms 
– poorly regulated and highly prone to abuses – as a proposed 
pandemic solution… The entire ecosystem presents a bonanza for 
petty criminals, ransomware opportunists, spyware firms and 
highly sophisticated nation-state spies alike (Deibert, 2020). 
Moreover, such concerns are unlikely to recede once the pandemic 
is over. Indeed: 
Some argue that this COVID-19-era innovation cycle will pass once 
there is a vaccine. But the more we embrace and habituate to 
these new applications, the deeper their tentacles reach into our 
everyday lives and the harder it will be to walk it all back. The 
“new normal” that will emerge after COVID-19 is not a one-off, 
bespoke contact-tracing app. Rather, it is a world that normalizes 
remote surveillance tools such as Proctorio, where private homes 
are transformed into ubiquitously monitored workplaces and 
where shady biometric start-ups and data analytics companies feed 
off the footloose biosurveillance economy (Deibert, 2020). 
This raises the very real question as to just how societies already 
weakened by the virus and its multi-faceted aftermath will be able 
to gather the will, imagination, resources and organisational 
capacity to somehow ‘disembed’ themselves from these very same 
devices and systems. As mentioned in a previous chapter there is 
one country where a very different dynamic has been underway 
for some time. For reasons best known to itself, the Chinese 
government has already exceeded the predations and incursions of 
Western Internet Oligarchs into civil society and is proceeding with 
the construction its very own high-tech digital dystopia. The retreat 
of American leadership over recent decades and the impacts of the 
pandemic have allowed it to proceed with its strangely arid and 
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inhuman desire for complete state manipulation and control of its 
population. A valuable study by Khalil on Digital Authoritarianism 
examines how China viewed the pandemic as a ‘proof of concept’ 
opportunity to show that ‘its technology with ‘Chinese 
characteristics’ works and that surveillance on this scale and in an 
emergency is feasible and effective.’  She continues: 
With the CCP’s digital authoritarianism flourishing at home, 
Chinese-engineered surveillance and tracking systems are now 
being exported around the globe in line with China’s Superpower 
Strategy. China is attempting to set new norms in digital rights, 
privacy, and data collection, simultaneously suppressing dissent at 
home and promoting the CCP’s geostrategic goals.’  Khalil considers 
this dangerous for other countries since it may well ‘result in a 
growing acceptance of mass surveillance, habituation to 
restrictions on liberties, and fewer checks on the collective use 
of personal data by the state, even after the public health crisis 
subsides.’ (Khalil, 2020). 
An obvious lesson to be drawn from this particularly dangerous 
precedent is the greatly increased need for Democratic nations to 
work together and be ‘vigilant in setting standards and preserving 
citizens’ rights and liberties.’ If anything, it adds urgency and 
salience for the free nations of the world to get their own houses 
in order and, in so doing, present a common front. What will this 
take? 
As discussed earlier, it’s useful to consider responses at several 
levels of aggregation, each of which may be appropriate to different 
tasks and actors.  Effective coordination between different levels 
and types of response would certainly increase the chances that 
more effective options for de-coding and re-constituting the matrix 
will emerge. At the individual level, for example, we’ve already seen 
how, over the past two decades, powerful insights have constantly 
emerged from the efforts, the sense of agency and commitment, 
of particular individuals. Of the many others that could be included 
we should mention Tim Berners-Lee’s Contract for the Internet, 
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Pascale’s New Laws of Robotics and author Dave Eggers bid to 
re-imagine the UN Declaration of Human Rights are worthy of 
mention (Sample, 2019; Funnell, 2020; Eggers, 2018). At the next 
level progressive community organisations play a strongly 
facilitative role. While some, such as the Oxford Internet Institute 
and the University of Toronto’s Citizen Lab, are located overseas, 
Australia also happens to be well-resourced in this area. For 
example, the Australia Institute hosts the Centre for Responsible 
Technology which published The Public Square Project (Guiao & 
Lewis, 2021). The report usefully identifies a number of vital themes 
and strategies for creating and extending public digital 
infrastructure. Similarly, a related organisation known as Digital 
Rights Watch also speaks for civil society by, for example, seeking 
a ban on facial recognition systems and the ‘microtargeting’ of 
individuals for political or commercial gain. Both organisations 
have active campaigns underway in relation to such matters and 
are easily located online. Finally, we’ve noted that government 
agencies have not been idle. We have recent, highly relevant proof 
that Australian citizens and organisations have the active support 
of powerful digital defence capabilities at the national level to 
moderate digital crime and cyber-aggression. Nor has the 
Australian Human Rights Commission been idle as its final and 
substantial report to the government, Human Rights and Technology, 
clearly demonstrates (Santow, 2021).  In summary, while such 
contributions may be far from the public mind at any particular 
time, they are each vital players in the fight to ‘delete dystopia.’ 
Other, perhaps less obvious, factors may also serve to focus 
and undergird these efforts. For example, one of the most serious 
charges to be laid against the internet oligarchs, their supporters, 
investors and other interested parties is that in pursuit of unlimited 
self-interest they have worked to sustain an environment 
characterised by stress, conflict and confusion when what the times 
call for are clarity, integrity and far-sighted care. Yet at present, 
few seem to be explicitly aware that none of these over-confident, 
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over-powerful entities possess anything remotely like a social 
licence for the intensive extractive and merchandising procedures 
they’ve undertaken, or for the many unauthorised uses to which 
this stolen ‘behavioural surplus’ has been put. To say nothing of 
those who divert high-tech equipment and expertise to support 
openly criminal enterprises. A case in point is the way that Mexican 
drug cartels are reported to have purchased hightech spyware 
from their country’s own police force (Schillis-Gallego & Lakhani, 
2020).  In principle, therefore, democratic agencies have every right 
to strip them of their illegitimately acquired dominance and power. 
There is certainly a huge task of institutional innovation and 
‘back-filling’ to accomplish first. Ironically enough, some parts of the 
necessary institutional infrastructure do not need to be re-created 
from scratch. It may be recalled that back in 1972 an Office of 
Technology Assessment (OTA) was established to advise the US 
Congress on the ‘complex scientific and technical issues of the 
late 20th Century.’ By 1995 it had produced studies on a wide 
range of topics including ‘acid rain, health care, climate change 
and polygraphs.’ It was highly successful and widely emulated yet 
abolished in 1995 by the Reagan administration which claimed 
it was ‘unnecessary’ (Wikipedia, 2015). The point is that, prior to 
the emergence of the IT revolution and the development of 
surveillance capitalism, prevailing political elites in the US chose to 
eliminate this core institutional capability leaving the nation (and 
world) ever more vulnerable to the unanticipated costs of high-tech 
innovation (and, as we now know to our cost, entirely foreseeable 
events such as global pandemics). Almost three decades on 
Institutions of Foresight (IoFs) remain uncommon. Very few nations 
have a high-quality foresight capability installed at the national 
level to advise governments on the issues such as those discussed 
here.  But this could change fast if what has been learned from 
previous iterations were to be taken up and consistently applied. 
In the absence of high-quality scanning, foresight and technology 
assessment societies remain profoundly vulnerable to a wide 
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variety of future hazards. These obviously include further 
high-impact technological innovations and their accompanying 
disruptions. This is particularly the case with poorer and less 
developed nations such as the Pacific Islands which, at the time of 
writing, were about to be connected to the internet by high-speed 
undersea cable. Needless to say, scant preparation for the ensuing 
social and cultural impacts had been carried out (Higginbothom, 
2020). This particular example is a reminder that there are still 
few or no effective, non-commercial, ‘filters,’ ‘barriers’ or ‘testing / 
proving grounds’ through which new technologies and applications 
are required to pass prior to implementation. 
The steady rise of Artificial Intelligence (AI) is among the most 
serious issues of concern, especially when united with new 
generations of high-tech weapons (Chan, 2019).  Google’s Deep 
Mind project generates headlines each time it makes new 
discoveries but as the property of a vast private company it raises 
far more questions than it answers. For example, a 2020 Guardian 
editorial in noted that ‘Only 25% of AI papers publish their code. 
DeepMind, say experts, regularly does not.’ Lanier goes as far as 
to suggest that AI should be seen less as a technology than as an 
ideology. The core of the ideology is that a suite of technologies, 
designed by a small technical elite, can and should become 
autonomous from and eventually replace, rather than 
complement, not just individual humans but much of humanity’ 
(Lanier, 2020). Similar issues also proliferate in the open market as 
consumer electronics become more complex and powerful. Apple 
has, for example, been working to develop its ‘consumer smart 
glasses’ without reference to any substantive external foresight 
evaluation. These devices are intended to be worn like regular 
glasses but include a visible layer of digital information known as 
AR (Artificial Reality). While this may sound useful it raises profound 
questions indeed not merely about data access, privacy, regulation 
and so on, but about the kind of ‘cyborg’ society that would result. 
If, as suggested here, current IT frameworks and installations are 
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frequently pernicious and defective, we need ways of enquiring at 
the social level whether such devices have any legitimate place at 
all in our lives, let alone those of our children. 
AR glasses would not be free standing. They would become one 
of countless other devices engaged in what’s being called ‘world 
scraping.’ That is, the constant recording and up-loading of 
information on more or less everything. It was referred to by one IT 
developer as ‘a big tech dream – and a privacy activist’s nightmare.’ 
He added that: 
Smart glasses turn people into walking CCTV cameras, and the data 
a company could gather from that is mindboggling. Every time 
someone went to a supermarket, their smart glasses would be 
recording pricing data, stock levels and browsing habits; every time 
they opened a newspaper, their glasses would know which stories 
they read, which adverts they looked at and which pictures they 
lingered on (Hern, 2020). 
In this context the need for more appropriate values, enhanced 
worldviews and a new sense of reality and purpose is paramount. 
New institutions and institutional settings are required to provide 
the means by which societies can refresh their view of the past, 
present and possible futures. The hard questions are indeed right 
there in plain sight. How, for example, can a society ‘find its 
bearings’ without putting in place learning contexts in which the 
broad issues of history, the constitution of the present and the 
span of possible future options can be freely examined and 
discussed? How can any social entity make considered choices 
about its present commitments and aspirations for the future 
without access to high quality, dedicated foresight capabilities and 
services? How can anyone gain a critical purchase on existing and 
new technologies without the embodied social capacity to do so? 
It takes years of effort and application to produce highly trained 
people who qualify as pathfinders and guides to the chaos ahead. 
None of these things can happen until societies wake up to the 
existential predicament that humanity has created for itself. But 
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there are distinct signs of hope. The ‘pushback’ against the Internet 
as a medium of extraction, exploitation and abuse has already 
progressed from a few lonely voices to a growing chorus of dissent. 
If the means can be rapidly put in place to invest in state backed, 
cooperatively owned and operated social media, the Oligarchs can 
be retired from history.  They will become redundant as the 
character and functions of IT shift from one cultural universe 
(invasion, dispossession and exploitation) to another (respectful 
fulfillment of authentic needs). 
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Conclusion 
The sleeping giant is one name for the public; when it wakes up, when 
we wake up, we are no longer only the public: we are civil society, 
the superpower whose nonviolent means are sometimes, for a shining 
moment, more powerful than violence, more powerful than regimes 
and armies. We write history with our feet and with our presence and 
our collective voice and vision (Solnit, 2016). 
Tech companies have had a monopoly on utopian thinking for their 
own benefit, defining them as large-scale top-down projects requiring 
submission to capital’s desires. But this means that resisting them can 
also become a large-scale project, a utopian project that touches us all 
and includes us all (Sadowski, 2021). 
This book has argued that current trends are far from inevitable. 
Intimations of dystopia are best viewed as warnings that inspire us 
in many different ways to take decisive action. ‘Deleting Dystopia’ is 
not about working to eliminate a powerful idea but, rather, getting 
behind those human and social forces that collectively move us 
away from its realisation as a radically diminished condition of 
human life. ‘Understanding the matrix’ is a vital and necessary 
step in that direction. But ‘technology’ per se is not the only, or 
main concern. Interior human characteristics such as ignorance, 
greed, self-regard and what E.O. Wilson once called our ‘paleolithic 
obstinacy’ have affected the trajectory of human development 
every bit as much as any conceivable array of devices and tools. 
The compromised condition of the Internet suggests that they are 
still doing so today. Navigating around a global, high-tech dystopia 
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confronts humanity with one of its most difficult and challenging 
tasks. It also suggests a new or renewed emphasis on the most 
positive and inclusive human qualities such as foresight, 
self-knowledge, empathy and perceptiveness. Which is why 
developmental psychology, integral theory and related fields 
constitute vital assets at this time (Gidley, 2017; Slaughter, 2012). 
Throughout this period countless warnings have been voiced 
about the failure of humanity to come to terms with the 
implications of its growing impacts on the global system. In 
September 2020, in the middle of a global pandemic, the United 
Nations (UN) published a ‘state of nature’ report which revealed 
that the world had failed to meet any of the targets set decade 
earlier to stem the tide of destruction (Greenfield, 2020). The UN’s 
head of biodiversity was quoted as saying that ‘Earth’s living 
systems as a whole are being compromised… The more humanity 
exploits nature in unsustainable ways and undermines its 
contributions to people, the more we undermine our own 
wellbeing, security and prosperity’ (Greenfield, 2020).  We know 
that coral reefs are disappearing while glaciers and ice sheets are 
melting at alarming rates. The declines in wildlife populations have 
been precipitous over the last half-century even as humanity’s 
population has exploded from around 2 to over 7 billion people. 
We know that in relation to the remaining ‘carbon budget’ (the 
amount of CO2 that can be put into the atmosphere) humanity has 
no more than a decade to avoid the chaos of irreversible global 
heating (IPCC, 2021). The environment is, of course, ‘only’ one 
source of long-term systemic risk but our health and well-being 
depend entirely upon it. 
The sober fact is that many human / cultural / technical 
combinations are unsuccessful and disaster-prone (Oreskes & 
Conway, 2016; Diamond, 2005). This is certainly the case within 
our fractured present when extreme degrees of self-regard took 
flight within a socially sanctioned economic system designed to 
maximise private profit at all costs. This, in turn, occurred within 
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an over-confident, expansionist worldview that encouraged the 
world’s richest nations to believe that they had the right to 
promulgate a limitless economy of acquisition and greed. In order 
to sustain the illusion, dominant players gave themselves 
permission to view the world as little more than a vast array of 
resources offering endless extractive opportunities and infinite 
wealth. A process that continues up to this day regardless of global 
heating and rother well-known hazards. (Neate, 2019). 
Few realised at the time that the design template perfected in 
1950s America contained no limiting principle and had tended 
toward ‘overshoot and collapse’ from the very outset (Slaughter, 
2010).  Yet it was within these very specific human and 
technological circumstances that the IT revolution took root. The 
ruthlessness of raw capitalist imperatives, along with the radically 
limited value set of the oligarchs, encouraged them to grow rich 
by invading unprotected human space. The defects and dangers 
associated with these particular human and cultural combinations 
were and are well known and obvious, but the voices of those who 
understood them, and sought alternatives, were overwhelmed. 
Pathways to other and more viable human futures were 
deliberately cast aside. The result is a world in which extractive 
hyper-cultures are failing, having reached the early stages of their 
own entropic breakdown (Wallace-Wells, 2019). 
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The key to moving forward is a paradigmatic shift, or several, 
from passively accepting the views of reality tenaciously 
promulgated by Silicon Valley and its agents toward a different 
reality altogether. Views based on broader, more embracing 
worldviews and life-affirming values provide far more productive 
starting points. It’s time to replace the self-centred and defective 
values of the Internet oligarchs with others that respect our 
common humanity and the fragility of the world upon which we 
depend. Together these provide a more appropriate and durable 
basis for civilised life. The proposition that knits together so much 
of what needs to be done is that the IT revolution has been wild, 
unauthorised, secretive and subversive of our humanity and our 
world. 
The practical shift away from what is already a ‘failed future’ has 
two parts. The first is to comprehensively deny continued, ‘rubber 
stamp’ social validation to the Internet oligarchs. It was never theirs 
to begin with. This means creating and enforcing new or renewed 
CONCLUSION 195
rules and regulations upon a recalcitrant and self-serving sector. 
We have seen that some governments have already started on this 
path. The second pathway, which again already has its champions 
and start-ups-in-waiting, is to transfer or duplicate the most socially 
useful parts of their operations from closed private infrastructures 
to a range of civil equivalents, each equipped with suitable codes 
of practice operating exclusively in the public interest. It is indeed 
an opportunity to ‘reset and rethink the entire technological 
ecosystem from the ground up’ (Deibert, 2020). None of this, 
however, is a quick fix. It will take time and there will be setbacks 
along the road. The goal, however, is clear: an international IT 
system that is benign, effective, respectful and safe for each and 
every legitimate need or purpose. 
The future before us continues to look threatening not because 
of any built-in necessity but because societies, and those in 
positions of power and authority, have still not woken up to the 
full costs of raw, unrestrained capitalism and the very real threats 
that now confront humanity. Does it make sense to stand by and 
passively watch the world’s most powerful organisations carelessly 
generate new waves of technological disruption regardless of the 
consequences? If so, we can say farewell to what remains of our 
environment, our autonomy, our privacy and humanity. If not, then 
we need to act together without further delay. 
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The Language of Shoshana Zuboff 
“Every threat to human autonomy begins with an assault on 
awareness.” 
DEFINITIONS 
Behavioural futures markets 
A new kind of marketplace for behavioural predictions. 
Behavioural surplus 
Raw data that is scraped or extracted from human experience 
and fed into a variety of manufacturing processes. 
Big other 
The transformation of the market into a technologically enabled 
project of total certainty and control that is unimaginable outside 
of the digital milieu and surveillance capitalism. 
Conditioning 
Method of inducing behaviour change. Encourages use of 
‘schedules of reinforcement’ that are used to reliably shape 
behavioural routines. 
Data exhaust 
The ‘spare’ or unused data that in the very early days clogged 
Google’s filters and had little value but later became available for 
extraction and use. 
Digital dystopia 
A condition of society in which the imperatives of technical 
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development have overtaken and overwhelmed those that 
promote human and cultural development. Utilitarian impulses 
(such as efficiency, prediction and control) become widely applied 
to human beings and ways of life. Supports misguided and 
untenable association between technical change and social 
development. Becomes incoherent since such phenomena 
effectively constitute different worlds. Also contains the seeds of 
its own failure by ignoring, or seeking to eliminate, in-built human 
requirements for autonomy and freedom from oppression. 
Economies of action 
Brought into play as a consequence of new methods that go 
beyond tracking, capturing, analysing and predicting behaviour. 
Economies of scale in surplus accumulation 
The consequence of automated systems that track, hunt and 
induce more behavioural surplus. 
Economies of scope, scale, variation and volume 
Required by more powerful prediction products. Occurs along 
two dimensions: extension (across a wide range of activities) and 
depth (of predictive detail within each activity). 
Extraction imperative, the 
A dynamic that became established as ‘machine intelligence’ 
increased the ability to produce ‘better,’ ie. more effective, 
prediction products. 
Herding 
 A common form of mass manipulation that relies on controlling 
key elements in peoples’ immediate context. Enables remote 
orchestration of human situations, forecloses alternatives and 
shifts behaviour in specific ways toward desired ends. 
 Means of behavioural modification 
Machine processes, techniques and tactics designed to shape 
individual, group and population behaviour in ways that 
continuously improve their approximation to guaranteed 
outcomes. Also see tuning, herding and conditioning. 
Prediction imperative 
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Became a strategic necessity as increased competition drove 
supply challenges to new levels. 
 Prediction products 
Fabricated data that is used to predict what you do now, soon 
and later. 
Two texts (1) the forward text 
Those aspects of the on-line world that users can see, use and 
be consciously aware of. They include software interfaces, design 
features of compelling websites, ‘like’ buttons and related devices 
to support user engagement Otherwise known as ‘the bait.’ 
Two texts (2) the shadow text 
The vast hidden world of dedicated machine intelligence that 
facilitates the ‘extraction imperative.’ Comprised of a vast network 
of AI applications that exclusively serve the owners of the system 
and are devoid of broader oversight and regulation. Contains depth 
knowledge about users but is unseen by, and unavailable to, them. 
Puppet and puppet master 
The ‘puppet’ is a device such as a mobile phone, security camera 
or other ‘smart’ device (such as a TV) that appears to operate 
according to its proximate owner’s bidding. But it actually operates 
according to the ‘designed-in’ dictates and hidden imperatives 
installed by the ‘puppet masters’ who ‘pull the stings’ in remote and 
unseen ways. 
Rendition 
A process in which something is formed out of something else 
that is previously given. Also refers to the way the original is 
transformed to something else in the process. Applies to all human 
products, needs and processes that are subject to the competition 
for surveillance revenues. 
Right to the future tense 
Based on the freedom of will, the openness of the future and the 
notion of civilisation as a ‘moral milieu.’ 
Right to sanctuary 
Elemental human right to be free of oppression and invasion. 
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Aligned with right to justice. Under extreme and sustained threat 
from big other’s ‘digital dystopia’ and the rise of untamed and 
unregulated conditions. 
Surveillance capitalism (SC) 
A mutant form of capitalism that unilaterally claims human 
experience as free raw material. 
 Surveillance revenues 
Extremely large sums of money generated within the hidden 
economy facilitated by ‘surveillance capitalism’ based on the 
extraction and use of private information for unlimited exploitation 
and use. A kind of ‘parallel economy’ that exerts hidden, mostly 
malign, pressures on ‘real’ economies based on the tangible 
exchange of goods and services. Similar in many respects to the 
parallel ‘negative economy’ of speculative financialisation and with 
equally disturbing real-world consequences. 
Social media 
Electronically enabled and thus highly attenuated interactions 
between people at a distance. Highly attractive, especially to the 
young, at superficial levels. Has become increasingly dangerous 
and divisive. For example, facilitating the invasion of private lives, 
demonising individuals, ethnic and other groups, facilitating the 
rise of disinformation, hatred and extremism. A classic case of 
applying a technology far too soon before its wider costs were 
properly appreciated. 
Tuning 
The use of subliminal cues designed to shape the flow of 
behaviour at specific times and places for maximum influence. 
Closely related to Nudging and Choice Architecture, both of which 
refer to situations designed to alter people’s behaviour in 
predictable and pre-programmed ways. 
Uncontract 
Contributes to ‘economies of action’ by leveraging the wealth 
created though ‘behavioural surplus’ to pre-empt and foreclose 
other alternatives. Replaces the indeterminacy of open-ended 
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social processes with pre-programmed machine processes, thus 
undermining human autonomy. Hence represents the annihilation 
of contract per se. 
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Useful resources 
Useful resources 
Australian Centre to Counter Child Exploitation: https://www.accce.gov.au 
Australian eSafety Commissioner: https://www.esafety.gov.au 
Australian Human Rights Commission: 
https://humanrights.gov.au/?_ga=2.105525635.1073371494.1623023089-213867029.1622
423351 
Australia Institute. Centre for Responsible Technology, Programs: 
https://www.centreforresponsibletechnology.org.au/foundation_programs 
Australia Institute. Centre for Responsible Technology, Public Square Project: 
https://australiainstitute.org.au/report/the-public-square-project/ 
Citizen Lab, University of Toronto: https://citizenlab.ca 
Digital Rights Watch: https://digitalrightswatch.org.au 
Human Rights and Technology, Final Report (2021): https://tech.humanrights.gov.au/
downloads?_ga=2.130363209.758525281.1622423351-213867029.1622423351 
Oxford Internet Institute: https://www.oii.ox.ac.uk 
Public Square Project Report, April 2021: https://australiainstitute.org.au/wp-content/
uploads/2021/04/210428-public-square-paper-WEB.pdf 
Reset Australia: https://au.reset.tech 
Ron Deibert, Berkman Klein Centre, Harvard University: https://cyber.harvard.edu/
node/91536 
Shoshana Zuboff: https://shoshanazuboff.com/book/shoshana/ 
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The Emerging Technology Lab, Monash University: https://www.monash.edu/
emerging-tech-research-lab 
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